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PREFACE
The general problem in this work is to examine and 
assess the influence of existentialist philosophy on 
contemporary theological thought, and this is illustrated 
from the particular case of the influence of Heidegger 
on Bultmann.
In the Introduction the problem is stated, and a 
sketch is given of the existential approach to theology. 
This approach is defended on three grounds. These are: 
l) the right of the apologist to make use of current 
philosophical concepts; 2) a special relation between 
existentialism and the work of theology; 3) an affinity 
between the concepts of existentialism and those of 
Biblical thought.
The main body of the work falls into two parts, 
reflecting a division found both in Heidegger’s 
”Sein und Zeit” and in Bultmann1 s ”Theologie des Neuen 
Testaments.” The first part considers Heidegger*s 
analysis of inauthentic existence in relation to 
Bultmann*s exposition of the Mew Testament teaching on 
man, showing the close connection between the two, 
and making critical comment where necessary. The 
subjects covered are man in the world, understanding,
anxiety, fallenness and sin, care, death. This concludes 
the analysis of inauthentic existence.
The second part is concerned with Heidegger's idea 
of an authentic existence in relation to Bultmann’s 
exposition of the Christian life as a new understanding 
of the self. Beginning from the problem of the transition 
from inauthentic to authentic existence, the argument 
goes on to consider the historical element in Christianity 
in relation to Heidegger’s philosophy of history and 
Bultmann’s views on demythologising, and ends with the 
analysis of the life of faith and the problem of 
authentic individual existence in the community.
The Conclusion attempts to summarise the results of 
the inquiry. Bultmann’s place in the development of 
twentieth-century theology is indicated, and the value 
of his contribution assessed.
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CHAPTER I
THE RELATION OP THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF EXISTENCE TO THEOLOGY
1. Philosophical Influences upon Theological Thought.
Whether for good or ill, it is a fact that throughout 
its history Christian theology has fallen at various 
times under the influence of different secular philo­
sophies. Even in the New Testament there are passages 
Which seem to betray Gnostic influence. Prom Justin 
Martyr to Augustine, the early theologians drew freely 
on Greek sources, especially Plato, for their theological 
work. Thomas Aquinas made use of the philosophy of 
Aristotle in his exposition of the Christian faith.
Butler shows in his writings the influence of eighteenth 
century rationalism. In the nineteenth century 
theology fell under the spell of Hegelian idealism, 
and later it was influenced by ideas stemming from 
the new scientific theories.
In all these cases we see an apologetic motive at 
work. The theologians were trying to find a point of 
entry into the contemporary mind in order that they
3might be able to present the Christian faith in tenns 
intelligible to their own age. They therefore made use 
of current philosophical concepts even when these were 
drawn from systems of thought quite alien to Christianity.
The apologetic purpose of the theologians who 
have been mentioned was, in general, sucessfully accom­
plished. The early apologists were faced with the challenge 
of pagan philosophy; Thomas Aquinas by that of the 
Averroism of the mediaeval universities; Butler by that 
pf deism. All of them by the skilful use of contemporary 
philosophical ideas restated the historic Christian faith 
in such a way as to win a hearing for it in their own 
time. But more than that, it may be said also that all 
of them made contributions of permanent value to 
theological thought, because they themselves won a 
deeper understanding of Christian truth through their 
work.
Clearly however there are grave dangers inherent 
in this way of theologising. The peril is threefold/ 
Pre-occupation with a secular philosophy and the employ­
ment of it in the interpretation of the Christian faith • 
may easily lead to the distortion of Christian teaching 
through the over-emphasis of those elements in it
4which happen to he specially congenial to the philosophy 
concerned. Or again, ideas quite foreign to Christianity 
may slip into its theology while masquerading under the 
guise of traditional Christian terminology. At worst, 
there may he, a plain accommodation of the Christian . 
faith to the prevailing philosophical fashion of the 
age.
It can he argued that these dangerous possibilities 
were in fact realised when Christian theology fell under 
the influence of Hegelian idealism, and it can he even 
'more forcibly contended that much in the movement known 
as liberal modernism was motivated by the idea that at 
all costs the Christian faith must be so interpreted 
that it would not give offence to the popular scientific 
outlook. It is understandable therefore that in the 
twentieth century there should have arisen among theo­
logians a sharp reaction against philosophical influences. 
Of Barth it has been said that he "is always the theo­
logian criticising the philosophers, and the theologians 
who allow their teaching to be determined by philosophical 
notions. "* It is maintained that the concern of theology 
is solely with the revealed Word of Cod, and that human
* R. Birch Hoyle, "The Teaching of Karl Barth," p. 57. <
5philosophies can only obscure and distort the Christian 
faith when they are allowed to influence its interpretation. 
The endeavour is to derive theological teaching entirely 
from the divine revelation of Biblical religion, and to 
exclude from it all elements of human speculation.
Thus to say that the thought of such a theologian 
as Bultmann shows the influence of existentialist philo­
sophy might seem sufficient to condemn it right away in 
the eyes of many contemporary theologians who have come 
to have a profound distrust of philosopl\y. Is not 
Bultmann falling into the old error of making Christian 
teaching conform to the trends of current secular thought? 
And will not Christian theology he again misled and 
distorted through this alien influence?
We might of course defend Bultmann on the lines 
on which the great apologists of earlier times could he 
defended, and say that he is seeking, not unsuccessfully, 
to present Christianity as a relevant issue in the mid 
twentieth century. Existentialism has appeared as a 
philosophical reaction against the scientific humanism 
that, prevailed in the early part of the century. It 
denies the claim of that school of thought that the 
only knowledge is that which can he scientifically
6verified, and affirms on the contrary that scientific 
knowledge is only one kind of knowledge, not privileged 
hut specialised, and subordinate to the fundamental 
knowledge, which is knowledge of existence. On the 
face of it, this philosophical movement does seem to 
offer to the Christian theologian a way of access to 
the contemporary mind? It has apologetic possibilities, 
and, rightly used, these might prove to be of considerable 
value. It may be that through his pre-occupation with 
existentialist ideas Bultmann on occasions misrepresents 
some Christian teaching, and where that can be shown to 
happen, it will be a weakness in his theological 
position. But it still remains arguable that the 
contemporary apologist, like his predecessors, has a 
right to use, with proper care, such current philosophical 
concepts as will enable him to present the Christian 
faith as a living and intelligible issue in his own 
generation.
This however is not the main line of defence for 
Bultmann1s position. He is not primarily concerned 
to expound Christian thought in the language and 
concepts of what may- prove to be a passing philosophical 
mood, but makes the more far-reaching claim that the
7philosophy of existence stands in a special relation to 
theology. If existentialism has influenced the theology 
of Bultmann, it is not as an external influence, like 
much of the influence of Greek and Western philosophy 
upon theology in the past. Theology is understood By 
Bultmann as the clarification of the content of faith, 
and the Bringing of it to conscious knowledge.* That 
is to say, theology is a kind of phenomenology of faith, 
through which that which is implicit in Christian Belief 
is exhiBited in a connected system of thought. Further, 
he says that this analysis of faith must Be undertaken 
from the standpoint of faith itself. Bultmann just as 
much as Barth is oriented in his thought to the faith 
which has its origin in the Christian revelation. His 
primary concern is to interpret faith itself, to let it 
show itself and speak for itself. His authentic intention 
is to exhiBit the thought of the New Testament as such. 
Where then does the influence of existentialism come 
in? Can it Be anything other than an extraneous and 
distorting influence in the exegesis of New Testament 
thought,'even when that thought is to Be shown in its 
relevance to the present day? But we have said that
* !,Theologie des Neuen Testaments,11 p. 187.
8existentialism is not an external influence upon theology, 
hut stands in a special relation to it. What then is 
that relation?
2. Theology and Ontology.
n Every inquiry has its presuppositions, and that is 
as true of theological inquiry as of any other. These 
presuppositions delimit the field of the inquiry, 
determine its "basic concepts, and give it direction.*
In some way they already determine the result of the 
inquiry - not the content of the result, hut the kind 
of result that will he obtained. These presuppositions 
are ontological, that is to say, they consist in a 
preliminary understanding of the heing of the entities 
into which the inquiry is heing made. For example, the 
theologian may ask, 1fWhat is man in his relation to 
God?M For the doctrine of man, that is to say, the 
content of the theological concept of man, he will go 
to the Christian revelation in search of his answer.
But what ahout the ,fisH in his question? That already 
implies some understanding of the heing of man - among 
otter things, that the heing of man is such that he can
* Cf. Heidegger, MSein und Zeit,** pp. 9-12.
9have a relation to God. Is the "being of man, for instance, 
already conceived as substance? Or is it conceived 
existentially? Or in some other way? Whatever the 
presupposition - and there must "be some presupposition, 
even if it is not explicit - it will influence "both the 
inquiry and its result.
Thus we see the possibility of a pre-theological 
inquiry into the heing of the entities discussed in 
theolqgy. This pre-theological inquiry is not itself 
theology, though intrinsically related to theology.
It is rather philosophy or, more strictly speaking, 
ontology. It is the critical examination and analysis 
of the understanding of heing from which the inquiry 
sets out. Prior to every ontical inquiry, there lies 
an ontological inquiry.
As an. illustration, let us return for a moment to 
the Christian doctrine of man. It is sometimes said 
that Saint Paul taught a trichotomy of man*s heing as 
opposed to the dualism of Greek philosophy. Man is 
hody, soul, and spirit, and we find this content for 
the concept of man hy going to the New Testament 
writings.* But how we understand this doctrine of
* I Thessalonians 5, 23.
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man depends on the preliminary understanding of his heing 
which we already have before we begin our inquiry into 
the New Testament teaching about man. If we conceive 
man’s being substantially, then we may conclude that 
according to Saint Paul he is made up of three parts 
or elements. On the other hand, if we conceive the 
being of man existentially, then we may conclude with 
Bultmann* that man consists neither of two elements nor 
of three, but is a unity with different possible ways 
of being, here indicated by the terms body, soul, and 
spirit.
The question of being, as Heidegger points out,** 
is one that has long been neglected or treated as 
superfluous, not only by theologians, but by philosophers, 
scientists, and historians as well. What is meant by 
the being of anything is supposed to be either indefinable 
or self-evident. We do not pause to ask what we mean 
when we say that anything is* Yet as Heidegger shows, 
it needs little thought to realise that the idea of 
being is obscure in the extreme, and since some under­
standing of being is assumed in every inquiry, that
* Th. des NT. , p. 205.
** S. u. Z., p. 2.
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initial obscurity is "bound to have its consequences in 
the ontical inquiry/into which it is carried. On the 
other hand, Heidegger thinks,* the progress of a science 
consists in the constant revision and clarification of 
the first principles and "basic concepts from which it 
sets out - a view with which the historian of science 
would probably agree.** On the special problem of 
theology, Heidegger remarks: "Theology seeks a more
original interpretation (than history does) of the 
being of man in relation to God, drawn from the meaning 
of faith itself and remaining within it. It is slowly 
beginning to uiiderstand once more Luther* s insight, 
that its system of dogma rests on a foundation which 
is not itself a matter of faith, and the concepts of 
which have not only been inadequately worked out for 
theological problems, but have been left obscure and 
distorted.’1***
‘ Bultmann has taken up this challenge. Before 
proceeding to the interpretation of what is contained 
in the Christian faith, he has paused to examine the 
presuppositions of theological thinking. And he has
* S. u. Z., p. 9.
** Cf. Dampier, "A History of Science,11 pp. 457 and 491. 
*** S. u. M* , p. 10.
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come to "believe that these presuppositions are clarified 
and secured "by a philosophy of the existentialist type. 
For existentialism is a philosophy of heing. It has 
been argued by Heidegger* that in the approach to the 
problem of being in general, precedence belongs to the 
problem of the being of man, because man1 s being is 
such that with it there is given some understanding of 
his being. As existing, man is disclosed to himself.* 
fhus existentialism claims that it is not a speculative 
phileepphy, but an analysis of that understanding of 
existence which is given with existence.
We can now see why it may be claimed that the 
influence of existentialism upon Bultmann*s theology 
is not an external influence like that of a metaphysical 
system. It is an intrinsic influence, and it may well 
be in some respects at least a legitimate one, for it 
is the influence of a pre-theological - or ontological - 
inquiry into the idea of being which theology assumes.
If it is claimed for any theologian that he is entirely 
free from the influences of secular philosophy, that 
may simply mean that he has not troubled to examine 
the implicit ontological assumptions from which his
* S. u. Z. , p. 7.
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theology sets out and which are necessarily carried 
into all his inquiries.
The argument which we have put forward here is 
admirably summarised hy Tillich: f,Theology, when
d;eaiing with our ultimate concern, presupposes in every 
sentence the structure of "being, its categories, laws, 
and concepts. Theology therefore cannot escape the 
question of "being any more easily than can philosophy.
The attempt of biblicism to avoid non-hihlical, onto­
logical terns is doomed to failure as surely as the 
corresponding philosophical attempts. The Bible itself 
always uses the categories and concepts which describe 
the structure of experience. On every page of every 
religious or theological text these concepts appear: 
time, space, cause, thing, subject, nature, movement, 
freedom, necessity, life, value, knowledge, experience, 
being and non-being. Biblicism may try to preserve 
their popular meaning, but then it ceases to be theology.
It must neglect the fact that a philosophical understanding 
of these categories has influenced ordinary language 
for many centuries. It is surprising how casually 
ttiedlogieal biblicists use a term like ’history1 when 
speaking of Christianity as a historical religion or
14
of God as * the Lord of history.1 They forget that the 
meaning they connect with the word ’history1 has heen 
formed hy thousands of years of historiography and 
philosophy of history. They forget that historical 
"being is one kind of being in addition to others and 
that, in order to distinguish it from the word ’nature,’ 
for instance, a general vision of the structure of being 
is presupposed. They forget that the problem of history 
is tied up with the problems of time, freedom, accident, 
and so on, and that each of these concepts has had a 
development similar to the concept of history. The 
theologian must take seriously the meaning of the terms 
he uses. They must be known to him in the whole depth 
and breadth of their meaning. Therefore the systematic 
theologian must be a philosopher in critical understanding 
even if not in creative power.”*
3. The Existential Approach to Theology.
Bultmann states his claim for the special relation 
of existentialist philosophy to the work of the theologian 
in the following terms: ”The ’right* philosophy” - and
that, we take it, means the philosophical outlook
* ’’Systematic Theology,” vol. I, pp. 24-25.
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proper to theological study - His quite simply that philo­
sophical work which endeavours to develop in suitable 
concepts the understanding of existence that is given 
with human existence.*** Believing as he does that the 
work of the theologian as the interpreter of the content 
of faith is dependent on his philosophical outlook,
"because consciously or unconsciously he brings to the 
exegesis of the sacred writings presuppositions derived 
from the tradition of secular thought, Bultmann holds 
that he must examine these presuppositions to ensure that 
he has the "right** philosophy, and he claims further that 
it is the philosophy which analyses man* s understanding 
of his own existence that especially clarifies the basic 
concepts that are of particular interest to the theologian.
The existential approach to theology - if we may 
call it such - will only be fully exhibited in the detailed 
examination of Bultmann* s thought, but his position can 
be made clearer at this stage by a discussion of two 
preliminary conceptions that are of considerable importance 
for both Heidegger and Bultmann. Since there are no 
precise English equivalents to express these conceptions, 
we may be permitted to use the German terns rather than
* "Kerygma und Mythos,’1 vol. II, p. 192.
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to paraphrase in English, provided that the meaning is 
first made clear.
The first term is Fragestellung - literally, the 
putting of the question. The way in which a question is 
asked has its consequence in determining the answer.
To give an extreme illustration, a man on the verge of 
despair who has come to the end of his own moral and 
spiritual resources and who asks himself whether there is 
a God has obviously a very different Fragest ellung from 
that of the philosopher who, reclining in his study, 
asks whether there is a God as the ground of the natural 
world. The former is inquiring about something that is 
of concern to his own existence, while the latter is 
asking an academic or speculative question. Both may 
come to the conclusion that there is a God, but their 
concepts of God will differ so widely that it might 
almost be said that they had come to believe in different 
entities. One will have found the God of prayer and 
worship, the other the God of metaphysical speculation. 
But the difference was already there in the manner in 
which each of them asked the question. The theologian 
also must have his Fragestellung. Bultmann tells us 
that when he goes to the Bible, the question to which
17
he is seeking the answer is the question of human existence.* 
No doubt he is also asking ahout God, hut ahout God in so 
far as He is significant to man as existing.** There 
may he depths of heing in God heyond His significance to 
us, hut if so, they are inaccessible and not the concern 
of theology.
Because of this Fragestellung, it follows that in 
the existential approach to theology, man and his heing 
are central in all theological problems. The statements 
of the New Testament will he interpreted as statements 
significant for my existence. (This point, incidentally, 
is fundamental for Bultmann* s views on demythoiogising.)
The centrality of human existence in this type of 
theology may he illustrated from Bultmann*s description 
of the conversion of Saint Paul as his entering into a 
new understanding of himself.*** One could equally well 
speak of a new understanding of God, hut Bultmann, in 
accordance with his Fragestellung, prefers to speak of 
it as primarily a new understanding of man’s own existence 
in relation to God. Again, we see the centrality of 
man’s existence for Bultmann*s thought in his exposition
* K. u. M., II, p. 191. ** Th. des NT., p. 186.
*** Th. des NT., p. 184.
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of the entire Pauline theology as an anthropology or 
doctrine of man.* Doubtless the Pauline theology could
f
he expounded in other ways, hut this is the typical , 
existential approach.
Bultmann claims, of course, that in making his 
theology centre in the question of man* s existence, he 
is simply following the precedent of the New Testament.
In the most systematic exposition of his own thought, 
the Epistle to the Romans, Saint Paul begins hy describing 
the situation of man, and relates all his teaching to 
that.** Bultmann1s claim that his own existential 
approach to theology is identical with, or at least very 
sympathetic to, the approach of the New Testament writers 
themselves is one that will require closer examination 
later. But perhaps enough has been said here to make 
out a preliminary case for the existential approach to 
theology as a possible and legitimate one, for where 
else are we to begin, if not with our own existence 
which lies open to us, and what question is more urgent 
than the question of deciding about our own existence?
But if this is so, then we see again the need to clarify 
the initial assumptions about human existence that are
* Th. des NT., p. 188. ** Th. des NT., p. 296.
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already there in the Fragestellung and which therefore 
underlie the inquiry and give to it its direction. This 
Fragestellung does not, of course, as Bultmann indicates, 
prejudice the content of the answer which we seek, or 
decide in advance the exegesis of the Biblical writings 
from which the Christian theologian seeks to interpret 
the faith; 'hut it does, he claims, ,fopen our eyes to the 
content of the text.1**
This leads us to the second of our preliminary con­
ceptions, expressed by the tern Begrifflichkeit. Sometimes 
this means no more than a teminology, as when Bultmann 
says that Gnosticism provided Christian missionaries 
to the Hellenistic world with a terminology familiar to 
their hearers, or that the Jewish sacrificial cult 
offered a terminology to express the significance of 
the death of Jesus.** But more typically the Begrifflich­
keit is the context of ideas expressed in the terminology. 
The Begrifflichkeit of any inquiry is the system of 
basic concepts which it employs in the understanding of 
its subject-matter. Biology, mathematics, history, 
and every other study have each a special Begrifflichkeit.
* XL u. M., II, p. 191.
** Th. des NT., p. 163 and p. 290.
so
\
In the widest sense the Begrifflichkeit can he a system 
of categories, that is to say, the basic formal concepts 
Tinder which we understand what confronts us in experience. 
The most familiar example of such a system of categories 
is that elaborated by Kant in ’’The Critique of Pure 
Reason.” It is dominated by the category of substance, 
as every traditional Begrifflichkeit in Western philo­
sophy has been since the time of Aristotle. These 
traditional categories make it possible for us to 
understand the natural world, and to classify its 
phenomena. According to Heidegger, the merit of Kant’s 
work is that it provides ”a concrete logic of the field 
of nature.”* But the important question raised by the 
existentialist philosophers is whether this traditional 
Begrifflichkeit is appropriate to the phenomena of 
human existence. While the natural sciences have steadily 
advanced, the human sciences remain in obscurity and 
confusion. May the reason be that whereas the natural 
sciences have in the traditional categories a Begrifflich- 
keit which is appropriate to their subject-matter, the 
idea of being which these categories imply is quite 
inapplicable to human existence? Convinced that this
* S. u. Z., p. 11.
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is indeed the case, the existentialist philosophers 
have tried to think out a new Begrifflichkeit that will 
enable us to have a true understanding of the being of 
man. The categories applicable to the natural world 
are replaced by new categories - or rather, existentials, 
as Heidegger calls them - applicable to human existence.
Let us take a simple example. The basic constitution 
of the being of man, according to Heidegger, is "being- 
in-the-world.rt This expression uses the terminology of 
spatial relations. (It may be noted in passing that 
Heidegger makes the curious claim that originally the 
preposition "in” had not spatial but existential meaning, 
and he quotes G-rimm as his authority on this linguistic 
point.* This claim, if true, is interesting, but of 
course does not alter the fact that in modern usage 
we would normally understand the expression rtbeing-in- 
the-woridM in a spatial sense.) But Heidegger is at 
pains to make it clear that this expression is to be 
understood in an entirely different Begrifflichkeit 
or context of ideas from that of spatial relations.
Here ,fbeing-inM (Insein) does not mean the relation of, 
shy, water in a glass or a coat in the cupboard. It
* S. u. Z., p. 54.
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signifies not a spatial "but an existential relation. It 
means not that man is located in the world, hut that he 
is hound up with the world in his existence.* Through 
his existential analytic, Heidegger seeks to show the 
structure of the heing of man, and how his. "being differs 
from the heing of objects in nature, and must he 
differently understood and described. How all this must
he of the greatest interest to the theologian, especially j
- |
if like Bultmann he approaches theology with the question
|
of human existence in the forefront of his thought. The j
theologian undertakes his task with a Begrifflichkeit !
(he it conscious or unconscious) as well as a Fragestellung. I
If he lacks an appropriate Begrifflichkeit, then his 
interpretation of Christian doctrine will force it ' j
into unsuitable categories of thought, and this will
i
lead to obscurity and distortion.
We now have before us thettwo main distinguishing 
characteristics of the existential approach'to theology: 
a) the Fragestellung or manner of putting the question, ' j
which treats theological questions as primarily questions 
of man* s existence in relation to God, and interprets 
the sacred writings as statements which primarily 1
* S. u. Z. , p. 53 ff.
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concern man’s existence; Id ) the Begrifflichkeit or system 
of basic concepts derived from the philosophy of existence 
which claims to have analysed in sutjiable concepts the 
•understanding of existence which is given with existence.
4. Existentialism and Biblical Thought.
At an earlier point in the argument it was shown 
how Saint Paul’s analysis of the being of man as body, 
soul, and spirit could be understood in two distinct 
.ways according as we conceive the being of man substantially 
or existentially. We deliberately refrained at that 
stage from asking an important question which no doubt 
occurred to the reader, namely, how did Saint Paul 
himself understand what he had written? That is the 
type of question that must be raised now. We must 
test the existential approach to theology in another 
way, by asking how far it is likely to reveal to us 
the authentic thought of the New Testament writers.
True, as Tillifeh^s remarks on uncritical biblicism 
showed us, we can never completely enter into the 
outlook of the Biblical writers, for some two thousand 
years of thought lies between us and them. Yet we 
must have as large a measure of sympathy with their
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outlook as possible, and approach as near as we can to 
their standpoint if we are making the claim to interpret 
their thought. However interesting and attractive the 
existential approach to theology might appear, it would 
he nothing other than a mistake if it makes us read into 
the Hew Testament thoughts which were never in the minds 
of the men who wrote the New Testament.
The business of the theologian, it has been already 
stressed, is not to construct or invent a philosophy of 
religion, but to exhibit clearly, systematically, and 
intelligibly for his own age the genuine content of 
historic Christian faith. Our principal source for the 
Christian faith is the New Testament. The theologian 
then is the interpreter of the thought of the New 
Testament. But the writers of the New Testament must 
also have had their presuppositions, their preliminary 
understanding of being. If existentialist philosophy 
is to be helpful to the theologian in his work of 
throwing light on the teaching of the New Testament, 
it should be possible to show that there is some sympathy 
and affinity between the idea of being made explicit by 
this philosophy, and the idea of being that is implicit 
in the thought of the New Testament writers. If no
such affinity can he shown, then, indeed it might be 
justly said that the existential approach to theolggy 
obscures and distorts authentic Christian teaching by 
compelling it to assume the forms of a way of thought 
which is quite foreign. Bultmann*s theology would not 
then be what it claims to be, namely, the theology of 
the New Testament.
Are we embarking on an absurd enterprise when we 
set out to look for affinities between Biblical thought 
and this secular twentieth century philosophy of 
existentialism? Is it ridiculous to speak of existentialism 
in Biblical thought? Are we falling into the same kind 
of trap as the victims of the Piltdown skull hoax, who 
are said to have explained a prehistoric human skull 
in conjunction with the jaw of a modem ape? That might 
be our first reaction, and when, for instance, Bultmann 
interprets Saint Paul*s concept of the body as meaning 
that man in his being is related to himself, we might 
without further consideration conclude, as one recent 
writer has done,* that this is a 11 glaring example” of 
the importation of contemporary philosophy into the 
New Testament. But this judgment may be too hasty.
* Robinson, ”The Body,” p. 12, note.
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Existentialism is not a philosophy hut a type of 
philosophy, and a type so flexible that it can appear 
in such widely differing forms as the atheism of Sartre, 
the Catholicism of Marcel, the Protestantism of 
Kierkegaard, the Judaism of Buber, and the Orthodoxy 
of Berdyaev. And again, though the name of existentialism 
is relatively new, it does not follow that this type 
of philosophy is new. Mounier has constructed a 
family-tree of existentialism with its roots going . 
far back into the pre-Christian era.* The contemporary 
existentialists look back to Kierkegaard. But before 
him there were Pascal and Maine de Biran, who both 
showed marked affinities with existentialism.. Father 
Gopleston claims that there was a school of thought 
with resiemblances to existentialism in.the late Middle 
Ages.** Brock, finds traces of existentialism in 
Augustine^ reflections on ”the ceaseless unrest which 
marks the temporal life of the individual.”*** There 
were undoubted stirrings of the existentialist type 
of thought in ancient Greece, for example, in Socrates,**** 
though it was not the dominant. trend in classical
*11 Existentialist Philosophies: an Introduction,” p. 3.
** In his paper, ”Existentialism and Modern Man.”
*** "Contemporary German Philosophy,” ch. on Heidegger.
**** Of. Pobin, ”Greek Thought,” p. 159.
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philosophy. Thus existentialism, it is claimed, is not 
merely a phenomenon of modem times. It appears rather 
to "be one of the hasie types of thought that has appeared 
from time to time in the history of philosophy. It 
stresses the difference “between the individual "being 
of man (Existenz) and the "being of objects in nature 
(Vorhandenheit) that lends itself to generalisation and 
classification, and it asserts the importance of the 
former as against the latter.
How what is the understanding of being that is 
implicit in the thought of the New Testament writers?
The assumptions of their thought stemmed in the main 
from Hebrew thought, and the New Testament can only 
be properly understood against the background of the 
Old Testament. And even where we discern Hellenistic 
influences in the New Testament, it is worth noting 
that they come primarily from an element in Hellenistic 
thought that was non-Hellenic - namely, from Gnosticism. 
In fact, there is a great gulf fixed between the basic 
concepts of the New Testament, taken over principally 
from Hebrew thought, and those of Greek philosophy, 
and therefore of the Western philosophy which is de­
scended from it.
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As a preliminary evidence of this difference, we 
may refer to a subject which has recently received 
attention - the form of the Biblical writings. Broadly 
speaking, it has been assumed in Greek and Western 
thought that knowledge is capable of being expressed 
in general statements, and its typical form is the 
'systematic scientific or philosophical treatise. There 
is hardly anything of that In the Bible. Are we then 
to say that the Bible does not convey knowledge? Or 
is it that the Biblical writers communicate a different 
-kind of knowledge - the knowledge of individual human 
existence before God, which defies the kind of classi-
J
fication and generalisation which are appropriate only 
to the knowledge of objects in nature? In other words, 
did Hebrew thought grasp what, in the main, traditional 
Western thought has failed to grasp - the fundamental 
distinction between Ibcistenz (the being of man) and 
Vorhandenheit (the being of things) as different ways 
of being? MRecitalu is the broad tern suggested by 
a recent writer* to describe the form of the Biblical 
writings. The sacred authors employed poetry, prophecy, 
* histories of national heroes and men of God, myths,
* Wright, "God Who Acts - Biblical Theology as Recital.11
and so on, to convey knowledge. They did not make general 
statements, hut confronted their readers with individual 
human beings in existentiell situations. That is 
understandable if their approach to the subject was 
existential. It is significant that many modern exis­
tentialists have reverted to a method of teaching 
similar to that used by the Biblical writers. While 
Heidegger has attempted the systematic description of 
the structures of human existence, Sartre has used the 
forms of the novel, the journal and the drama to convey 
his existential teaching through existentiell situations. 
As has been said, there is presented a situation in 
order to suggest the situation.*
Obviously, so vast a subject as the Biblical 
understanding of the being of man can be treated only 
very briefly here. Yet before proceeding any further 
with the examination of Bultmann* s theology, it will 
be necessary to show that the philosophy of existence 
is not only the "ri&ht" philosophy from the point of 
view of theological method, but also - which is more 
impprfcte&tif we are aiming, so far as possible, at the 
elucidation of the genuine thought of the Hew Testament - 
that this is the philosophy which, more than any other
* Remark attributed to T.S. Eliot.
30
philosophy, expounds an understanding of the heing of 
man which has affinity with the understanding of his 
heing implicit in the thought of the Biblical writers.
It may he asserted first that on the Biblical 
understanding of his heing, man is not simply a part 
of nature. While both man and nature are the creation 
of God, and while man in his existence is hound up 
with the world, the heing of man, as made in the image 
of God,* is conceived as quite distinct from the heing 
of nature. flMan cannot be submerged in nature, or 
merged in the laws of the cosmos, so long as he remains 
true to his destiny. The Creator’s greatest gift to 
man, that of the personal ’I,’ necessarily places him, 
in analogy with God’s heing, at a distance from nature.”** 
This understanding of the heing of man is far removed 
from Greek attempts to determine and classify his 
place within the unity of the cosmos, for instance, as 
a rational animal. It is equally far removed from the 
Cartesian notion of res cogitans. which, however distinct 
from res extensa. still remains res, an objective 
concept which fails to do justice to the personal ”1”
♦Genesis 1, 26.
** W. Eichrodt, ”Man in the Old Testament,” p. 30.
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that is made in the image of the Creator. And' it is 
poles apart from modem endeavours to understand man 
scientifically, as though he were'nothing "but an 
unusu^ally complicated phenomenon of nature that may, 
with patience, he ultimately explained in the same 
kind of way as science explains the rest of nature.
But on the other hand, the teaching of the existentialists 
who maintain that Existenz and Vorhandenheit are 
fundamentally different ways of heiiig which must he 
" differently conceived seems to have a certain .kinship 
with the Biblical understanding of man. The philosophy 
of existence does not depersonalise man, as any philo­
sophy which objectifies him must do. It does justice 
to the claims of the individual personal f,I,fl and in 
this important respect we are entitled to say that there 
is a definite similarity between existentialism and 
the understanding of the being of man in Biblical 
thought.
Confirmation of the affinity between the two 
may be obtained from a consideration of some of the 
main themes in the Biblical teaching about man. Among 
these may be mentioned: individual reponsibility
before God - which Eichrodt well illustrates from
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the reiterated demands of the prophets for personal 
obedience to G-od, and their protest against the reduction 
of religion to a collective impersonal cult;* man’s 
fall from his true destiny into concern with the creature; 
his consciousness of guilt; the call for decision; the 
fleeting nature of man’s temporal existence, and its 
termination by death.** But these are remarkably similar 
to the main themes of existentialist philosophy. The 
responsibility of the individual confronted with the 
possibility of being himself and the possibility of 
losing himself, fallenness, guiltiness, resolve, 
temporality, death - these are prominent among the 
phenomena which such a philosopher as Heidegger considers 
to be constitutive structures of the being of man. It 
would be strange indeed if the Biblical writers and the 
existentialist philosophers both concentrated attention 
on the same charadteristics - so often neglected - of 
human life, were there not some fairly close relation 
between them in their understanding of the being of man.
The Biblical concept of God may be adduced as 
further evidence for the kinship between Biblical thought
* Eichrodt, op. cit., p. 21.
** These points may be illustrated by, e.g., Genesis 3,6; 
Psalm 51, 3; Joshua 24, 13; Psalm 103, 15-16.
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and existentialism. Since the philosophy of existence 
analyses the -understanding of existence which is given 
with existence, and since this existence is always my 
existence,* that is to say, a human existence, it 
follows that this philosophy does not directly give 
an account of the "being of God. That it raises the 
question of God indirectly we shall endeavour to show 
later, so that we would give only a modified assent to 
Oopleston* s contention that flthe problem of God cannot 
"be raised on the plane of the phenomenological analysis 
Of man.,f** Yet in any case we must understand the 
"being of God as somehow analogous to our own, if we 
are to speak of Him' at all. The Bible certainly does 
so. It thinks of God as personal and historical - 
"the living God” is a typical and significant expression.*** 
This, concept is utterly different from the concepts of 
God which have been current in Greek and Western philo­
sophy - the Unmoved Mover, the First Cause, the Timeless 
Absolute, and so on. Where these concepts have influenced 
theological thought, they have obscured the authentic 
Biblical understanding of God. The difference between
*. Of .Heidegger, S. u. Z. , p. 42.
7 ** rt Existential ism and Modern Man,’1 p. 18.
*** E.g., Psalm 42, 2.
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such concepts of God and the Biblical concept may he 
expressed by saying that the former understand His 
heing under the categories of substantiality, the latter 
understands His heing under the categories of- exis­
tent ial it y.
When someone claims, let us say, that he finds the 
doctrines of socialism in the New Testament, it is only 
too easy for him to read into the text what is not there, 
and to he guilty of the wildest anachronisms. We must 
therefore he very careful when we speak of existentialism 
in Biblical thought. A n  that we have claimed here is 
that there is a certain kinship or sympathy between the 
understanding of heing implicit in Biblical thought 
and the understanding of heing made explicit hy the 
philosophy of existence. But this is sufficient for 
our present purpose, which is to show that the ontological 
presuppositions of a theology such as Bultmann* s are 
not alien to those of the New Testament writers, who 
took them over from the Old Testament tradition. As 
a consequence, Bultmann*s existential approach to the 
teaching of the New Testament should not he found to 
impose upon it ideas foreign to the minds of the writers, 
but should reveal to us not only how Bultmann understands
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it, “but, so far as possible, its authentic meaning as 
understood "by the Hew Testament writers themselves*
5. Existentialism and the Teaching of Jesus.
This subject will he treated here partly because 
it will supplement the argument of the preceding section, 
and partly because the teaching of Jesus, like that of 
the Old Testament, is preliminary to the theology proper
of the New-Testament.* There will be the further
(
advantage that a discussion of Bultmann1 s treatment of 
the teaching of Jesus will introduce a line of criticism 
of his position, which will be more fully developed 
later.
It is not difficult to find elements in the teaching 
of our Lord which invite comparison with the teaching of 
the existentialists. He protested against the deadening 
influence of tradition, which had made observance of 
the law formal and external, so that in the Sermon on 
the Mount he was able to draw a contrast between the 
law and the will of God, though these two should have 
been identical.** As against this formal observance,
* Gf. Th. des NT., p. 1.
*♦ E*g. ,>Matihew 5, 21-22; cf. Th. des NT., p. 12.
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Jesus demanded authentic individual obedience. Bather 
similarly we find the existentialists protesting against 
the blind acceptance of the traditions and customs of 
collective humanity - das Man, in Heidegger1s expression - 
and insisting that the individual must understand and 
decide for himself.
The worst that can happen to a man, Jesus taught, 
is to lose himself. This he does when he sets his heart 
on the world' and in the process loses his own soul. On 
ithe other hand, he is saved when he comes to himself, 
and through a renunciation of the world finds his true 
being.* With this we compare the existentialist teaching 
that man is confronted with the basic possibilities of 
an authentic existence, in which he finds himself, and 
an inauthentic existence, in which the self is lost 
and scattered in concern with the world.
Thus man is pressed to a radical decision. He must 
choose between God and the world - that is to say,
between being his true self in a life of obedience to
/
his Creator, and losing himself in serving the creaturely.** 
The whole eschatological teaching of Jesus stresses the
* ILg., Mark 8, 36; Luke 15, 17; Matthew 10, 39.
, ** Gf. Matthew 6, 24.
urgent need for decision. But in existentialist teaching 
also, radical decision has an important place. It is 
resolve which unifies the self and makes its existence 
authentic.
So far as this line of thought goes, it may fairly - 
he claimed that there is some affinity between existentialism
i
and the teaching of Jesus, and again Bultmann is 
cleared of the charge that his philosophical assumptions 
are foreign to the New Testament. But the question may 
be raised whether this presentation of the teaching of 
Jesus ’goes nearly far enough. According to Bultmann, 
this would appear to be the essence of what our Lord 
taught, but to many it will seem a very attenuated 
account of the matter. Did Jesus have no consciousness 
of being the Messiah? Was there no reflection of such 
a consciousness in his teaching? Would men have believed 
on him apart from it? Was his teaching not closely 
connected with his own person? These questions are j
i
surely not unimportant, but Bultmann does not seem to >
take them very seriously. They are somewhat dogmatically 
brushed aside, and it is asserted that Jesus had no 
consciousness of being the Messiah. Now Bultmann, as 
a great New Testament scholar, has of course been led
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to this conclusion hy his own critical studies. But 
on the other hand, his negative attitude to these 
questions compared with his preoccupation with the 
existentialist elements in the teaching of Jesus 
suggests that Bultmann may he unconsciously biased 
in his presentation because of the influence of exis­
tentialism in his thought.
It is very doubtful whether the Christian faith 
could have been built upon the foundation Of a historic 
Jesus who, as Bultmann presents him, was little more 
than a teacher of a practical philosophy with certain 
resemblances to existentialism, and who is stripped of 
the numinous characteristics which the Gospels ascribe 
to him. “There must have been something, “ says Professor 
Henderson, “about the actual Jesus at the time at which 
he was on earth, to make the New Testament witnesses 
summon men to decide for or against him. And if it 
is so, the historical facts about Jesus, and the 
mythological element in his life cannot have quite the 
subordinate role that Bultmann allots to them. “*
We might say that of the three pitfalls mentioned 
earlier as lying in the path of the unwary theologian
* “Myth in the New Testament,“ p. 49^ .
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who approaches the work of interpreting the .Christian 
faith with certain philosophical presuppositions in 
his mind, we have sought to show that Bultmann is in 
little danger from the second and third of these, which 
were the importing of alien ideas into Christian theology, 
and the accommodating of that theology to a prevailing 
philosophical fashion. But his treatment of the ministry 
of our Lord indicates that Bultmann may he in considerable 
danger from the first of the three, which was the 
over-emphasis of those elements in Christian teaching 
which are specially congenial to the theologian* s 
philosophical outlook, accompanied hy neglect of any­
thing that is not so congenial, with consequent dis­
tortion of the whole. This line of criticism will he 
followed up when we come to consider Bultmann*s 
interpretation of the Mew Testament theology proper.
6. A Preliminary View of Bultmann* s Position.
Apart from the note of criticism struck in the 
preceding section, we have so far heen principally 
concerned to defend Bultmann against some of the 
more obvious and superficial charges that might he 
made against him for permitting the secular philosophy
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of existentialism to influence his theological work*
We have hased this defence on three grounds. The first, 
and least important, is that Bultmann is simply following 
the precedent of some of the greatest theologians of 
the past in making use of contemporary philosophical 
concepts in his presentation of the Christian faith.
It is obvious that there are apologetic possibilities 
in existentialism which has reinstated in the province 
of philosophy problems which tflogical positivism would 
declare to belong to the province of feeling.11 * The 
second and more important ground is that since exis­
tentialism is specially concerned to analyse the con­
stitution of the being of man, and since the theologian 
must make certain ontological assumptions about man, 
this philosophy stands in a special relation to the 
theologian* s work. The third ground is that what 
existentialism teaches about the being of man has a ^  
certain kinship and sympathy with the understanding 
of his being implicit in Biblical thought, so that 
the theologian who approaches the Bible with an 
existentialist understanding of being is likely to 
interpret its teaching in a way which would be faithful
* Gopleston, "Existentialism and Modern Man,’1 p. 6.
to the authentic thought of the Biblical writers themselves. 
If then we have succeeded in making out a case for the 
existential approach to theology as exemplified hy 
the work of Bultmann, we may proceed to the examination^ 
of his thought in the knowledge that here we have a 
serious, legitimate, and possibly valuable contribution 
to the problems of a genuinely Christian theology.
It will be understood of course that a purely 
existential approach to theology is almost impossible, 
even if it were supposed to be desirable. Consciously 
or unconsciously, other influences from the long 
tradition of theological and philosophical thought 
will enter into any presentation of the Christian faith.
This is quite obviously the case in Bultmann1s work, 
where we can detect other influences besides that of 
the philospjahy of existence. Among them we note a 
strong evangelical and Protestant influence. Like 
Barth, Bultmann attaches great importance to the concept 
of the Word. As we shall see, the preaching and hearing 
of the Word are accorded a key position in his theology.
His distinctively Protestant outlook may be illustrated 
from his interpretation of the sacraments as Monly a 
special mode of the proclamation of the Word.”* Another
* Theologie des HT., p. 309.
influence which exerts itself quite noticeably is that 
of liberal modernism. While Bultmann differs from its 
positions at many points, it would be surprising if its 
influence were entirely absent in one who has been 
known for many years as a fairly radical New Testament 
critic. In his treatment of the Resurrection of 
Christ, for instance, it appears to me that this 
influence is combined with the influence of existentialism 
and the two must be carefully disentangled if the 
existential element is to be properly evaluated.
It may seem surprising that in the preceding pages, 
apart from one passing but not unimportant reference,* 
nothing appears to have been said on the subject of 
demythologising. There are two reasons for this.
The first is that the notoriety given to this part of 
Bultmann*s work in recent controversy may obscure the 
fact that it is, after all, only a part of his work, 
and may detract attention from much of his theology 
which is not directly connected with demythoiogising 
but which seems to me of very considerable value.
The second reason is that demythologising can only 
be properly understood in the light of Bultmann* s
* See supra, p. 17.
general theological position. Demythologising is only 
a consequence - albeit a very important one - of 
Bultmann* s existential approach to theology, and as 
such it will be treated in its proper place.
Bultmann holds that there is strictly speaking 
no unitary theology of the New Testament, but a number 
of theologies, each with its own terminology and 
distinctive emphasis. He gives pride of place to 
the Pauline theology which, as was stated already, 
he expounds as a doctrine of man. This exposition 
falls into two parts - the life of man without Christ, 
and the life of man in the Christian faith. In a 
similar fashion Heidegger in the exposition of his 
philosophy describes first what he calls everyday or 
inauthentic existence, and then goes on to the problem 
of an authentic existence. We shall follow the 
same order in the present inquiry, taking the 
Pauline theology as the main source for illustrations 
from the New Testament, but referring also to the 
Johannine and other writings where necessary. First 
we shall consider how far the ontological analysis 
of everyday inauthentic existence, as we find it 
expounded in existentialist philosophy, throws light
on the New Testament teaching on man without faith - 
the natural man. Then we shall go on to consider how 
far the idea of an authentic existence elucidates the 
theology of the life of faith in Christ.
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CHAPTER II
EXISTENCE IN THE WORLD
7. The Concept of Existence.
Our subject is the relation of existentialist 
philosophy to theological thought, and to make the 
argument concrete, it will be illustrated especially 
£rom the work of Martin Heidegger, the philosopher, 
and Rudolf Bultmann, the theologian. Bultmann is 
probably the most noted exponent of this type of theology 
Heidegger fairly represents the existentialist school 
of philosophy; and further there is, as will be shown, 
a particularly c&bse connection between these two 
thinkers? In what follows therefore we are confronted 
with a twofold task: first, to follow Bultmann to the 
pages of the New Testament, and to determine exactly 
where and how his interpretation of its teaching is 
influenced by his ontological assumptions derived 
from Heidegger's philosophy of existence; and next, 
to assess the value of such an interpretation, that 
is, to answer the question whether, as Bultmann himself
claims, his eyes have been opened to the meaning of 
the text, or whether on the contrary he has been misled. 
The most interesting method of accomplishing this task 
will be to consider side by side and step by step the 
existential analytic of Heidegger on the one hand, and 
Bultmann* s exposition of the New Testament theology . 
as a doctrine of man on the other. But first we must 
examine more closely some of the leading ideas of 
existentialist philosophy, and define more exactly 
some of its technical terms, already introduced in 
the preceding pages, and freely used by Bultmann in 
his theological writings.
Strictly speaking, it might be said that Heidegger 
is not so much an existentialist as an ontologist. His 
concern is with the problem of being in general, and 
his exposition of the being of man was intended to be 
only an introduction to the wider problem. But 
Heidegger has not fully carried out this ambitious 
programme, for his principal work, MSein und Zeit,*’ 
breaks off at the end of the analysis of human 
existence;, and has not been completed. While of his 
later writings in which he attacks his main problem, 
even so acute an interpreter of the thought of Heidegger
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as H.J. Blackham remarks that they are ,foracular in
tone, and one can have no confidence in interpreting
the cryptic sentences in which his thought is condensed.w#
In view of this, it is therefore not unfair to regard
Heidegger as primarily an existentialist philosopher,
while recognising his intention to go beyond existentialism.
We begin by noting the distinction between being 
as such (Sein) and being in the sense of that which is 
(Seiendes). The former, in Heidegger*s view, is the 
proper subject of philosophical inquiry; the latter is 
the subject both of scientific and everyday knowledge.
It follows that we can make two kinds of statement 
about anything. A statement may be ontological (onto- 
logisch), that is to say, it will tell us about the 
being of something and its range, of possibilities.
Or a statement may be ontical (ontisch), that is to 
say, it will tell us about some entity in its actual 
relations with other entities. But every ontical 
statement carries ontological implications, for to 
say that A is in fact B implies that A has the possibility 
of being B. This is a statement about the being of A, 
namely that its being is such that A can be B. Hence ;
* ’'Six Existentialist Thinkers,’1 p. 103.
arises Heidegger1 s insistence on the need to examine the 
ontological assumptions of all ontical inquiries.
Let us now try to clarify these points with an 
illustration from theology. When Saint Paul says that 
"all have sinned" he is making an ontical statement.* He 
is claiming that in fact the entity (das Seiende) which 
we call man has fallen into the relationship which we 
call sin, and that this is true of all men. But clearly 
this ontical statement can only he properly understood 
if it is clarified ontologically. Both its subject 
and predicate remain little more than vague words 
unless we understand how the being (das Sein) of man 
is such that sin can be a possible way of being for 
him. On a materialistic and mechanistic view of man 
sin, as Saint Paul understood it, would be an illusion. 
On certain idealistic views of man, it might be possible 
to construct some concept of sin, but it would be open 
to question whether or not it represented the genuine 
Christian understanding of sin. In both cases however 
these are speculative theories, and the Christian 
theologian is under no obligation to conform to their 
views. If they teach a view of man which does not
- li .... . .
* Homans 3, 23.
allow for the possibility of sin, as the New* Test ament 
■understands it, then so much the worse for these 
theories, for they have failed to take into account 
a fact of Christian experience. An academic theory 
-of "being cannot "be set up as a standard hy which 
ontical statements are to he tested. Yet we have said 
on the other hand that the ontical must he clarified
ontologically, that the fact must he shown to* fall 
within the possible ways of heing of the entity about 
which the statement is made. How then do we arrive 
aty this ontological understanding which is necessary 
for the proper understanding of an ontical statement?
Returning to our example, "All have sinned,'1 we 
may say that this statement can he clarified ontologically 
in two ways. Partly it may he clarified in the light 
of the whole Pauline theology. That theology not 
only makes statements about man’s actual relationships, 
hut discloses an understanding of his being. The 
important concept of for instance, with which
we shall shortly he occupied, is primarily an 
ontological concept. Saint Paul* s ontical statements 
;^©wt iman afe made in the light of his own ontological 
, understanding of man. Yet we do not find, and we
would not expect to find, a systematic ontology of man 
explicitly stated in the Pauline writings. That is not 
the business of the theologian but of the philosopher.
It is to the latter that we must go for a full account 
of the possibilities of man!s being. We are not concerned 
with speculative philosophies, whether idealistic or 
materialistic, which try to fit man into some comprehensive 
world-view. The theologian has no need to adjust his 
thinking to their teaching. But we are concerned with 
the existentialist type of philosophy, which is not a 
speculative metaphysic but simply the philosophical 
analysis of man* s own understanding of his being. Man 
not only is - he understands that he is, his being is 
open to himself, and this understanding of being which 
belongs to man in virtue of his being, however vague 
it-may be at ordinary levels, is capable of being ana­
lysed and clarified. It is such an analysis that
Heidegger claims to have accomplished in "Sein und Zeit." '
/
Heidegger prefers to speak not of man but of
\
Dasein, a term which he thinks expresses manfs peculiar 
way of being - man considered ontologically. Dasein 7
means literally "being-there,1 and the reasons for this v : 
choice of terminology will become clearer as we proceed.
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Dasein is said to exist, and it is important that we 
should he clear ahout the meaning of this basic term, 
existence (Existenz). It does not merely mean to he 
extant, the traditional sense of existentia. For that 
way of heing, Heidegger uses the term Vorhandenheit.
An inanimate object, such as a stone, is extant, it 
occurs, hut it does not existein the sense in which 
Heidegger uses the term. ?/hat then are the distinctive < 
characteristics of existence?* .
^hese may hest he explained hy contrasting the 
heing of man with the heing of a thing (Vorhandenheit) 
for to say that man exists means that in some way he 
stands outside (ex-sistere) the world of things, a)
Man has a relation to himself in a way that is peculiar 
to him as existing. A cricket-ball, as we understand 
it, is purely an object. But man is not an object. He 
is at once subject and object to himself, or as is 
said, he transcends the subject-object relationship.
He understands himself, is open to himself in his 
being. He can he at one with himself or at war with 
himself, he can he himself or lose himself. The 
examination of this relation of Dasein to himself is 
one of the main concerns of existentialist philosophy.
* 5f. S. u. Z. , p. 41 ff. k ^
b) Man is possibility. He is always more than he is,
his being' is never complete at any given moment. He
therefore has no essence as an object has. The essential 
properties of a cricket-ball are a certain size and 
weight, redness, rotundity, resistance, and so on.
These give a more or less complete description of it.
But because man as existing is possibility, and is
never fixed or complete in his being, he is not to be
described in terms of the 1 objective properties of 
something merely extant, but his possible ways of being, 
and only t h e s e . I t  will be understood of course that 
by possibility the existentialist does not mean mere 
contingency, something that may happen (for in that 
sense a thing also would have infinite possibilities) 
but a possibility of decision, a way of being which 
man, because he exists, can choose for himself, c)
Man is individual. This is the characteristic of 
existence which Heidegger terms Jemeinigkeit - existence 
is always mine. One cricket-ball is pretty much like 
another. They are all made to a standard pattern, 
and while there are no doubt minor differences, it; • :■ ■ : ■. V ■ - 7
is true to say that if we have seen one, we have seen
them all. Things can he classified - indeed not only 
science hut everyday life would he impossible were we 
unable to classify and expect that one dbject will 
behave in the same way as others in the same class.
But man as existing is an individual and defies classi- . 
fication. This is a point on which existentialism 
does justice to the Biblical understanding of men as 
individual creatures of the Father* and sets itself in 
opposition to the tendency of modern scientific humanism 
to regard the being of man as at ^bottom no different 
from the being of things, and therefore amenable to 
study by scientific methods. Of course this is not 
to deny value to the social sciences. But it is to 
indicate their severe limitations. We read, for 
instance, that "loose thinking and prejudice are 
extremely prevalent in matters of politics, economics, 
religion, crime, and the like . . . yet the social 
sciences, such as psychology and sociology, are en­
deavouring to study these subjects rationally and ’ 
impartially, in the same manner as the physicist studies , 
the atom, or the physiologist the workings of the body."**
* Of. Matthew 10, 29-31.
** Vernon, "The Measurement of Abilities," Pref. pp. v-vi.
The sciences mentioned are highly abstract, since they 
must select as their data such facts about man as are 
measurable, either statistically or in some other way.
The information thus gained is valuable, but we should 
■understand that what has been excluded in this "impartial" 
investigation is precisely that which is distinctively 
human. It is interesting to know that a family of 2.3 
children is necessary to maintain the population of 
these islands at its present level, or that the average 
American woman has 3.7 romances in her life. But of 
course, this says absolutely nothing about the human 
phenomena of the family and love. The distinctively 
human is characterised by Jemeinigkeit - existence is 
always my eiistence, individual, unique, personal. It 
is never as such a classifiable object.
This last point raises the question whether and 
how existence can be described. If Dasein* s existence 
is always his own, then is it not futile to attempt 
an analysis of the being of Dasein which would be true 
for every Dasein? To answer this question, we must 
note the distinction which is made between what are 
called .existent!ell (existenziell) and existential 
(existenzial) possibilities. The concrete practical
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possibilities of the individual Dasein are his existentiell 
possibilities. But there are horizons to Dasein* s 
possibilities - limits within which every individual 
existence must fall. These wide possibilities are 
called existential, and their investigation is the 
subject of the existential analytic of Dasein. What 
we have then is not an attempt to describe universal 
properties of Dasein - which would be'impossible, since 
Dasein is not an object, but exists - but an attempt to 
show the horizons of possibility within which the con­
crete possibilities of every individual Dasein must 
fall. Used as a noun, the term existential (Existenzial) 
denotes One of the broad fundamental possibilities of ^
Dasein*s being, in analogy to the term category which 
denotes one of the basic formal characters'of an object.
The systematic description of all the fundamental 
possible ways of being of Dasein is called the 
existentiality (Existenzialitat) of existence.
" •" * K-
By what method is the task of an existential y -
analytic of Dasein to be carried out? The scientific -
method which discovers the general properties and 
befcavio'trr of an object has already been ruled out, as * ;
unsuitable to the study of that which exists. The ' i
method used "by Heidegger is that of phenomenology, and 
while we cannot go fully into this subject here, something- 
must he said about it, more particularly as we already , 
suggested that Bultmann might be said to regard theology 
as a kind of phenomenology of faith. The phenomenological 
method stems from Husserl ,* who developed it in reaction 
against the scientific positivism which had begun to 
prevail at the end of the nineteenth century. He , 
pointed out that the knowledge of nature gained by 
science never attains certainty or finality. It is 
Subject to constant revision and correction. Further, 
the scientific method is not itself a piece of scientific 
knowledge. The scientist must make in his investigation 
of nature assumptions and presuppositions which science 
itself cannot establish. Husserl believed that 
certainty is attained when the attention is directed 
to the experiences of the self which stands outside 
nature, without raising the question of the reality 
to which these experiences are supposed to refer. The 
exploration of the experiences of the self consists 
not in reasonings but in descriptions of what shows 
itself, namely, the phenomenon.
* See his own art., ’’Phenomenology,’1 En. Britt. 14th Edn.
Heidegger has adapted the phenomenological method 
to his own purposes,* hut substantially it remains as 
we have described it. For Heidegger phenomenology is 
directed to being - the being which shows itself in 
Dasein1 s own understanding of himself. The existential 
analytic consists in the descriptive analysis of that 
which is revealed to Dasein in his own self-disclosure 
as existing. And this method of investigation, the 
phenomenologists would claim, yields in itssown field 
results more securely based than any knowledge that 
we can have of nature.
On the subject of the relation of phenomenology 
to theology, Tillich claims that "theology must apply 
the phenomenological approach to all its basic concepts, 
forcing its critics first of all to see what the criticised 
concepts mean, and also forcing itself to make careful 
descriptions of its concepts and to use them with 
logical consistency, thus avoiding the danger of trying 
to fill in logical gaps with devotional material. The 
test of a phenomenological description is that the 
picture given by it is convincing, that it can be seen 
by anyone who is willing to look in the same direction,
Of. S. u. Z., pp. 27-39.
that the description illuminates other related ideas, 
and that it makes the reality which these ideas’are 
supposed to reflect understandable."* These points 
are worth bearing in mind, particularly in assessing 
Bultmann1 s treatment of the Pauline theology.
Returning however to Heidegger* s phenomenological 
method, we find dozens of examples of this careful 
ahalysis in his work - indedd the minute detailed 
descriptions become somewhat tedious as the method 
is applied to one phenomenon after another. We will 
give one illustration here, the analysis of fear,** 
which shows very clearly this method of descriptive 
analysis of the constitutive structures of a phenomenon 
which is open to Dasein as understanding himself. 
Heidegger begins with that which is feared, and care­
fully analyses its characteristics: it is injurious, 
its harmful character is directed on a certain area 
which it renders insecure, it is not yet present but 
is approaching, it is uncertain in the sense that it 
may pass by, but this uncertainty does not lessen 
the fear but fosters it. He then proceeds to the de­
scription of fearing. This is the discovery of something
* "Systematic Theology," i, p. 118. ** S.u.Z., pp. 140-2
as terrible, which implies, Heidegger thinks, that the 
world is understood a priori to he such that out of it 
something terrible may appear. And finally Heidegger 
turns to Dasein himself, who fears for the sake of 
himself, and asks what this phenomenon reveals in the 
heing of Dasein. It reveals his possibility of danger, 
and incidentally throws light on Heidegger* s choice fe 
of the term Dasein since it draws attention to the 
sheer fact of Dasein* s heing situated in a world where 
his heing is threatened - he simply is there.
This illustration of fear, as well as showing us 
Heidegger*s method of phenomenological analysis, may he 
used also to show the distinctive nature of the existential 
analytic. For it may he asked whether the heing of man 
Is not albeady analysed and described for us in psychology, 
history, theology and other subjects which make a 
study of man in his various activities. But how other 
disciplines differ from the existential analytic may 
he illustrated if we consider, for instance, how the 
psychologist, for instance, might describe fear. He 
would tell us* about the organic state of the fearing 
subject, the action of the sympathetic nervous system
* Gf. e.g., Woodworth, "Psychology," p. 419 ff. -
and the endocrine glands, the effect upon the action of 
the heart, stomach and other organs, the preparation of 
the entire organism for sudden action in the emergency 
which has arisen, and so on. Quite clearly, what we 
have here is an ontical account of fear, whereas 
HMdegger has given us an ontological or existential 
account. He has analysed fear as a way of heing of 
Dasein, and the whole existential analytic is of the 
same kind. It describes Dasein in respect of his heing, 
and is more fundamental than any ontical or scientific 
description of human activity, and is indeed required 
for the proper interpretation of the latter.
We now have before us a preliminary view of the 
concept of existence, and the method by which existence 
may he analysed and described. The existentialist 
philosopher claims that man must always he understood 
as a "who" and not as a "what," and further that 
because existence implies with it the understanding of 
existence, there is open to man the possibility of a 
knowledge of the "who" more certain and more fundamental 
than any- knowledge that he can reach of the "what." We 
how proceed to the existential analytic proper, and its 
bearing on theology.
8. Man and the World.
Man exists, in the sense which we have endeavoured 
to explain in the preceding pages, that is to say, he 
has a relation to himself, he is confronted with 
possibilities, and he is individually unique in his 
heing. This concept of existence carries with it two 
implications which are important for our purpose.
The first is that man is in a world. Heidegger 
is never tired of attacking the notion of a pure ego, 
or a hare subject.* Man is always already in a world 
which is, so to speak, his Spielraum, the field within 
which his possibilities confront him. Whether the 
world is ideal or material, or whether there are both 
ideal and material worlds, are speculative questions 
which need not be raised on the level of the existential 
analytic. The point is simply this, that with the 
understanding of his own existence there is'given to 
man the idea of the world, something other than himself, 
an environmentsin which he is set. Biologists, 
psychologists, and educationists all understand the 
importance of the relations of man to his environment
* Gf. S. u. Z., pp. 114-117.
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"but their interest in these relations is naturallly 
confined to certain ontical aspects. Heidegger is 
interested in the problem from the ontological point 
of view.
He has little difficulty in showing the obscurities 
which beset philosophies which begin with the notion 
of a self-contained subject and seek to relate it to 
an object. Descartes1 res cogitans and res extensa 
come in for special criticism. This philosophy - and 
other traditional philosophies share the defect - is 
bedevilled by the idea of substance, which, Heidegger 
claims, is a category inapplicable to the being of man. 
Man exists, and the world is already given with his 
existence, so there is no need to work out the problem 
of how a world of objects can be known to the mind - 
indeed the attempt to do so rests on a misunderstanding 
of the being of man. Kant thought that it was a scandal 
to philosophy and human intelligence that there was 
lacking a cogent proof for the reality of a world 
outside ourselves. Heidegger's reply is that the 
true scandal of philosophy is not that such a proof 
is lacking, but that it was ever looked for.* Man
* S. u.Z.y p. 203 ff.
as existing is always already in a world. And if he 
were not in a world - whether it be this world of 
space and time, or some other world beyond our ken - 
then he would no longer exist. The pure ego, the 
thinking substance, is a fiction, for if I think, I 
already have an object for my thought. Heidegger would 
restate the famous argument, tfCogito ergo sum," in some 
such words as, "I think something, therefore I am in 
a world. "*
This fundamental character of existence Heidegger 
denotes by the hyphenated expression "being-in-the-warld 
(In-der-Welt-sein). This being-in-the-world is a unity 
Within which we may distinguish through analysis the 
self on the one hand and the world on the other, but 
from which we may not separate either of them. We 
said already that Heidegger’s interest in being-in- 
the-world is ontological or existential. It follows 
therefore that the preposition in the expression must 
be understood in an existential, not a spatial, sense.
To call marl "being-in-the-world" is to say something 
about him Quite different from saying, for instance 
that the Isle of Arran is in the Firth of Clyde.
,fBeing-inM (Insein) is an existential, a way of "being. 
Being-in-the-world expresses the fhe character of man 
that as existing he is hound up with the world, he has 
to do with it, he is occupied with it. The general term 
used hy Heidegger to express this relation of Dasein 
to his world is concern (Besorgen). To he in the world 
does not mean for man merely to he located in it, as 
a rock is, hut to he concerned with it in his existence.
We now turn to the second implication contained in 
the concept of existence. It is that existence can he 
either authentic (eigentlich) or inauthentic (uheigentlich) 
These are the fundamental possibilities which confront 
man in his existence. What exactly is meant hy these 
terms?
Heidegger* s view at this point could almost he 
expressed in Johannine terminology hy saying that man 
is in the world hut not of the world.* He is in the - ‘ ' N'
world in the sense already explained - so long as he 
\
exists, his existence is hound up with the world and 
he has to do with it. But heing-in-the-world is quite 
different from heing within the world (Innerweltlichkeit) 
in the sense of belonging to the world, being a part
* John 17, 15-16.
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of it, as a physical object is. This is once again the 
difference between Existenz and Vorhandenheit. Man is 
always in the world, and yet he is quite distinct from 
it in his way of being. But in his intimate concern 
with the world, claims Heidegger, '’Dasein can lose 
himself to the being that meets him in the world, and 
be taken over by it."* Because he has a relation to 
himself, man can become an object to himself, and can 
understand himself as one object among the other 
objects in his world. This is what is meant by an 
inauthentic existence - man becomes merged in the 
world. He exists authentically when, instead of being 
enslaved to the world, he is free for his world, in 
Heidegger* s phrase. In that case he resolves to be 
himself in the face of a world the being of which is 
alien to his own being. These fundamental possibilities 
of authenticity and inauthenticity may be expressed in 
another way by saying that man can either gain himself 
or lose himself.
- "But what," it may be asked, "has all this to do 
with the faith once delivered to" the saints - or with 
the interpretation of it which is the business of the
* S. u. Z. , p. 76.
theologian?” Admittedly we have made a fairly*long 
excursus at this point into the technicalities of 
existentialism, hut that was necessary if we are to 
follow Bultmann1 s exposition of New Testament teaching 
and assess the value of his work. However we now 
return to the theological problem, and first to the 
Pauline concept of ffQjuu* which Bultmann treats as an 
ontological concept and believes to be of first class 
importance for the understanding of the whole Pauline 
theology, and therefore of much of Christian theology 
in general.
Bultmann says that the concept of is the
most comprehensive of the Pauline anthropological 
concepts, and also the most complicated and difficult 
to understand.* It will be understood therefore that 
here we have a key concept, and that much of - Bultmann1 s 
subsequent exposition of the New, Testament teaching 
rests upon his interpretation of The term is
used in various senses by Saint Paul. We leave aside 
for the present all passages in which he speaks of 
”the body of Christ,” since that is a specialised
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usage. Again, in passages such as that in which he 
speaks of the destruction of the ”body of sin1'* he uses 
the term <* to express a concept for which he more 
commonly uses the term otxpf which will also he treated 
later. For Saint Paul did not share the Gnostic view 
that the hody is necessarily evil. On the contrary 
he taught that f,the hody is not for fornication hut 
for the Lord . . .  it is the temple of the Holy Ghost.”** 
But when special usages have heen set aside, there is 
still a bewildering range of statements and phrases 
from which the characteristic meaning must he sought.
Bultmann1 s own discussion of the concept of ' '■ 
is fairly complicated. Broadly speaking, he approaches 
the problem with the assumption that stands for
a way of being, and more particularly, a way of heing 
in virtue of which man is in a world. While guarding 
against the dangers of over-simplification, we will 
endeavour to expound his interpretation of &u}Uot as 
three fundamental propositions concerning the heing 
of man.
a) Man* s existence is always somatic. The hody 
is constitutive of the being of man, and Saint Paul
* Romans 6, 6. ** I Corinthians 6, 13 & 19.
cannot conceive him without a hody. Even in the life 
to come, man will still he a hody* - not indeed a hody 
of flesh and hlood, hut nevertheless a hody of some 
kind. Saint Paul follows the Hebrew rather than the 
Greek understanding of man. For him man is a unity, 
and the hody is his characteristic way of heing. There 
is no hint here of man’s heing compounded of a material 
substance called a hody and an immaterial substance 
called a soul. The hody, as Saint Paul uses the term, 
is a way of heing - not a substance or a thing. It 
can of course he considered as a purely physical 
structure,'hut that is the concern of the anatomist.
When Saint Paul says, ”Let not sin therefore reign 
in your mortal body,”** he is obviously not thinking 
of tissues of hone and muscle and so on, hut of man*s 
way of heing in a world where sin is possible. To
/
he a hody means that man does not exist as a hare 
discarnate ego - he is always in a world where possibilities 
confront him.
There are of course some passages in Saint Paul’s 
writings which suggest another point of view. The
* I Corinthians 15, 35 ff.
** Romans 6, 12.
most obvious is that in which he seems to speak of 
absence from the body as equivalent to presence with 
the Lord.* This rather looks like the Gnostic view 
of the liberation of the soul from the body. Yet a 
glance at the preceding verses shows that Saint Paul 
believed that on the dissolution of the earthly body 
the believer would be"clothed anew," that is to say, 
his existence would still be somatic. In speaking of 
his own mystical experience of the risen Lord, Saint 
Paul says that he does not know whether this experience 
were "in the body, or out of the body.11** This however 
is an exceptional way of speaking, and seems to mean 
simply that he did not know whether his vision was 
perceived by the bodily senses or by some supernatural 
insight. In any case neither of these passages is 
sufficient to overthrow the characteristic interpretation 
of somatic existence as found in Saint Paul's writings.
b) Man in his being has a relation to himself.
"He can make himself the object of his own action."***
And to express this reflexive action, if we may so 
call it, Saint Paul customarily uses the term
* I Corinthians 5, 8.
** II Corinthians 12, 2. *** Th. des NT., p. 192.
Thus he says that man can abuse himself or master 
himself; that \ie can surrender himself to sin; or that 
he can offer himself to God.* In these examples 
stands for the object-self, yet it is the same man 
who is at once subject and object to himself, so that 
we have here expressed the relatedness of man to 
himself in his being.
c) Man has two fundamental possibilities: he 
can be at one with himself or he can be estranged 
from himself. This follows from what has been said 
about man having a relation to himself. He may master 
himself or he may lose himself and live at war with 
himself. When Saint Paul does on occasion seem to 
approach to the Gnostic understanding of the being of 
man as a soul imprisoned in an alien body, it is, 
Bultmann suggests, because he had become so acutely 
aware of the split within the self in a sinful existence 
that his thought assumes a dualistic form - or at 
least appears to come very close to it.** When the 
body has fallen completely into sin it becomes "the 
body of death"*** from which man must be rescued -
* Of. I Corinthians 9, 27; Romans 6, 12 ff; 12, 1.
** Th. des NT., p. 195 ff. *** Romans 7, 24.
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but this means deliverance from the , the evil
possibilities of somatic existence, and not from the 
body as such, the possibilities of which may be either 
good or bad. The Gnostic view that the body is alien, 
an encumbrance to man’s true being, leads naturally 
either to asceticism or to libertinism. The body 
does not matter. But if the body is man’s necessary 
way of being, both of •fc'tvsse extremes are excluded, 
and that is surely the typical Pauline and Christian 
view.
The three propositions, that man's existence is 
always somatic, that therefore he has a relation to 
himself, and that he is confronted with the two 
basic possibilities of either being at one with himself 
or estranged from himself, clearly constitute an 
existential interpretation of the concept oftftyc*.
This interpretation which Bultmann puts forward immediately 
invites comparison with Heidegger's teaching that man 
is always being-in-the-world, that he exists in the 
sense of being related to himself, and that his 
existence can be authentic or inauthentic. But what 
are we to say of Bultmann's exposition of the concept?
If it is valid, then it is a further confirmation
of what has "been already suggested, namely that there 
is a kinship "between existentialism and New Testament 
thought, so that what we have called the existential 
approach to theology is likely to lead us to the 
authentic thought of the New Testament writers. On 
the other hand it may "be contended that this interpretation 
of the concept of (T^jLtc*. is due simply to the ascendancy 
of existentialist influences in Bultmann’s thinking.
If the question is raised whether the text itself 
supports the interpretation of which Bultmann
expounds, I do not think that a conclusive answer can 
"be given either way. There is insufficient exegetical 
evidence to prove conclusively that Bultmann’s inter­
pretation is the right one, yet on the other hand he 
can adduce sufficient evidence to show that his view 
is at least a reasonable and possible interpretation.
The validity of Bultmann*s exposition may however 
be tested from another angle. If it can be shown that 
Bultmann* s existential interpretation of the concept 
of throws light on any difficult passage of
Pauline theology, and enables us to make better sense 
of it'than other interpretations of do, then
that would weigh the balance significantly in Bultmann’s
74
favour. As an example, we take the notoriously difficult 
doctrine of the resurrection of the "body, as Saint Paul 
teaches it in his First Epistle to the Corinthians.
It is generally agreed that this doctrine, as 
opposed to a "belief in the survival of a soul apart 
from the "body, is intended to teach the continuation 
of the entire personality into the life to come. But 
that in itself does not answer the question of what 
can "be meant "by the resurrection of the "body. The 
crucial element in Saint Paul’s teaching on this subject 
is contained in the verse: ”It is sown a natural body;
it is raised a spiritual body. There is a natural 
body, and there is a spiritual body.”* How do we 
understand this?
Normally Western man understands the body to be a 
substance. About the natural body there is no difficulty 
it is the mortal body of flesh and blood, the physical 
organism. But what of the spiritual body? The trouble 
is that he understands spirit to be a substance also, 
but an immaterial substance, entirely different in 
its nature from the substance of the body. The idea 
of these two substances of which man is supposed to be
* I Corinthians 15, 44.
compounded comes not from the New Testament hut from 
Greek thought, yet it has become so much a part of the 
Western outlook that it is used to interpret the New 
Testament. Hence the difficulty with the spiritual 
body. At first sight this looks like a contradiction 
in terms. If spirit and body are two entirely different 
kinds of substance, how can there be a spiritual body? 
An attempt is made to get round the difficulty by 
imagining some kind of ethereal stuff, midway between 
spirit and body. This seems to be the view taken by 
commentators who work with the concept of substance, 
and are forced to imagine the spiritual body as a kind 
of ghostly replica of the natural body, differing 
from it only in "being freed from some of its previous
i
limitations”* - that is to say, not subject to all 
the laws which normally govern the behaviour of physical 
bodies. This is a far from satisfactory interpretation. 
Not only is it highly speculative, but it seems also 
to be materialistic or animistic in its tendencies. 
Moreover it may be questioned whether such an 
interpretation would really ensure that continuity of 
personality which is implied in the doctrine of the
* Evans, "Corinthians,” p. 139.
resurrection of the body. And similar difficulties 
will beset any interpretation which, explicitly or 
implicitly, understands the body under the category of 
substance.
But now let us set aside the notion of substance, 
and try to understand the natural body and the spiritual 
body existentially. That means that we must understand 
the natural body and the spiritual'body as ways of being 
The first describes man's way of being upon earth, the 
second the Christian believer's way of being in the 
world to come. Ontologically, his being is the same 
in both cases - he is a body, he exists in a world.
Thus the principle of continuity is safeguarded. But 
ontically there is a difference. On earth he is 
always more or less estranged from himself, in the 
life to come he is at one with himself. For 
like is to be understood not as a substance
but as a way of being. It is that way of being in 
which man is truly himself, as opposed to <ToCp>j> j.n 
which he loses himself to the world. Thus understood, 
there is no contradiction and, indeed, no difficulty 
in Saint Paul's mention of the spiritual body. The 
passage, when it is interpreted in an existential
context of ideas appropriate to its subject-matter, which 
is man, becomes simple and intelligible.
It may be objected that we have made the interpretation 
too simple, by those who still hanker after some meta­
physical explanation of the life to come. But to that 
objection it may be replied that Saijtn Paul wrote to 
answer concrete questions of human existence, not to 
satisfy the curiosity of philosophers, and that must 
be remembered in the interpretation of his writings.
His theology is not philosophical construction but the 
exposition of the content of faith - it is existential 
in the sense that it exhibits man's way of being as 
believing. If an existential explanation seems in­
adequate and we look for some abstruse metaphysical 
doctrine in his treatment of the resurrection of the 
body, his reply might well be: "Eye hath not seen, nor 
ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, 
the things which God hath prepared for them that love 
him. But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit."* 
Saint Paul is not concerned to solve intellectual 
problems but to set before men existentiell possibilities.
The risen life in Christ is not a philosophical
* £ Corinthians 2, 9.
conception but a possibility for which men are asked to 
decide. Thus it may be claimed that Bultmann* s existential 
interpretation of somatic existence not only renders 
intelligible a difficult passage in Saint Paul's 
writings, but brings it from the realms of speculation 
to the actual problems of human existence.
We have so far confined our attention almost ex­
clusively to the Pauline theology. But Bultmann 
extends his existential approach to the other New 
Testament ^ writings also, and before we leave this 
general discussion of the concept of existence in the 
world and its implications, we must look at the Johannine 
theology also. Attention was already drawn to the 
significance of the Johannine way of speaking of 
being in the world but not of the world. There is 
however in the Johannine writings no key ontological 
concept comparable to the Pauline (pSjUbi. The argument 
for an existential interpretation here must therefore 
rest on the question how far it makes the Johannine 
theology intelligible, and how far the implicit v
understanding of the being of man which can be discerned 
in the Johannine writings is akin to the concept of 
■existence. So far as the Johannine writings take
over the same assumptions derived from Hebrew thought 
as did Saint Paul, we would expect to find a similar 
understanding of man1s existence in the thought of bbth. 
That this is indeed so Bultmann argues from his con­
sideration of what he calls the Johannine dualism. By 
this he means the contrasted concepts which occur 
throughout the Johannine writings - light and darkness, 
truth and falsehood, life and death, freedom and 
enslavement.* This dualistic way of speaking suggests 
a Gnostic provenance. But whereas Gnosticism attributed 
darkness, falsehood, and the other negative concepts 
to the working of evil powers, and rested on an 
ultimate metaphysical dualism, in the Johannine writings 
in which God is acknowledged as Creator of the world 
they must be interpreted in the light of some such 
concept of existence as we have described. They are 
possibilities of decision. These concepts "gain all 
their meaning from the question of human existence, 
and express the double possibility in man1s existing."** 
That $ouble.i possibility is to live from God, or to 
iiire from human resources - for man to be himself as 
the child of God, or to lose himself in the world.
* E.g. , John 1, 5; 6, 33; 8', 32, etc. ** Th. NT., p. 367.
9. The World.
We saw that man is always in a world, and that 
Heidegger uses the expression being-in-the-world to 
indicate a fundamental characteristic of human existence, 
namely, man* s intercourse in the world with entities 
belonging to the world.* "Being-in” here meant an 
existential relation, and is to be distinguished from 
the physical relation of being within the world, which 
characterises the things with which man is concerned 
in the world. They belong to the world, whereas man 
as existing stands apart from it. To reach the existential 
understanding of the world we begin with the consideration 
of the things within the world (das innerweltliche 
Seiende) which confront man in his practical concern 
as being-in-the-world.
"The Greeks,” says Heidegger, "had an appropriate 
name for things, namely, rrpvy^ arnx, that is, what we 
have to do with in 7Tp3L§t.$ or active intercourse."**
He goes on to say that unfortunately (from his point 
of view) when the Greeks came to philosophise they 
neglected the pragmatic character of things and
* S. u. Z. , p. 67. ** S. u. Z. , p. 68.
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considered them as mere things (hlosse Dinge), objects of 
theoretical study rather than of practical concern. This 
led them to explain the "being of what is within the world 
in terms of substantiality, extension, and so on, and to 
understand the world as a self-contained cosmos. In 
constructing the existential concept of the world 
Heidegger returns to the pragmatic character of the 
entities within the world as they confront man in his 
concern. They are characterised as zuhanden rather than 
merely vorhanden - they are to hand, immediately present 
to my concern, rather than mere objects for contemplation 
or observation. The ®erman term Zuhandenheit conveys the 
further sense of being handy or useful. What is in the 
world is of use to me, it is an instrument (Zeug).
This applies not only to things like writing materials, 
garden implements, vehicles and the like, which are 
obviously instrumental in character, but to objects in 
nature which might at first sight seem to be remote from 
man* s concern. The forest is timber, the mountain is a 
quarry, the river is a canal, all are actually or 
potentially instruments. Even the celestial bodies 
can be used as instruments for telling the time, finding 
the way, and so on. To quote one of Heidegger*s own
examples,* the south wind may "be considered as purely an 
object (vorhanden), namely, a stream of air with a given 
geographical direction. When the farmer makes use of 
the south wind as an indication of rainy weather to come, 
this is not just an additional property of the wind, it 
is man’s discovery of its instrumental character so that 
it ceases to be merely vorhanden and becomes zuhanden.
The mere thing, Heidegger maintains, is potentially an 
instrument not yet understood, and as man learns to use 
it, he also discovers it in its being.
Boes this look like pure subjectivism? We reserve 
this point for discussion later. Meantime we are coming 
into view of the existential concept of the world as 
an instrumental system. That which is immediately to 
hand has the character of escaping notice (Unauffalligkeit) 
My attention is not directed to the pen in my hand but 
to what I am writing, not to the telephone I use but 
to the person at the other end of the line. The in­
strument immediately to hand only comes into the focus 
of attention when something goes wrong with it - for 
instance, the pen runs dry or the telephone goes dead.
Then we suddenly become aware of its place in an entire
= ... . ^ *V  '•"'** ‘7  ^ J? S  J?W*
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instrumental system. F6r each individual instrument 
carries with it its implications (Bewandtnisse).* The 
fountain pen in my hand implies ink to fill it and paper 
on which to write, the paper implies the paper-mills 
and the raw materials, and so on. As an instrument, 
everything has a reference (Verweisung) to something 
else, and the totality of these references constitutes 
the significance (Bedeutsamkeit) of the world. These 
references are Brought into a unity in that they are 
all directed to one end - they are for the sake of 
Daseln. Now since every instrument implies a reference 
to the whole system, the idea of the world is already 
present implicitly in the understanding of the individual 
instrument. Thus the world, as Heidegger understands it, 
is an a priori concept of an instrumental system 
founded in man* s practical concern.
The world, in Heidegger’s view, is therefore not 
primarily an objective cosmos the laws of which are to 
he discovered by the intellectual activity of science, 
but a workshop** which man, as being-in-the-world, 
constructs in his practical concern. The implications 
of this concept of the world will be more fully clarified 
when we go on to discuss Heidegger’s view of understanding.
* S. u. Z. , p. 83 ff. ** S. -q. Z. , p. 75.
Meanwhile to complete the picture we note briefly the 
existential concept of spatiality. The pure extension of 
geometrical science is an abstraction prior to which 
comes the space of practical concern. This is conceived 
as a system of places, analogous to the system of 
instruments which constitutes the world. A place (Platz) 
is not a mere location (Raumstelle).* It is to be 
understood in relation to man’s practical concern - 
everything that he uses has its place where he will find 
it to hand. He constructs for himself a system of 
places in which he moves in his everyday concerns. This 
system also escapes notice until something forces our 
attention upon it - for instance, we remove from one 
house to another, nothing can be found in its place, 
and we realise for the first time how much we relied 
upon the system of places which we had constructed. 
Distance also is primarily understood in relation to 
concern. The interlocutor at the other end of the tele­
phone line is near to my concern, even if, in terns of 
the objective measurement of distance, he is a hundred 
miles away. Man has a tendency to annul space and 
bring things nearer to himself, for instance, in speedier
* S. u. Z. , p. 102.
..... „ . -• >”- r .v#: iv*-';!'.w£:Xv., -’ - ■'•;- •:. y - - _ ' - =■; ;_ - ' ‘ " '• s vOp ;
transport and teleeoimirunioations of various kinds. It 
is true that the distance in terms of miles remains the 
same, hut it is reduced from the point of view of man’s 
concerns, and in Heidegger’s view the space of practical 
concern is prior to the space of geometry and exact 
measurement, and the condition of it. While time is 
considered by Heidegger to he quite different in its 
character from space, the primary reckoning of time is 
also in terms of my concern. There is a time to get up, 
a time to go out to work, and so on.
In his everyday inauthentic existence, man is
- /
ahsorhed in his concern with the world. He is at home 
(vertraut) in the world, he understands himself and his 
possibilities from the world, he seeks his security in 
it.* He loses himself in the world and regards himself 
as belonging to the world. But in that case has not man 
ceased to exist, since existence was defined hy dis­
tinguishing the being of man from the being of what is 
within the world, the objects of the world? Heidegger 
himself answers this objection. It could only hold, he 
says, if man were an isolated subject, and the world his 
object. Then to be lost in the world would mean that 
he too had become an object. But man is always already
* Of. S. u. Z., p. 54.
being-in-the-world, and even inauthenticity is a possibility 
of being-in-the-world. Man can only lose himself because 
he exists, and stands before the possibility of losing 
himself.*
The complete existential concept of the world has 
therefore two sides to it. a) The world is an instrumental 
system, a workshop, to be understood in relation to man’s 
practical concern, b) The world is a threat to man’s 
authentic existence, in so far as he can lose himself in 
it, and conceal from himself the difference between his 
own being and the being of what is within the world.
The New Testament term for the world of things is 
generally not , as in Greek philosophy, but MTfcrtj f
the creation. Sometimes in the Johannine writings Ac 
means the created world, but both there and in the 
Pauline writings this term usually has a different 
significance, as we shall see later. In any case the 
Greek concept of a self-contained rational cosmos is 
one that is quite alien to Biblical thought. The Old 
Testament writers speak often enough of the world of 
nature, but they appear to have no interest in what 
might be called the scientific view of nature. The
* S. u. Z. , p. 179.
New Testament writers, accepting this tradition of thought, 
are equally indifferent to anything like a scientific 
view of nature.
What then is their concept of the world? The term 
used hy Saint Paul for the world is, as was mentioned 
already, k t 'ktis 9 the creation. Bultmann points out that 
this term has a twofold significance for Saint Paul.* a)
The creation is the work of God, made hy Him for man1s 
use and enjoyment. ”The earth is the Lord’s, and the 
fulness thereof.”** As such, the creation is good. Here 
Saint Paul is following the Old Testament teaching. God 
Himself ia author of the creation, and He considered it 
to he good; it is a garden for man to cultivate; it is 
the sphere over which man has been set.***01 early what 
we have here is something like a religious interpretation 
of the existential concept of the world as a workshop, 
primarily to be understood in relation to man’s practical 
concerns, b) But the creation can also be conceived as 
hostile. It has fallen under the dominion of evil
i
powers**** - and here presumably we see a Gnostic 
influence combining with the Old Testament tradition in
* Th. des NT., p. 226. ** I Corinthians 10, 26.
*** Genesis 1, 31; Genesis 2, 8 ff; Psalm 8, 6.
**** Romans 8, 22.
the Pauline concept of the created world. But while ' 
Saint Paul sometimes uses Gnostic terminology, it seems 
clear that in his view the creation (which is God’s 
creation) can be hostile not because it belongs to evil 
powers external to man, but because man himself has given 
to it these possibilities of evil. The real trouble is 
that man has “worshipped and served the creature (#-rfcrt£) 
more than the Creator. ”* Because he has done so, the 
creation has, so to speak, gone corrupt in his hands, 
and instead of being a thing of use it becomes a threat 
to his being. It can become “a hostile destroying force 
if man has decided for it instead of for God, that is, 
if he founds his life upon it instead of upon God.”**
Man as existing stands apart from the world. He is 
between the world and God, and he can decide to build 
his life on the one or the other. Again we have here 
something like a religious statement of the second side 
of the existential concept of the world as the alien 
being in which man can lose himself.
The corresponding Johannine teaching may be summarised 
in Bultmann* s phrase as ”the perversion (Verkehrung)
* Romans 1, 25.
** Th. des NT., p. 226.
oof the creation into the world.”* As an illustration 
there may "be quoted the double use of the term l<£b'/uo$ 
in the verse, Hthe world was made hy him, and the world 
knew him not.”** Here we have together the thought of 
the world as the creation of G-od and the thought of the 
world as hostile power. But since we have here heen 
principally concerned with the term KTtcn^i further 
discussion of the t em KOGftc% will he deferred until 
later.
The foregoing discussion has shown how the existential. 
concept of the world is used hy Bultmann to interpret 
the Mew Testament concept of the creation. The problem 
is related to the possibilities of human existence, and 
the New Testament teaching on this subject is expounded 
within the horizon of these possibilities. The inter­
pretation offered by Bultmann appears to be intelligible 
and satisfying, nor does it seem to do violence to the ' 
text of the New Testament. But is the existential "
concept of the world a valid one? Is it not subjective, 
or even fanciful, in its thought of an instrumental 
system, or a world which tempts man to lose himself?
* Th. des NT. , p. 373.
** John 1, 10.
Over against it stands the scientific attitude to the world 
with its claim to he objective, impersonal, and unpre- '
frudiced. Is that not the true picture, and.the one in
;
the light of which we should seek to interpret the Biblical 
concept of the world? But if we do seek so to interpret 
it, we seem to find that there is no point of contact.
The Biblical concept of the world seems to be as far 
removed from'the scientific view as is the existential 
concept, and to be equally fanciful and unrealistic from 
the viewpoint of one accustomed to look upon nature scienti­
fically. Or on the other hand, does the existentialist 
concept of the world represent the rediscovery of truths 
long neglected, and which are present also in the Biblical 
concept of t4ae world? To these questions we must now 
address ourselves, and this will involve a consideration 
of what we mean by understanding.
CHAPTER III
THE DISCLOSURE OP EXISTENCE
10. Understanding.
When we speak of understanding, we commonly think' 
of an intellectual activity which leads to theoretical 
knowledge. To understand anything means to know its 
properties and 'behaviour, and the most exact understanding 
is of the kind which we call scientific. Against this 
excessive intellectualism however Heidegger and other 
existentialist thinkers protest. For Heidegger, Munder- 
standing always touches on the whole constitution of 
■being-in-the-world.,f* That is to say, it is not purely 
or even primarily theoretical, "but is rooted in man1 s 
way of being as practically concerned with his world.
We all know that theoretical understanding is not the 
only kind of understanding. I may understand the 
working of the internal combustion engine, the principles 
of transmitting power, and so on, but that in itself 
will not enable me to drive a car. For that I need a 
different kind of knowledge which must be acquired by
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practice. Yet the latter seems to "be at least equally as 
important as the former, and is equally entitled to toe 
called understanding. I may toe thoroughly conversant 
with the rules of cricket, tout it does not follow that 
therefore I can emulate Sir Donald Bradman with the 
bat. That would require a practical understanding of 
the same kind as I need for driving a car. It is worth 
noting that a child’s first question atoout any novel 
object is usually, "What is it for?" That is the 
question of practical concern. The child seeks to 
understand things in terms of their use. An infant 
may toe said to have understood a spoon when he lifts it 
to his mouth. He has discovered its serviceatoility, 
though he is still ignorant of its objective properties, 
for instance, whether it is of wood or horn or silver.
To quote one of Heidegger’s own illustrations, consider 
the sentence, "The hammer is heavy."* For everyday 
understanding this does not mean that a certain object, 
called a hammer, has a certain property, namely, 
heaviness. It is understood in relation to practical 
concern, and it issues in changing the unsuitable 
instrument for a lighter one. Indeed the understanding
* S. u. Z., p. 157.
93
is there in the act of substitution, even if nothing is 
said. It need not he formulated in words at all. The 
world is not primarily an object of contemplation hut 
the field of my concern, and my everyday understanding 
of it and statements ahout it relate to that concern. 
Things are understood as zuhanden rather than vorhanden, 
to use the terms which we met in connection with the 
existential concept of the world.
The practical understanding which we have described 
is regarded by Heidegger as the fundamental understanding, 
the understanding which touches on the whole constitution 
of man as being-in-the-world. It is the condition which 
makes theoretical understanding possible. Theoretical 
or scientific understanding is held to be a special case 
of understanding in general. In that special case 
entities are abstracted from all practical concern 
and viewed as purely objective.
Did men play cricket before they formulated the 
rules of the game? No doubt the rules were subsequent 
in time to the playing of the game, and were framed in 
accordance with the way in which the game was actually 
played. On the other hand it might be contended that 
the rules, in some form, were logically prior to the
game, "because as soon as men "began to play the game, they 
must have had already some accepted conventions in their 
minds. If the question were whether or Tp^ftS
comes first, it might seem as insoluble and as fruitless 
to attempt an answer as to decide "between the rival 
claims to precedence of the hen and the egg. Each seems 
to imply the other.
However the contrast in Heidegger is not strictly 
"between theory and practice, "but rather "between the 
purest theory (which, in his view, is never quite pure, 
that is to say, never entirely aloof from practical 
concern,) and that other understanding, itself a kind of 
implicit theory even if it cannot, "be formulated, which 
"belongs to everyday activities. To return to our
*
illustration, as well as the rules of cricket there is 
what the Americans would call the ''know-how,f of the 
players. They cannot formulate that as they formulate 
the rules, though perhaps it is communicable in other 
ways, but it is knowledge or understanding, possessed 
by those who play the game. And this type of under­
standing, Heidegger claims, is our most fundamental 
understanding of the world. Our closest intercourse 
with the world is not percipient knowledge, but the
practical concern which uses, handles, and so on, and 
has its own knowledge.*
Before we go on to the further exposition of 
Heidegger’s treatment of understanding, let us pause 
to consider Briefly the implications of this line of 
thought for theology. Heidegger has attempted to show 
that as well as the theoretical knowledge which reaches 
its purest expression in science, there is another 
knowledge which is much more difficult to formulate 
hut which should not on that account he overlooked. 
Indeed, if Heidegger is right, scientific knowledge is 
subordinate to and derivative from this fundamental 
existential knowledge, as it is frequently called.
(The expression 1 existential knowledge” is not used hy 
Heidegger, hut as it has become current, we accept the 
Usage while noting that the tern ”existential” is 
here used in a looser sense than the one already 
defined.**) How it is with this existential kind of 
knowledge that theology is primarily concerned. The 
knowledge of God is different from our knowledge of 
nature. It is not a set of propositions about God,
i
* S. u. Z. , p. 67.
** Supra, p. 55.
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as if God were an object to be viewed with acadeMelc
/
detachment, hut the knowledge which is implicit in our 
faith in God. "He judged the cause of the poor and 
needy; then it was well with him: was not this to know 
me? saith the Lord.”* The knowledge spoken of here, 
like Heidegger* s understanding of the hammer, did not 
issue in a statement hut in a pattern of action. This 
knowledge is not theoretical in the usual sense of that 
term, hut it is a genuine an insight or under­
standing implicit in the experience of faith in God. 
Contemporary theologians, whether or not they use the 
expression "existential knowledge,'* seem to have grasped 
the peculiar status of religious knowledge much more 
clearly than did the theologians of a century ago.
Dr William Temple, for instance, has dealt very faithfully 
with the difference between a mere theistic philosophy 
and the genuine knowledge of God in his criticism of 
Descartes.**
Two consequences follow from recognising that the 
knowledge of God is of the kind that we call existential.
The first is that we can no more speak intelligently
* Jeremiah 22, 16.
** "Nature, Man, and God,** Lectures II & III
about God without the experience of faith than we can 
talk intelligently about cricket without ever having 
handled a bat or bowled a ball. Theological knowledge 
must be from the inside, it must be faith interpreting 
itself. Here of course the difficulty of communication 
arises. We saw already that the Biblical writers used 
poetry, myth and historical narrative rather than the 
systematic treatise for the communication of their thought 
Action and example are other important ways in which an 
existential understanding of any kind may be communicated.
But in any case the communication must be made by
6-
someone who has the existential knowledge. To quote 
Tillich: "If the word ’existential’ points to a parti­
cipation which transcends both subjectivity and ob­
jectivity, then man's relation to the gods is rightly 
called existential. Man cannot speak of the gods in 
detachment. The moment he tries to do so, he has lost 
the god and has established just one more object within 
the world of objects. Man can speak of the gods only 
on the basis of his relation to them."* It may be 
asked in view of this whether the work of the theologian 
does not therefore break down on the difficulty of
* "Systematic Theology," vol. I, p. 238.
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communicating knowledge which is of an existential kind, 
for the theologian is expected, so far as possible to 
dispense with myth, poetry, and the other ways of com­
municating existential knowledge that were mentioned, 
and to set out his teaching systematically in the 
plainest language that he can find. This however is 
precisely the same question that was asked and. answered 
in connection with the existentialist philosopher’s 
attempt to give a systematic account of the being of 
man after he had maintained that existence is always 
my own or someone’s own - the principle of Jemeinigkeit* 
and therefore defies generalisation and classification. 
The being of neither man nor God can be objectively 
set down as are the properties of the natural world in 
scientific analysis. But there is still the possibility 
of the phenomenological method, which in the case of 
theology would mean the descriptive analysis of the 
self's experience of God in faith.
The second consequence of recognising that the 
knowledge of God is existential knowledge is to give 
to it its own certainty. If we accept Heidegger’s 
analysis of understanding, the understanding which is 
implicit in jr^ Sjfv is as much entitled to respect as
* Supra p. 55 ff.
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is the purest theory, and is indeed, he would claim, 
more fundamental. This is of course altogether 
contrary to the prevailing popular view that the highest 
degree of certainty belongs to scientific knowledge 
alone, and that other kinds of so-called knowledge, 
religious knowledge among them, are really only 
matters of opinion, or perhaps matters of feeling.
Many reasons could he adduced for the rise of that 
popular view - or popular delusion, we might say - 
such as the amazing success of science in explaining 
nature on the one hand, the difficulties of communicating 
knowledge of the existential kind on the other, and 
the frequent confusion in the past (especially in 
the disputes between theology and science) of existential 
understanding with what we may call objective under­
standing. All these factors have contributed to the 
development of a scientific positivism, which of 
course has its influence on the unreflective popular 
outlook of the twentieth century. Heidegger - and 
in this he remains faithful to Husserl - opposes the 
exclusive claims made for the scientific method as 
the only avenue to genuine understanding and knowledge, 
and in the guest for certain foundations on which to
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build his philosophy, he directs attention away from 
nature to the analysis of the self as existing, that 
is to say, standing outside nature. And the self differs 
from every object in nature precisely in this, that to 
the self belongs what Heidegger calls disclosure 
(Erschlossenheit). Man not only is, he understands 
that he is, he is open or disclosed to himself in his 
being. This disclosure, which is a fundamental structure 
of existence, Heidegger identifies with the traditional 
doctrine of a ’’light of nature.”* This is the fundamental 
understanding which makes possible all other understanding 
and knowledge. It has already been pointed out how this 
teaching of Heidegger differs from the ’’cogito ergo 
sum*1 of Descartes, to which it bears a superficial 
resiemhlraBee. ** Descartes also was looking for a certain 
foundation on which to erect his philosophy, and he 
thought that he had found it in the pure subject, the 
doubting self which cannot doubt the reality of its 
own doubt. Heidegger, we saw, rejects the notion of 
a bare subject. What is disclosed by the ’’light of 
nature” - that is, by the very structure of man’s 
existence as open to himself - is ”being-in-the-world.”
* S. u. Z., p. 133. ** Supra p. 64.
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The self and the world are given together. ”Truth in 
the most original sense is the disclosure of Dasein, 
to which belongs the discovery of nature.”* But if 
this be so, then the phenomenological analysis of the 
experiences of the self as being-in-the-worid should 
be able to yield knowledge which is more fundamental, 
certain, and indubitable than any scientific understanding 
of nature. And if, among the possible ways of being 
which are disclosed to man in the analysis of his own 
existence, we find the way of being which we call . 
religious faith, then the analysis of it - that is, 
theology - can lay claim to the same truth that belongs 
to all phenomenological analysis. Theological statements 
are not therefore merely matters of opinion, still less 
expressions of feeling, neither true nor false, as the 
logical positivist might say. They are statements 
which communicate that existential knowledge to which 
the most original truth belongs. That original truth 
is not the correspondence of statements to facts (a 
very difficult theory in any case) but the ”light of 
nature,” the disclosure of being-in-the-world to itself, 
which makes all understanding and knowledge possible.
* S. u. Z. , p. 223.
Let us now consider further the view of understanding 
which Heidegger sets forth. Understanding is an existential 
a possible way of being. Its characteristic structure is 
the project (Entwurf).* The term project, as used by 
Heidegger, seems to contain two ideas. As related to 
man’s possibilities, it suggests intention or purpose.
By this we do not mean that a project is a plan which 
has been thought out and is then put into operation - 
indeed Heidegger explicitly says that a project does 
not mean this for him. But when the child lifts a spoon 
to his mouth, he has understood the spoon in the sense 
that he has discovered its instrumental character. He 
is making it serve his possibilities in projecting his 
possibilities upon it.
This brings us to the second idea contained in the 
notion of a project. This is analogous to projection 
in mathematics. Meaning is projected upon things by 
the understanding. In themselves, Heidegger holds, 
they are meaningless. But this implies that the world 
itself is an existential. That is not to say that 
there is nothing apart from what is understood, for 
Heidegger is not a follower of Berkeley. What is (das
Seiende) is there whether it is understood or not, hut 
it only becomes a world and acquires significance 
through the projecting activity of man’s understanding. 
The world is thus itself a way of being which man as 
understanding constructs in projecting his possibilities 
This brings us once again to the question whether 
the existentialist view of the world as an instrumental 
system constructed by man’s projects is subjectivism, 
even in spite of the fact that Heidegger strenuously 
opposes the notion of a pure subject, and contends that 
the being of man is always being-in-the-world. Does 
he really escape subjectivism? It may, I think, be 
fairly claimed that Heidegger’s account of the world 
is neither more nor less subjective than, let us say, 
the account given by Kant on the one hand, or by a 
modern physicist on the other. Kant’s categories of 
substance and accident, cause and effect, and so on, 
were in his own view forms imposed upon phenomena by 
the understanding. The mathematical formulae of the 
scientist are equally constructions of the understanding 
which he finds convenient for the interpretation 
of natural phenomena. These two cases are projects, 
in Heidegger’s sense of the term, but they are highly '
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specialised projects - the projects of theoretical 
understanding. The categories of substantiality, 
causality, and so on, or their modem equivalents, 
are the basiceconcepts (Begrifflichkeit) for the 
project of a scientific understanding of the world. 
Heidegger1s categories, for instance, Zuhandenheit, 
Vorhandenheit, Innerweltlichkeit, - and we must 
remember that his categories are to be distinguished 
from his existentials* - differ from those of Kant or 
the scientist in being the categories of everyday 
understanding, and not of that specialised type of 
understanding which we call theoretical or scientific.
And this everyday understanding which relates to practical 
concern is of course far more fundamental to man’s 
existence and occupies him for a far greater part of 
his time than theoretical understanding. Even a 
philosopher or a physicist, when he turns a door 
handle, thinks of it as a handy instrument, not as a 
metal object or a pattern of molecules and atoms. In-
other words, he conceives it under the categoryeof
/
Zuhandenheit, not under the categories of philosophy 
or science which are related to theoretical understanding, 
whether they be Kantian or more recent.
* Supra p. 21.
These different ways of understanding the world 
are not antagonistic to one another, and it is most 
unfortunate that existentialism is sometimes regarded 
as anti-scientific or even irrational. The different 
ways of understanding arise from the projecting of 
different possibilities of man1s being - the possibilities 
of his practical concern, or the possibilities of his 
theoretical reasoning. There could only be conflict 
if it were claimed that the true understanding of the 
world belongs exclusively to one of these projects - 
a claim which might be made by the logical positivists 
on behalf of the scientific project. But we have 
already dwelt at some length on Heidegger1s arguments 
against such a claim, and his demonstration of the 
importance of existiential understanding over against 
theoretical understanding.
What further light does the foregoing discussion 
throw on the New Testament understanding of the world 
as the ktutis , the creation of God? We" noted already 
that this understanding of the world is more akin to 
th.e existentialist than to the scientific concept of 
the world. The world, as created by God, is of use 
to man who is God’s creature, but it has also the
possibility of being hostile to man when he prizes the 
creation above the Creator. This understanding of the 
world is the project of religious faith. It is not a 
theoretical but an existential understanding. That is 
to say, we do not reason from the world and its useful­
ness to a Creator. Such arguments may have some force, 
but they lead to the God of metaphysics, an object of 
theoretical knowledge, and can never lead to the living 
God of religious faith. Who is never an object. In 
religious faith, God is disclosed immediately with 
the self and the world. Heidegger teaches that in the 
original disclosure of Dasein the self and the world 
are disclosed together. Religious thought must go 
beyond that and assert that God also is disclosed - 
or rather, discloses Himself. In the light of that 
disclosure, the world is understood as creation and 
the self as the creature who may use the creation or 
be lost in it. It is through the existential knowledge 
of God Who discloses Himself to man in his way of
being which we call faith, and not through any theoretical
\
reasoning that we understand the world as creation. 
"Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed 
by the word of God, so that things which are seen were
not made of things which do appear."* Only so do we 
apprehend the Creator as the living God, and not as 
merely some shadowy First Cause.
But if God discloses Himself together with'tthe 
self and the world, why then, it may be asked, is 
there no mention of God in Heidegger’s existential 
analytic, which Bultmann seems prepared to accept, 
in its broad outlines at least, as an adequate analysis 
of that "understanding of existence which is given with 
existence" and therefore as a suitable ontological 
Begrifflichkeit for the problems of theology? This 
is in fact the question which Schumann has raised 
about Bultmann’s approach to theology.** Can there 
be a trustworthy analysis of human existence which does 
not see that existence in relation to God? In answer 
to this objection, it may be replied that the religious 
bearing of Heidegger’s philosophy is by no means simple. 
This question will be raised again later, but for 
the present we may say that even if God is not dis­
closed in the phenomenological analysis of understanding, 
so far as we have pursued it, there is still another
* Hebrews 11, 3.
** Kerygma und Mythos, vol. I, p. 220.
very important mode of disclosure of which Heidegger 
treats, that which is given in affective states or 
moods (Befindlichkeiten) which have their own understanding, 
and especially the state of dread or anxiety (Angst).
This topic will occupy us in the next section, and 
there we shall see that Heidegger’s existential analytic 
comes very near to becoming a religious philosophy.
It will be argued at that point that the existential 
analytic should become religious for its completion, 
and that God is disclosed with the self and the wrorld, 
as has been already asserted.
Before leaving the subject of understanding, there 
are some further points that remain to be discussed. 
vThe doctrine of creation, which is of fundamental 
importance in the New Testament as well as in the Old 
Testament, has been one of the principal battle-grounds 
in the conflicts which have arisen over the question 
of the relations of religion and science. It should be 
clear from what has been said that the scientific and 
Biblical accounts of the world arise from different 
projects, and there can be no question of conflict 
between them - unless, indeed, one or the other asserts 
to itself exclusive truth as the only possible understanding
of the world. The scientific view of the world is 
the project of the theoretical understanding, the 
doctrine of creation is the project of the existential 
understanding which belongs to faith.
There are of course now very few who would hold 
that, let us say, the Genesis accounts of the creation 
are to be regarded as science, or who would attempt 
the harmonising of these accounts with the teaching of. 
science, as was once done. But what is not so clearly 
understood is that these accounts are not primarily 
theism either, even if they imply theism. They are 
not, that is to say, mythological symbols intended to 
teach a philosophy of cosmic origins or a theistic 
world-view. Their teaching goes far beyond any meta­
physical doctrine of a First Cause, which like science 
would belong to the sphere of theoretical understanding. 
The Biblical accounts of the creation are to be under­
stood existentially. They are vehicles for the communi­
cation of the existential understanding of the living 
God - the saving knowledge of God, if we may so speak - 
which belonged to the sacred writers and was disclosed 
or revealed to them in the experience of faith. Thus 
Adam’s dependence and creatureliness is both the writer’
and mine when I read his story and understand it as 
something which touches my existence. Adam’s dis­
obedience is the writer’s disobedience and my dis­
obedience; Adam’s fall is the writer’s fall and my 
fall. Here is neither science nor philosophy, but 
something much more important for myself confronted with 
the problems of existence, namely, a disclosure of 
myself as a creature who has fallen into sin. So 
also with the account of the creation of the world of 
nature. It does not teach me hofc/to understand the 
world considered as an object for theoretical study, 
as science teaches me, but it does teach me to understand 
the world as a constant factor in my existence as 
being-in-the-worid, that the world is good and for my 
use, but that at the same time I lose myself in the 
world in preferring the creature above the Creator 
as Adam did. Thus understood, there can be no possible 
conflict between the teaching of these accounts and 
the teaching of science or cosmology, and thus under­
stood it is clear also that these accounts of the 
creation touch a level of truth more fundamental and 
important for my existence than any theory of cosmic 
origins could be.
To complete this discussion of understanding, it 
is necessary finally to consider the New Testament 
passages which explicitly speak of understanding or 
knowledge, and to- ask whether they confirm the existential 
view of religious understanding which has here been 
expounded. And first let us consider the Pauline 
concept of voos > with reference to Bultmann’s inter­
pretation of it.*
Passages such as "be ye transformed by the renewing 
of your mind (or understanding)" and "God gave them over 
to a reprobate mind (or understanding),1 to do those 
things which are not convenient,"** clearly indicate 
that for Saint Paul voo$ does not stand for theoretical 
understanding but for a practical understanding closely 
connected with willing and doing. Indeed, Bultmann 
suggests that in the two verses quoted, vo3% might 
almost be rendered by character.*** Ontologically 
this practical understanding is the "light of nature" 
which discloses to me my possibilities for good or 
evil, and makes possible my decisions - it is "the 
law of my mind (or understanding). "**** But ontically 
the understanding may be fallen or "reprobate" and
* Th. des NT., p. 207 ff. ** Romans 12, 2; 1, 28.
*** Th. des NT., p. 208. **** Romans 7, 23.
therefore misleading - and of course both Saint Paul 
and Heidegger teach that the understanding is in fact 
generally fallen.
If understanding bears this practical or existential 
sense in the New Testament, it justifies the reiterated 
use by Bultmann (and in this usage he also follows 
Heidegger) of the expression self-understanding (Selbst- 
verstandnis) in his interpretation of Christian theology. 
He can say that Jesus taught men a new understanding 
of themselves; that Saint Paul’s conversion was a new 
self-understanding; that the Christian life is a new 
understanding of the self. If by understanding Bultmann 
meant primarily a theoretical activity, then to speak 
of a new understanding of the self would seem to be 
a very inadequate account alike of the teaching of 
Jesus, the conversion of the apostle, and the Christian 
life. But in the sense of understanding which has 
been explained, and which seems close to the New 
Testament meaning of the term, a new understanding of 
the self means nothing less than a complete reorien­
tation of the entire personality. It is equivalent 
to a new life.
In the Johannine writings it might seem that 
there is a bias in the direction of intellectualism.
Frequently recurring concepts such as "knowledge,” "truth,” 
“light,” are reminiscent of Greek philosophy. Commenting 
on this affinity with Greek thinking, E.F. Scott remarks 
that the Fourth Gospel “lays stress on knowledge as the 
chief factor in the attainment of life.”* But is knowledge 
understood even here, in spite of the affinity with 
Greek thinking, as theoretical or speculative knowledge?
The same commentator goes on to say that ”a native 
Hebrew strain in John’s thinking blends itself with the 
Greek, and essentially modifies it.” The effect of this 
modification, we would say, is to bring knowledge and 
truth from the sphere of the theoretical to that of the 
practical. Christ himself is the truth** - not his 
discourses only, but primarily himself in his life and 
death and resurresction. Another commentator on the 
Fourth Gospel says, “Christ did not answer all our 
speculative questions, but his life itself is the 
answer to all the final questions”*** - and by “final 
questions” we may suppose are meant the ultimate 
questions of man's existence. Whatever affinities we 
may trace with Greek speculation, the Johannine concept
* Of. "The Fourth Gospel,” pp. 256-257. ** John 14, 6.
*** C.J. Wright, “Mission and Message of Jesus,” p. 881.
of the knowledge of God which is “life eternal”* is 
essentially like the concepts of knowledge and under­
standing which we find in the other Biblical writers.
It is a knowledge of the kind which we call existential.
11. Anxiety.
It was mentioned before that Heidegger teaches 
that man is disclosed to himself in his being not 
only by understanding but also by affective state 
(Befindlichkeit). All understanding is coloured by some 
emotional mood, while every mood of the emotions has 
its own understanding.** We suggested that this mode 
of disclosure which comes with feeling is of special 
importance for religious thought, and it is to this 
problem that we turn now.
The affective states which Heidegger proposes to 
analyse ontologically are, he says, familiar to us 
ontically as moods. Man always has some mood. Both 
the undisturbed equanimity and the frustrated discontent 
of everyday existence, and the passing over from one 
to the other, have, in Heidegger*s view, their
* John 17, 3.
** Of. S. u. Z., p. 134 ff.
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ontological significance, even if these phenomena are 
commonly supposed to he the most fugitive elements in 
the heing of man. Mood has its own understanding - 
not in the sense of an explicit knowing, hut in the 
sense that it discloses man to himself as f,being-there. M 
It lights up heing-in-the-world, and discloses together 
hoth the self and the world in their inseparable 
relationship with one another. Heidegger maintains 
that (from the ontological point of view at least) 
the disclosures which scientific knowledge makes fall 
far short of the original disclosures of mood. Theory 
seeks a uniform unchanging knowledge of the world, 
hut it is just in the unsteady flickering disclosures 
of mood that there is revealed the nature of the world 
which is never the same on two successive days.*
We already considered, as an example of Heidegger1s 
phenomenological method, his ontological analysis of 
one such affective state, namely, fear.** Heidegger 
regards fear as an inauthentic mood. As we saw, fear 
always has as its object something within the world, 
and it belongs therefore to that inauthentic way of heing 
in which man is absorbed in concern with the world and
* Gf. S. u. Z., p. 138. ** Supra p. 59 ff.
seeks his security there. An authentic existence, claims 
Heidegger, knows, no fear, for it is not oriented to the 
world. It is worth noting here that the New Testament 
also characterises the life without Christ, that is, 
the life founded on the world, as a life of fear, from 
which Christ brings deliverance. ”Ye have not received 
the spirit of bondage again to fear,'* says Saint Paul to 
the Roman converts.*
Can we discern the fundamental affective state 
(Grundbefindlichkeit) of which fear is an inauthentic 
mode? In his inauthentic way of being, man loses 
himself in the world, and understands himself in terms 
of the world. This may be regarded as a kind of flight 
from himself as existing, that is, standing apart from 
the world. It might be called a flight from the re­
sponsibilities of existence. It is from a consideration 
of this flight that Heidegger approaches the problem 
of the mood which above all discloses man in his being, 
and which he calls anxiety (Angst) .** (Following Tillich, 
we here translate "Angst” by ’’anxiety,” in preference 
to the terms "dread” and "anguish” which have been used
* Romans 8, 15.
** S. u. 2., p. 184 ff.
by English translators of Kierkegaard and Zehrer re­
spectively.) Bultmann also suggests that Jewish 
legalism and pagan speculation alike, characterised in 
the New Testament by "confidence in the flesh,” arise 
from man1s flight from his own being as disclosed in 
dread.*
But if man, in his inauthentic way of being, flees 
before the disclosure of himself in ^ anxiety and seeks 
to allay the feeling, how can we know what that dis­
closure is? Heidegger replies that man can only flee 
before himself in so far as he has been brought before 
himself in the disclosure which belongs to anxiety.
The flight itself is evidence for what is disclosed, 
and what is thus ontically disclosed may possibly be 
ontologically conceived. In one of his works,** Sartre 
has set down a careful day to day descriptionoof changing 
moods, and leaves the reader with the impression of 
man1s helplessness in the world, which, as we shall 
see, is not far removed from the disclosure of anxiety, 
as Heidegger interprets it. Genuine anxiety would 
appear to be a much rarer phenomenon than fear, with
* Th. des NT., p. 239.
** ”La Nausee,” 1938.
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which it must not he confused, hut it belongs to man1s 
.existence as such, even if the majority of men experience 
it chiefly in the way of flight and avoidance.
It is interesting to preface Heidegger*s account 
of anxiety with the description given hy Kierkegaard, 
who was also deeply interested in this phenomenon:
"One may liken dread to dizziness. He whose eye 
chances to look down into the yawning ahyss becomes 
dizzy . . . Thus dread is the dizziness of freedom, 
which occurs when freedom gazes down into its own possi­
bility."* Thus for Kierkegaard anxiety is primarily 
associated with freedom - though admittedly with freedom 
conditioned by finitude. In anxiety man is confronted 
with his possibility and his responsibility. In 
Heidegger’s analysis of anxiety, the emphasis has shifted 
somewhat. This shift is from the possibility to the 
facticity of human existence, which he regards as 
the primary disclosure of anxiety. It discloses man 
as "being-there," possibility thrown into the world.
There would be no flight from freedom if freedom were 
unlimited, but freedom is always tied down and circum­
scribed by the alien being of the world. In the mood
* "The Concept of Dread," p. 55.
of anxiety, man is disclosed to himself as responsible 
for an existence of which he can never be the master.
Heidegger* s phenomenological analysis of anxiety 
i& developed along the lines of his analysis of fear, 
from which anxiety or dread is distinguished at each 
step. The object of fear, it will be recalled, was 
always something within the world. But the flight to 
which anxiety gives rise is not a flight from anything 
in the world - on the contrary it takes the form of a 
flight to precisely that which is within the world, 
that is, man allays his anxiety by losing himself in 
the world. The object of anxiety ( we are speaking of 
course of ontological anxiety or dread, not of actual 
concrete anxieties in the popular sense) is wholly 
undefined - it is nothing in particular, nothing within 
the world. And whereas the object of fear has always 
a particular direction and location, that which is 
dreaded, being nothing within the world, is nowhere.
It cannot approach from any direction because it is 
already there - so near as to stifle the breath, and 
yet nowhere. That before which ontological anxiety is 
experienced is therefore nothing and nowhere within 
the world. It must therefore be something standing
apart from the world which confronts man in anxiety. It 
is, claims Heidegger, his own being-in-the-world which 
is disclosed - the self with its freedom hound up with 
the world, possibility thrown into the world. Anxiety 
therefore discloses to man that he is not at home (nicht 
zu Hause) in the world. We are, in the Mew Testament 
phrase, ’’strangers and pilgrims on the earth.”* This 
contrasts with what was said before about the inauthentic 
existence which is at home in the world and seeks con­
tentment and security in the world.** It explains also 
the flight from the disclosure of anxiety which shatters 
that illusory contentment, and arouses in man an 
uneasiness which preoccupation with the world and its 
concerns never fully removes. Here the teaching of 
existentialism appears to approach to that of the 
Mew Testament. Man’s being is such that he cannot 
find contentment in the world, and even when he is lulled 
into a false sense of security, a fundamental uneasiness, 
which we have called for want of a better expression 
the mood of anxiety, arises out of the very constitution 
of his being and breaks in to disclose to him that he
* Hebrews 11, 13. 
** Supra p. 85.
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is not at home, that the world is uncanny (unheimlich), 
and can he hostile when man surrenders himself to it.
,fIt is no accident,/’ remarks Heidegger, " that the 
phenomena of anxiety and fear - which are generally 
left undistinguished from one another - have come within 
the orbit of Christian theology, both ontically and, 
though within narrow limits, ontologically. That has 
happened whenever the anthropological problem of the being 
of man in relation to God gained a precedence, and 
guided the treatment of phenomena such as faith, sin, 
love and repentance.”* And he instances Augustine,
Luther and Kierkegaard in support of his statement.
Why should Heidegger say that it is "no accident" that 
the phenomenon of ontological anxiety has been chiefly 
studied by Christian theologians? Although Heidegger 
does not explicitly say so, we contend that at this 
point the existential analytic has brought us to the 
threshold of religion, and that the concept of anxiety 
demands a religious interpretation - and with it the 
whole concept of human existence. For in this fundamental 
malaise which springs from man1s very being, there is 
disclosed not only the self and the world, but also God.
* S. u. Z. , p. 190, note.
The disclosure does not indeed yield the explicit 
knowledge of God, but directs man to God as the ground 
of his being, in a way which will shortly be more fully 
described. For what is this anxiety or dread, this 
basic malaise, this uneasy restlessness, this feeling 
of not being at home in the world, this disclosure 
which shatters the illusory contentment and security 
of everyday existence, but the cor inquietum of Christian 
experience? Augustine*s famous dictum^ "Thou hast formed 
us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they 
find rest in Thee,"* might be interpreted as meaning 
that, confronted with the disclosure of that anxiety 
which relates to nothing in the world but arises from , 
his own being, man has an alternative to that flight 
into an inauthentic existence of surrender to the 
world - namely, recourse to God, Who is the ground of 
being, Creator of both man and the world.
But before we expand this point, let us return fdr 
a moment to the question of the relation of Heidegger*s 
existentialist philosophy to religion. The charge 
against Bultmann is not only that his theological thinking 
is influenced by a human philosophy, which, in the eyes
* Confessions I, 1.
of some, would be grave enough, but further, that the 
particular philosophy which has exerted an influence on 
his thought is an atheistic and pessimistic philosophy.
But is it true to say that Heidegger* s philosophy is 
atheistic? He himself says that it is not, and is said 
to have defined his position as that "he does not deny 
the existence of God, but affirms his absence."* At 
first sight this cryptic statement might not seem to 
carry us very far in the direction of a religious 
philosophy, or even of a philosophy which could be ex­
pected to throw any light on the interpretation of 
religious faith. It depends however upon how we 
understand Heidegger*s assertion of the absehce of God. 
This appears to me to be part of Heidegger*s revolt 
against convention and tradition. God may have been 
in the past in the sense that He may have been significant 
for man*s existence. That is to say, there may have 
been a genuine existentiell knowledge of God, but, 
Heidegger thinks, that original knowledge has been 
so overlaid, trivialised, and stultified by the 
deadening hand of tradition and dogmatism that God 
is now absent. So it has happened with the quest for
* Quoted by Troisfontaines, "Existentialism and 
Christian Thought," p. 48.
being in philosophy: "The dominance of tradition makes
what it * hands down* inaccessible and more than ever 
concealed. What is handed down is taken as self-evident, 
and the way to the original sources is lost."* If this 
interpretation is correct - and admittedly it is a pretty 
free and very tentative construction of Heidegger*s 
cryptic utterance - then his affirmation of the absence 
of God would be very much like Nietzsche’s assertion 
that God is dead.** Eounier interprets this as meaning 
that Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God "to the men 
who, even after having been responsible for it, /dared 
not accept it as a fact."*** There are obvious re­
semblances as well as differences between Heidegger 
and Nietzsche. But just as Zarathustra, having broken 
the old tables of the law, proceeds to create new ones, 
so it might be claimed that Heidegger, having affirmed 
the absence of God, proceeds to look for Him afresh.
He speaks somewhat contemptuously of "the remnants of 
Christian theology which have not yet been expelled 
from philosophical thought,"**** yet his own return to
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philosophy*s original search for being is also a return
* S. u. Z. , p. 21. **** S. u. Z. , p. 230.
** "Thus Spake Zarathustra," p. 5.
*** "Existentialist Philosophies," p. 5>,
to the quest for God. Here we are on firmer ground.
Blackham says of Heidegger: "His philosophy takes shape
as the historical quest for being, and is seen to be 
essentially religious."* Gopleston concurs: "His philo­
sophy is, in a sense, a seeking for God."**
Admittedly this is scanty evidence that "Sein und 
Zeit" forms a suitable prolegomena to the study of the 
theology of the New Testament. We have at most demonstrated 
a religious tendency, but no more than a tendency, in a 
philosophy which is, generally speaking, non-theistic 
and non-Ghristian. Nor will it suffice to say, as 
Gopleston does, that the problem of God is not raised 
on the plane of the phenomenological analysis of man, 
and explain the "absence of God" from Heidegger*s 
philosophy as a mere circumstance attendant on his method.
We are seeking to show now in connection with the 
concept of dread or anxiety that the problem of God 
is raised on the plane of the phenomenological analysis 
of man, even if the answer is not supplied there, and 
we shall seek to show again in connection with the 
transition to an authentic existence that the problem
* "Six Existentialist Thinkers," p. 103.
** "Existentialism and Modem Man," p. X8.
of God is raised once more, and that "because Heidegger 
fails to come to grips with it his philosophy is exposed 
s at that point to a very serious line of criticism. We 
must not make too much of religious tendencies in 
Heidegger’s thought, just as we must not label it as 
atheistic. The religious tendencies are undoubtedly 
there, but I cannot find that they ever take any very 
definite shape.
What then are we to say of Bultmann’s preoccupation 
with this philosophy? If we have shown that it is not 
actually atheistic, we have also given warning that it 
is not to be too lightly hailed as a religious philo­
sophy, which would seem to be an essential condition of
its being usefully employed in the interpretation of
/
New Testament thought. A way out of the difficulty 
may however be found by distinguishing Heidegger the 
existentialist from Heidegger the ontologist. We saw 
already that Heidegger*s investigation into the being 
of man was intended to be the prelude to an investi­
gation into the problem of being in general.* On the 
basis of the results of the existential analytic he 
was to have understaken what he called a "destruction"
* Supra, p. 47.
of the history of ontology, though this would at the same 
time have "been the construction of a new philosophy of 
"being.* Although this ambitious programme has not been 
formally carried out, there are pointers which suggest 
the direction of Heidegger1s thought in its quest for 
being in the widest sense. Now Bultmann*s concern is 
with Heidegger the existentialist, for, as we saw, the 
philosophy which is claimed to have a special relation 
to theology is 1 that philosophical work which endeavours 
to develop in suitable concepts the understanding of 
existence which is given with existence.’1** The 
existential analytic, which is sinrply the phenomenological 
description of man’s own understanding of his being, 
has in itself nothing repugnant to religion - on the 
contrary, we are contending that it leads to religion.
It is another question altogether what general ontology 
may be built upon the existential foundation, and if 
Heidegger rejects a religious Interpretation and tends 
towards a non-theistic philosophy of being, that does 
not in any way alter the possible value of the existential 
analytic to the theologian, or argue against Bultmann*s 
use of it.
* S. u. Z., p. 19 ff. ** Supra, p. 14.
The bifurcation between the theistic and the non- 
theistic interpretations of being, so far as these are 
built upon the existential analytic, first appears in 
connection with the concept of ontological anxiety.
To eiiplain how this bifurcation comes about, we may say 
that when man* s existence is disclosed to himself in 
the mood of ontological anxiety as possibility bound 
up with the world, there are two possible ways in which 
he can interpret his situation. He can accept that he 
is thrown into an ocean of being, alien and even 
hostile to himself, in which he must exist; or he can 
seek a ground of being, which means simply a Greator 
Who is author both of man’s being and of the being 
of nature. Suffice to say for the moment that Heidegger' 
appears to me to stop at the first possible interpretation. 
For him anxiety discloses the sea of what is (das Seiende) 
into which man is thrown as isolated possibility. This 
is what he calls the facticity of man*s existence, and 
is a genuine phenomenon which will require to be 
discussed later. But to concentrate on man* s being 
thrown into this ocean of being as if that were the 
only possible interpretation gives a one-sided picture 
and leads in fact to that pessimism and nihilism which,
not altogether unfairly, can he regarded as the logical 
consequences of Heidegger*s philosophy. Our contention 
is that dread or anxiety not only discloses man cast 
on a sea of "being, "but also the ground of being, and that 
the analysis of anxiety as an ontological phenomenon 
remains incomplete unless we take into account this 
other possible interpretation implied in the disclosure. 
We said that in anxiety man is disclosed as responsible 
for an existence of which he is not the master. But 
equally original with, and implied in, the disclosure 
to man in anxiety of his own being as possibility 
thrown into the ocean of what is, is the disclosure of 
the possibility of a Being Who is not thrown into the 
sea of what is, because He is Himself the ground of 
what is, being itself, beyond both the Vorhandenheit 
of inanimate things and the Existenz of man, both of 
which are contingent and conditioned. In the language 
of an older philosophy, the idea of God is innate - 
that is to say, it is already given with man*s under­
standing of his own existence. Schleiermacher’s 
feeling of dependence, which he regarded as fundamental 
to religion, belongs here, though we should prefer to 
speak of a feeling of creatureliness - remembering too
that this feeling is not bare feeling, but has its own 
implicit understanding. In anxiety man is disclosed to 
himself in his specific creatureliness, and it is 
anxiety therefore which makes possible the quest for 
God, the ground of being, which man can find neither 
in himself nor in the world. Jeremiah likened the quest 
for God to the instinct which mysteriously but unfailingly 
guides the migratory birds to their home in the proper 
season,* and the aptness of this comparison arises from 
its suggestion that the quest for God is not an accident 
or a luxury or an abnormality, but arises from the very 
constitution of man’s being - which it does, if our 
interpretation of the phenomenon of anxiety is correct.
1 It is the instinct *of the human soul for the divine - 
an instinct which, unless perverted by evil habit,11 - 
in existentialist terminology we would say ”by flight 
into concern with the world,” - ’’guides it unerringly 
to its true home in God.”** Thus anxiety discloses to 
man with his own being the possibility of God, and gives 
rise to his search for God - the very motive behind 
Heidegger’s own philosophy, if we may believe Blackham 
and Copleston.
* Jeremiah 8,7.
** Skinner, ’’Prophecy and Religion,” p. 121.
It is however a commonplace of religious experience 
that God is not found by searching, and that faith, as 
a way of "being, is man1 s response to God’s revelation 
of himself. Anxiety is a condition of the knowledge 
of God, just as complacency prevents that knowledge, 
and in lighting up man’s ’’being-there” it discloses 
the possibility of the ground of his "being, that is, 
his Creator, "but it does not in itself yield an 
explicit knowledge of God. It opens the door to religion 
and even pushes man through the door, hut it is not yet 
religion. Anxiety or dread as we have considered it 
is still a formal ontological or existential structure, 
a hare horizon of possibility, which has to he made 
concrete in some ontical or existentiell experience 
before religion proper emerges.
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Such an existentiell possibility is the experience 
of religious awe. This may be regarded as rooted in 
ontological anxiety, and there are obvious similarities - 
’’creature feeling,” for instance, is mentioned by Otto 
as a primary characteristic of the experience of the
' t
numinous in awe. The distinction between the broad 
existential concept of anxiety or dread and the special 
religious concept of awe appears to me to be that
whereas in anxiety the primary disclosure is of man1s 
own being, while the possibility of God is lit up on 
the periphery, as it were, in awe the positions have 
changed, God's revelation of Himself is central, while 
the being of man is now disclosed on the periphery.
It is worth noting that Otto1s treatment of his 
subject* approximates to Heidegger's methods in at least 
two important particulars. His approach is existential - 
he proposes to explore the numinous through the affective 
states of man’s religious experience in which the 
numinous is encountered. His method is phenomenological, 
and consists in the detailed analysis of man’s experience 
of the numinous. Let us take his phenomenological 
analysis into the elements m&rSterium tremendum fascinans
"I-— nri-r t-t 1 ^
as a basis for discussion.
The divine being is mysterium because it is wholly
*
other. That is to say, it is not explicable in terms 
of everyday experience. The categories under which 
nature (Vorhandenheit) is understood are not applicable 
here. The existentials under which the being of man 
(Existenz) is understood may have a limited application 
by analogy, but are not exhaustive. And since these
* ’’The Idea of the Holy," p. 6 ff.
are the only kinds of concepts that we have, we under­
stand why, in speaking of God, we must always have 
recourse to symbolical and mythical language. A third 
kind of category - for which, so far as I am aware, 
neither philosophers nor theologians have yet invented 
a name - would he necessary for the description of 
God, the ground of being beyond both Vorhandenheit and 
Existenz. Presumably the numinous is such a category.
Here too a further word must be said about the expression, 
"ground of being." Ground cannot mean cause, which is 
a category of the vorhanden. It stands for the creative 
element in God, disclosed in experiences of the kind 
described above, though it is not explicitly conceived 
since it belongs to the mysterium of divine being, and 
can therefore only be spoken of by analogy as ground or 
cause. The element of tremendum brings us back to dread. 
It is man’s awareness of his own finitude, not this 
time in the ocean of what is, but before the ground 
of being, God, in the encounter with Whom man understands 
that he is "but dust and ashes." The element of 
fascinans appears to be the other side of the phenomenon 
noted already in connection with the analysis of anxiety.
* Genesis 18, 27.
Man was disclosed as "not at home" in the world, hence 
his uneasy restlessness which finds expression in the 
quest for God. Now in the analysis of awe God is 
revealed as fascinans, drawing man to Himself, giving 
direction to his quest and meeting him in his search.
Let us now pause to consider what point we have 
reached. First, attention was drawn to the ontological 
significance of affective states, which Heidegger denotes 
hy the term Befindlichkeit. These, he claims, are 
moods, not purely feeling but having their own under­
standing, so that they disclose man to himself. One 
of these was selected as the Grundbefindlichkeit, namely 
anxiety or dread, which yields a pre-eminent disclosure 
of the being of man. It isolates him from his concern 
with the world and discloses his "being-there." This, 
it was contended, opens up man’s restless quest for 
God. Finally within the existential possibility of 
anxiety we came to the concrete experience of religious 
awe in which man is set before God, Whom he apprehends 
as the numinous. This is that existential knowledge 
of God of which we spoke before in connection with 
the doctrine of creation. We do not infer the Creator 
from the creation by argument (for if we did so, we
would reach the objectified God of metaphysics, not 
the holy and living God of religion and theology.) But 
in ontological anxiety there is disclosed to man directly 
with his own finite being the possibility of the ground 
of his being, namely God, and the possibility is 
actualised in God’s revelation of Himself in religion.
Corresponding roughly to the broad existential 
concept of Befindlichkeit we find one of Saint Paul’s 
anthropological concepts, namely, This term
occurs very frequently in the Pauline writings, and 
again there is variety of usage. Often it seems to 
stand for the whole self, as willing, understanding 
and doing, and therefore this concept is hard to 
distinguish from Bultmann however draws a
distinction which throws light on the characteristic 
use of hdxp&oL, In this concept, he maintains, the 
element of knowing, so important for Voo$ , is not 
stressed, but rather the elements of feeling.* In 
the New Testament of course there is no sharp distinction 
between understanding and feeling, and that is true to 
life. Understanding has its moods, and moods have 
their own understanding, as we noted already. But
Bultmann's distinction seems to be justified, for 
is used characteristically in connection with such 
affective states as love, pain, penitence, and so on.* 
In some passages /fctpSck approaches the specific sense 
of the Grundbefindlichkeit and is connected explicitly 
with the knowledge of God, notably, for instance, when 
it is said that "God, who commanded the light to shine 
out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give 
the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the 
face of Jesus Christ."** But in the natural man who 
has turned away from God to the world, the light of 
the heart that might direct him to God is darkened: 
"their foolish heart was darkened."*** It would of 
course be absurd to claim that there is any rigid 
parallel between anci either Befindlichkeit or
Angst, but on the other hand these existential con­
cepts do help us to determine the place of in
the Pauline anthropology.
The connection of the ontological interpretation 
of affective states with the knowledge of God is 
however implied in other Pauline passages. Saint
* E.g., II Corithians 8, 16; Romans 9, 2; 2, 5.
** II Corinthians 4, 6. *** Romans 1, 21.
Paul himself claimed to have extraordinary and even 
ecstatic religious experiences. These must have been 
accompanied by profound emotional moods, and it is 
significant that the apostle explicitly connects them 
with revelation of God.* This is true of
his own account of his conversion experience as he 
described it in the Epistle to the Gfelfefcians. ** 
Commentators are agreed that the period before Saint 
Paul1s conversion must have been one of inner conflict 
and doubt, and it would not be unfair to say that at 
that time he must have been in the mood of anxiety.
Yet this anxiety was the beginning of a new understanding 
of himself, in Bultrnsnn1 s phrase, end made it possible 
for God’s revelation - as he calls it himself - to 
reach him. This confirms the view of ontological 
anxiety set out in the preceding pages. In the mood 
of anxiety which isolates him from the world so that 
he no longer feels at home, man begins to guestion 
his own understanding of himself. His questioning 
may lead him to despair, as in the philosophies of 
Heidegger and Sartre, or it may lead him to the 
quest for God and so bring him to the encounter with 
God in faith.
* Galatians 1, 12: II Gor. 12, 1. ** Gel, 1, 11-17,
The concept of anxiety or dread makes its appearance 
also in the Johannine writings, though implicitly rather 
than explicitly. When Jesus claimed to he the light of 
the world, the good shepherd, the true vine,* it is 
assumed in each case that man is looking for light for 
his way, a shepherd of souls, a ground of being. "He 
needs," says Bultmann, "an understanding of himself in 
his world . . . consciously or unconsciously, he is 
agitated (bewegt) by this question."** Admittedly man 
often follows a false light or a false shepherd. He- 
flees into the illusory security of the world to allay 
his anxiety. Yet again this very flight is evidence of 
his fundamental malaise, which everyday concern with 
the world can never quite extinguish because it belongs 
to the being of man himself.
Incidentally, Bultmann has very skilfully shown 
how the Jews sought to set aside the uneasiness ($torung) 
which our Lord aroused in them. They appealed to their 
law, their history, their honour (the familiar world in 
which they felt at home) and they raised against Jesus 
trivial objections, such as his Galilean origins.***
* John 8, 12; 10, 11; 15, 1. ** Th. des NT., p. 373.
*** John 7, 42. Of. Th. des NT., pp. 375-379.
This recalls an earlier part of the discussion* in 
which we complained that Bultmann himself had stripped 
our Lord of the numinous character which the Gospels 
ascribe to him, and represented the historical Jesus 
as simply a teacher of practical philosophy. But here 
he is surely right in pointing out that it must have 
been a characteristic of the historic Jesus to disturb 
men - to make them question their self-understanding in 
the mood of anxiety. This is indeed what we would 
expect of Jesus as the revelation of God, The Jews 
sought to explain away this feature in the person of 
Jesus, so as to quieten the feeling he had aroused 
and restore their sense of security in their way of life. 
Ho doubt with a different’motive, much modem criticism 
has been equally active in explaining away the numinous 
elements in the personality of the historic Jesus. 
Recognition of the importance for religion and theology 
of the concept of ontological anxiety might give a more 
balanced picture of the actual Jesus, who must have 
stirred such anxiety, but Bultmann does not follow up 
this line and remains content with a very attenuated 
picture of the historic Jesus.
* Supra, p. 57 ft.
CHAPTER IV 
THE THREAT TO EXISTENCE 
12. Facticity.
The term facticity (Faktizitat) has "been already 
encountered, but it has not so far "been formally 
defined, nor has its place in the existential analytic 
■been indicated. This term also stands for a way of 
being - the way of "being in which I exbst as a fact.
That does not mean a fact of nature (vorhanden) or a 
purely objective fact, which I never am, but a fact 
in the sense that ”1 am and have to be.11* Even if my 
whence and whither remain hidden, the stark fact that 
rtI exist*1 shows itself, that is to say, is a phenomenon 
which the existential analytic must seek to describe.
I am there, I am in the world - that is a fact, even 
if it is a mystery how or why or to what end. Pacticity 
too is part of the disclosure of dread or ontological 
anxiety, but it is the other aspect - the one which, 
we suggested, becomes dominant in Heidegger1s guest 
for being, and is at the root of his pessimism. Yet
* S. u. Z., p. 134.
even on a religious interpretation of man*s existence, 
facticity remains as a phenomenon to be taken into 
account. If man is disclosed in his creaturely relation 
to the ground of being, he is also disclosed in the 
ocean of what is, isolated possibility thrown into 
t^he world.
The notion of facticity was already present in the 
preliminary sketch of the concept of existence. It 
was stated then that a fundamental character of 
existence is that it is always mine (Jemeinigkeit). 
However much my dispositions, abilities, circumstances, 
and so on resembled those of another person - suppose 
even that they were identical and indistinguishable, 
if that were possible - there would still be the un­
bridgeable gap between an existence that is his and 
an existence that is mine. That I am myself and no one 
else is the unaccountable fact at the bottom of 
this structure of facticity in existence. That this fact 
is of a different order from facts of nature also 
follows from the initial concept of existence from 
which we set out. I can never be purely an object 
to myself, even in my facticity. I can try to 
objectify myself, I can call to my assistance
psychology, statistics, and whatever methods of ob­
servation are calculated to yield the most objective 
results obtainable, but I can never be quite detached 
because I have that relation to myself as ‘existing in 
virtue of which l a m  at once subject and object, or - 
if such a way of speaking is preferred - I transcend 
the subject-object realtionship. Hence my existence 
is never a fact to me as the Forth Bridge is a fact - 
it is always my own. Yet it is a fact in the sense 
explained above - that I am and have to be myself in 
my world.
Facticity is characterised not only by the stark 
individuality (Jemeinigkeit) of my existence but also 
by what Heidegger calls in somewhat uncouth language 
Hthrownness,f (G-eworfenheit). tfAn entity of the character 
of Dasein is there, in the sense that, whether explicitly 
or not, he finds himself thrown (into existence).11 * 
According to Troisfontaines, the idea of thrownness 
came to Heidegger when he was serving in the trenches 
during the First World War. It is that outside our 
control which enters into the structure of our 
existence to circumscribe and narrow down our possibility
I am responsible for my existence and I can choose 
between my possibilities, but already with my existence 
and its possibilities there is given my facticity, 
for which I am not re-sponsible and which I have not 
chosen - namely, that I have to be myself in my world. 
Plato was aware of this problem, and in the myth 
which he tells of pre-existent souls1 choosing their 
lots before they enter the world, sought to reconcile 
the elements of freedom and facticity in human existence.* 
The point is that I never begin from scratch, so to 
speak, I am always already thrown into a situation, 
given over to my being.
Man1s possibilities are therefore to a considerable 
extent determined by his facticity, and may be frustrated 
by it. He has to live out his existence in his world, 
and it is no dream-world, for however much he may seek 
to conceal it from himself, he is ultimately not at 
home. We can see now why Heidegger claimed that the 
ontological disclosures of scientific thinking fall 
far short of the original disclosures of mood. 1fPure 
theory,11 he says, ,feven if it penetrated to the 
inneimost heart of objective being, could never discover
* Republic, 618 ff.
the menacing."* Yet to me as existing it is more 
important to know that the environment contains a threat 
to my existence than to know the abstract theory of 
its structure and existence, just as it' was more 
important for the farmer to know the significance of the 
south wind for his agricultural projects than to know 
its objective properties as a stream of air with a 
given geographical direction. With facticity there 
is disclosed the standing threat to human existence, 
contained in existence itself as being-in-the-world.
Man must live alongside an entity the being of which 
is alien to his own being. It.has no meaning or sense 
in itself', apart from what man1 s understanding projects 
upon it in constructing his world - though of course 
it is a fair question whether man could understand or 
use something entirely alien, since that would seem 
to be unintelligible and unusable. This is precisely 
the point where Christian thought, with its doctrine 
of creation, diverges from the thought of Heidegger, 
as we shall see in a moment. But man in his world is 
always under the threat of being engulfed and lost 
in his world, so that he loses his authentic being.
* S. u. Z., p. 138.
If man in the ocean of what is, possibility entangled 
in facticity, were the whole picture, the only logical 
outcome would seem to he that heroism of despair, the 
determination to he myself within and in spite of the 
limitations of a miserable existence, which we ‘associate 
with Heidegger and Sartre, and with the atheistic type 
of existentialism in general. But on the other hand, if 
anxiety discloses the possibility of a ground of being, 
being itself, beyond the contingency of both Yorhanden- 
hfe&t and Existenz, that is, divine Being, man*s finitude 
may be interpreted as creatureliness. Ahd further, if 
this bare possibility is made concrete and actualised 
in God1s revelation of Himself in religious faith, the 
absolute dualism of Yorhandenheit and Existenz dis­
appears, and becomes a relative dualism. God is the 
Lord of all being, Creator of man and nature alike, so 
that although man differssfrom nature in his being, 
he has a common origin with it in God, the ground of 
all being. The picture is only made complete when 
God, the ground of being, is seen over against man as 
existing in the ocean of all that is. And it may be 
argued that if the dualism of man and nature were 
absolute (as it seems to be in Heidegger) and these
two ways of Toeing quite alien to one another, the 
construction of an instrumental world, and the projection 
of meaning upon what is, would he impossible. Its 
possibility becomes intelligible in the light of the 
Biblical doctrine of creation, which shows us man and 
nature alike deriving their being from the Creator God.
There are elements of dualism both in existentialism 
and in Hew Testament thought. In existentialism we 
have already noted the contrasted concepts of authenticity 
and inauthenticity, Existenz and Vorhandenheit, possi­
bility and facticity. In Biblical thought we have 
noted the contrast between man and nature; the Johannine 
opposition of light and darkness, truth and falsehood, 
and so on; and the double concept of the KThtlS as at 
once the creation of God for man and a possible threat 
to man - a view with obvious correspondences to the 
existentialist concept of the world.* Attempting some 
analysis of these contrasts, we find: a) the dualism
of man and nature, Existenz and Vorhandenheit: b) the
dualism in man himself, possibility and facticity, 
the breath of life and the dust of the ground; c) the , 
dualism within man’s possibility, to exist authentically
* On these points, supra, pp., 30-31, 78-79, 86-88.
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or inauthentically, to have his being in light or in 
darkness; d) the dualism or rather ambiguity in the 
concept of the world in both Christian and existentialist 
thought.
All these contrasts however appear to be reducible 
to that between man and nature. The ambiguity of the 
world arises from man’s attitude to it, this in turn 
springs from his dual possibilities, and these originate 
from his being-in-the-world, so that the fundamental 
dualism seems to be man and world, or man and nature, 
or Existenz and Vorhandenheit.
Now in the absence of God, to use Heidegger’s 
expression, this dualism of Existenz and Vorhandenheit 
appears to be absolute and untimate. It finds expression 
in another description which Heidegger gives of facticity, 
as man’s imprisonment within his destiny with the alien 
being of the world.* The use of the term ”imprisonment" 
in this connection will immediately suggest to the 
student-of the New Testament a comparison with Gnosticism. 
Gnosticism in the first century and existentialism 
in the present century have both exerted an attraction 
on the Christian apologist, and for very much the
* S. u. Z. , p. 52.
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same reason, namely, that hoth distinguish the being of 
man from the being of the world, and deny that man can 
be understood as simply a part of the world. Bultmann 
points out that Min the Gnosis as in Christianity 
there came to consciousness the fundamental difference 
between the being of man and the being of nature, and 
thus the world became alien to the self, even a prison. 
Because of this point of contact, the Hew Testament 
writers sometimes found it convenient to employ Gnostic 
terminology for the presentation of their thought to 
Hellenistic minds. But the relation was a superficial 
one, and could not be pressed too far. Christianity 
and Gnosticism were agreed that man and nature differ 
in their being, as against the classical attempt to 
assimilate man to the cosmos, but for Christianity 
the difference was relative, whereas for Gnosticism 
it- was absolute. Christianity had a doctrine of 
creation and referred both man and nature to God as . 
their author, while Gnosticism did not. Hence 
Gnosticism proved to be a dangerous fellow-traveller 
for Christianity, and the same will be true of 
existentialism if its dualism remains unqualified.
* Th. des HT., p. 164.
Without "belief in a Creator God, Heidegger cannot "bring 
together Existenz and Vorhandenheit, therefore the 
opposition of possibility and facticity remains unresolved, 
and the practical outcome is heroic despair. Admittedly 
his aim is to discover the totality of being, embracing 
both Existenz and Vorhandenheit, and that, we saw, is 
really a seeking for God. But failing the accomplishment 
of his aim, the cleavage between the two ways of being 
remains absolute. Man’s possibility in the grip of 
facticity is hopeless, and the estimate of Heidegger’s 
thought as a philosophy of despair seems just.
For religious thought facticity remains, and so 
does a relative dualism - nThe Lord God formed man of 
the dust of the ground (facticity), and breathed into 
his nostrils the breath of life (possibility)* - for 
we take it that these contrasted elements are to be 
interpreted existentially as xvays of being, and not as 
substances, such as soul-substance and body-substance.
But the difference here is that the dualism in the 
being of man is set against the unitary ground of his 
being, that is, God. This does not in itself solve 
the problem of facticity, or make it cease to be a
* Genesis 2, 7.
problem. The Book of Job and the Psalms show the 
urgency of the problem of facticity for r.eligious minds, 
and that it remains an impenetrable mystery. Nevertheless 
the problem is at least eased somewhat. Facticity no 
longer leads to pessimism, for in the light of faith in 
a Creator God, the author both of man and nature, faith 
in His providence becomes possible. That possibility 
is only brought to concretion within the context of 
the Christian revelation, but it is already present as 
possibility with the disclosure of a ground of being.
And while it is not arrived at by reasoning, it is 
supported by the argument that the world as a ?/orkshop 
is only possible because nature, like man himself, is 
the creature of God, to Whom man may say of himself:
”Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of 
thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet.”*
Yet at the same time creation and providence remain 
mysterious, for the reason already stated, that the 
categories of thought under which man understands 
nature and his own existence must necessarily fail to 
comprehend the ground of being which lies beyond them 
both.
* Psalm 8, 6.
Let us now illustrate these points with reference 
to the New Testament. Saint Paul is well aware of the 
problem of facticity, of the resistance and standing 
threat to the ”inward man” (understanding possibility) 
which arises from his own constitution as being-in- 
the-world. "For I delight in the law of God after 
the inward man: but I see another law in my members, 
warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me 
into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members*:”* 
Here admittedly the apostle is speaking of sin, but 
sin is made possible and there is the standing temptation 
to sin because he is in the world, because his being is 
constituted not only by the ”inward man” but also by 
the ’’members.” Presumably in the days of his zealous 
legalism Saint Paul found no solution to his problem, 
for the law itself was a flight from surrender to God 
and an attempt to find security in something that 
really belongs to the world.** But with his discovery 
of the God of grace (and we shall see later that 
Bultmann interprets the New Testament concept of grace 
as something very like providence) Saint Paul found a
* Romans 7, 22-23.
** Supra, p. 117.
ground of hope. ”We know that all things work together 
for good to them that love God . . .  If God he for us, 
who can he against us?”* That is not to say that the 
problem of man’s facticity had "6600110 as clear as daylight 
It was still a mystery, but no longer a hopeless mystery. 
He was ’’perplexed but not in despair . . . cast down but 
not destroyed”** - and the occurrence here of the 
’’thrown” metaphor, reminiscent of Heidegger’s Geworfenheit 
is rather interesting. The threat to man’s existence 
as possibility conditioned by facticity, a self 
entangled in a world, is not minimised. Even the 
Christian believer is still menaced in his being. ”So 
long as he lives in the flesh,” says Bultmann, ”his 
being is one that is permanently threatened and beset 
by trials.”*** Saint Paul himself gives expression 
to the possibility that ’’when I have preached to 
others, I myself should be a castaway” - again the 
metaphor of being thrown into an abyss.**** Yet 
while the threat is faced, there is found a ground of 
hope that is lacking in Heidegger’s philosophy. Man 
and the world belong alike to God, so that the opposition
* Romans 8, 28 & 31. ** II Corinthians 4, 8-9.
*** Th. des NT., p. 317. **#* 1 Cor., 9, 27.
between them is not absolute. Heidegger offers the 
alternatives of being lost in the world through 
surrender to its alien being which surrounds us, or 
of resolving to be myself in the narrow limits open 
to me in an existence of which I can never be the 
master. The New Testameht is well aware of the first 
of these alternatives, but for the second it substitutes 
the possibility of being myself by the grace of God 
Who has mastery of all being. At present however our 
concern is with the inauthentic mode of existence, 
and we must now consider how the threat to existence 
involved in facticity develops.
13. Depersonalisation.
The world of work and practical concern is a 
common world (Mitwelt). The instrument which I use 
not only implies the total instrumental system, as 
we already saw, but also the existence of other persons 
to whom these instruments are to hand in their concern 
as they are to me in mine. Generally indeed the 
instrument which I use is the result of the work of 
someone else, and the work which I do with it is 
appointed for yet another person. The book in my hand,
for instance, was written "by A, printed and "bound by B, 
published by 0, bought from D, and I am now reading it 
so that I can say something about its contents to E - 
and so we could continue indefinitely. Thus ”being-in- 
the-world” implies "being-with-others” (Mitsein). *
It follows therefore that for Heidegger community 
belongs to being-in-the-world, which man always is. It 
is not something added on to individual existence, as, 
for instance, by a '’social contract,” but something 
which necessarily belongs to existence. It would still 
be true, he claims, that I am ’’being-with-others” even 
if no others are present or perceptible, supposing I 
were a hermit or a shipwrecked mariner. This is worth 
observing, because although Heidegger, like the exis­
tentialists in general, has strong individualist 
tendencies, his individualism is quite different from 
the individualism of eighteenth century thinkers, of 
whom Housseau will serve as an example. Heidegger1s 
individualism appears to me to be accidental rather 
than essential to his philosophy, which clearly 
recognises ”being-with-others” as a necessary way of 
being of the individual, a basic existential. Yet the
concept of "being-with-others” is a side of his philo­
sophy which is left curiously undeveloped, and we shall 
later have cause to ask whether this bias of Heidegger 
towards individualism does not reflect itself in 
Bultmann’s thought also.
Although other persons are met out of the world 
with which I am concerned, they do not belong to the 
world any more than I do. They have the character of 
’’being-there-with-me” (Mitdasein). They are therefore 
not objects within the world, but co-existents with me. 
Thus it follows that I am never related to a person as 
I am to awthing. A thing is to me an instrument, and 
my relation to it is practical concern (Besorgen). But 
my relation to a person is personal concern (Fursorge) - 
a broad term which Heidegger uses to cover all kinds 
of personal relationships. A person is never a mere 
object. Here Heidegger is distinguishing between 
the ”I-it” and the ”I-thouM relationships, yet once 
again, beyond a formal definition, the theme is left 
largely unexplored.
’’Being-with-others” has the two fundamental 
possibilities that we have learned to expect in 
Heidegger - it can be authentic or inauthentic. In
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the authentic mode it helps the other to his freedom, 
to the attain&ent of his true self. In the inauthentic 
mode it makes possible dominance and the corresponding 
dependence, and it depersonalises, destroying rather than 
liberating the true being of man. It does so because, 
just as I can mistakenly regard myself as an object 
belonging to the world, so I can regard another person 
in that way, and treat him impersonally. It is with 
this inauthentic mode of "being-with-others" that we 
are concerned for the present, and to it Heidegger has 
given full consideration.*
In this inauthentic way of being-with-others, I 
am subject to others. They have, so to speak, taken 
away my being, so that I am no longer myself. Yet 
when I ask who it is that has thus acquired dominance 
over me, and makes my decisions for me, it turns out 
to be no one in particular. It is the neuter tfdas Man1 
in Heidegger's terminology, the German impersonal 
pronoun denoting an indefinite subject of action.
We might translate it into English as "people" or "the 
public" (the expression used by Kierkegaard for the 
same phenomenon) though perhaps these terms scarcely
* S. u. Z., p. 126 ff.
do justice to the sheer impersonality of the neuter 
"das Man."
For the most part, Heidegger contends, a man is 
not himself hut others, in the sense of being part of 
the public. He enjoys what the public enjoys, and he 
finds shocking what the public finds shocking. He 
reads and sees and judges as the public does, all become 
uniformly alike, and thus men "unfold their own dictator­
ship."* Yet the dictator is no one in particular, but 
the amorphous depersonalised mass to which all are 
subject.
We must briefly review the principal characteristics 
of this depersonalised way of being as they are mentioned 
in Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis. There is 
"everydayness" (Alltaglichkeit). We have already fre­
quently met the expression "everyday existence." This 
is a technical term with Heidegger. It stands for a 
way of being dominated by unthinking habit, a mechanical 
following of the ways laid down for us in an established 
order. Then there is "averageness," or mediocrity 
(Durchschnittlichkeit). which comes about as the result 
of a levelling tendency (Einebnung) present in the use
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"by all of facilities which make all alike - filling up 
forms, queuing for transport or entertainment are 
familiar examples. ’‘Every supremacy is silently suppressed, 
every original thought is glossed over as well-known, 
every triumph is vulgarised, every mystery loses its power.,!> 
Publicity C(3ffentlichkeit) is another related character­
istic of the depersonalised way of being. Whereas 
dread isolates the individual in his facticity and 
responsibility, in publicity he can forget himself and 
his responsibility, and so allay his anxiety, by 
identifying himself with the indeterminate impersonal 
multitude. Talking (Gerede) is the everyday way of 
speaking which, instead of disclosing anything as it 
really is, rather makes it become what the public says 
that it is.** Corresponding to this baseless talking 
there is a scribbling (Geschriebe) or popular literature 
which passes for writing.- This scribbling really 
obscures the truth, but it becomes popular and authori­
tative because it tells people what they want to hear. 
Finally there is curiosity (Neugier). This is the desire 
to enter into experiences without taking the resolve
* S. u. Z. , p. 127.
** Cf. S. u. Z., p. 167 ff.
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to have them for one’s self. The cinema affords imaginative 
entry into the gay luxurious world of Hollywood; the 
"thriller" gives the reader the excitement of sharing - 
in the deeds of daring of the hero, without needing to 
leave his fireside; the sensational type of Sunday 
newspaper makes possible vicarious indulgence in crime 
and adultery, even if the reader professes (and himself 
believes) that he is horrified by the stories which it 
reports.
These artifical devices prevent an authentic 
"being-with-others," and pervert it into the public, 
the depersonalised way of being that characterises 
man in the mass. The ontological significance of the 
concept of the public is that it again shows us man’s 
flight from his responsibility. In escaping into the 
public, man avoids being pressed to the point of 
decision. Because what the public does is done by no 
one in particular, the public relieves the individual of 
his accountability. The everyday self is called by 
Heidegger the "public self" (Man-selbst), and fce dis­
tinguishes it from the authentic self. This public 
self is lost, in the sense of being scattered through 
the public, frittered away in the trivialities of
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talk, curiosity and the rest, and in this inauthentic 
"being-with-others man conceals from himself the challenge 
of his existence.
The public is a universal way of "being for man.
The individual can never completely loose himself from 
its dominance, even if he were to attempt it. The 
authentic self is therefore not a "breakaway from the 
public, "but an existential modification of the public, 
the public being considered as one of man’s fundamental 
ways of being, that is, an existential.* This means 
that the individual must be himself within and in spite 
of the public. He need not take th public as his hero, 
yet he can no more get away from it altogether than 
he can get away from the world. The concept of the 
public is therefore related to facticity also. Just 
as man is always already thrown into a world which 
limits his possibilities, so he is also thrown into a 
public, a social environment, which necessarily circum­
scribes his possibilities, even if he is able to resibt 
falling under its complete domination. It remains the 
all-powerful but impersonal (and that means here sub­
personal) tyrant, yet the irony of the situation is
* S. u. Z. , p. 130.
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that man himself has created its power in his stampede 
from the ultimate issues of his existence into the 
illusory security of an inauthentic collectivism.
Man is always and everywhere more or less deper­
sonalised. Yet it might he said that depersonalisation 
is especially characteristic of the modern era. As 
such, it has received detailed attention from another 
philosopher of existentialist tendencies, namely 
Jaspers, in his study of the present situation of 
mankind.* "The inevitable mass-effect," he says, 
tfis intensified to-day hy the complicated articulations 
of a modern economic society. The rule of the masses 
affects the activities and habits of the individual.
It has become obligatory to fulfil a function which 
shall in some way be regarded as useful to the masses. 
The masses and their apparatus are the object of our 
most vital interest. The masses are our masters; and 
for everyone who looks facts in the face his existence 
has become dependent on them, so that the thought of 
them must control his doings, his cares, and his duties. 
Even an articulated mass always tends to become unspiri­
tual and inhuman. It is life without existence,
* ”Man in the Modern Age,” p. 43.
superstition without faith. It may stamp all flat; it 
is disinclined to tolerate independence and greatness, 
hut prone to constrain people to become as automatic 
as ants. ’*
The factors which have accentuated depersonalisation 
in the modern world are well-known. Industrialisation 
condemns multitudes to mechanical tasks, and herds them 
together in over-grown cities; press, radio, television, 
and advertising mould what is called public opinion, and 
relieve the individual of the necessity of thinking and 
deciding for himself; commercialised sport and enter­
tainment have a deadly uniformity the world over. And 
depersonalisation has perhaps reached its pitch in 
modern warfare, in which the individual has almost ceased 
to count.
It would be tedious to enlarge upon these themes, 
since they have become themselves the well-worn and, one 
may almost say, trivialised topics for contemporary 
statesmen, journalists, churchmen:and philosophers.
They have themselves been turned into platitudes that 
have lost their power, exactly as Heidegger says - 
"every original thought.is glossed over (by the.public) 
as well-known."Thus the public has already gone far
to depersonalise and rob of their sting even pronouncements 
on the very menace of deprsonalisation. They have become 
so familiarised and vulgarised that we can now hear them 
without uneasiness. Has not this been the fate of 
existentialism itself? "The very last thing in absurdity 
during this century,1' says Mounier, "must have been the 
craze for existentialism, the degeneration into idle 
daily gossiping of a philosophy whose whole purpose is 
to drag us away from our idle gossiping."* But das Man 
is stronger than the philosopher.
Depersonalisation, it is worth remembering, has 
proceeded almost as far in the Western democracies as 
it has in the countries which have fallen under dictator­
ship. The factors contributing to depersonalisation are 
universal in their distribution through the civilised 
world. Totalitarianism - if by that is meant the 
omnicompetence of the state - is in theory possible 
“Wcirbhinr a democracy as well as under a dictatorship.
It has often been pointed out that the ideal of the 
welfare state, however laudable and desirable in many 
ways, seems to be one that must be purchased at the 
price of progressive depersonalisation. The twentieth
* Op. cit., Preface.
century has been called the age of the common man, but 
it is open to question whether this means a recognition 
of the rights and dignity of every man, or a levelling 
of all men to the average uniformity of mass-existence.
It is against this background of modern deper­
sonalisation that Heidegger’s individualism must be 
understood, and this explains our suggestion that it 
is accidental rather than essential to his philosophy. 
Heidegger h i m s e l f  deserted the haunts of the public 
to study the poems of Holderlin in the solitude of the 
Black Forest. That is the typical reaction of existential 
ism against the dominance of the impersonal public. As 
an attempt to rescue and restore individual existence 
and responsibility, it is so far good. But it seems to 
stop there, and leaves undeveloped the concept of an 
authentic being-with-others, though this, as we saw, 
on Heidegger’s own analysis necessarily belongs to the 
authentic being of the individual, which would be 
incomplete without it. On the other hand Christianity, 
while agreeing with the existentialist philosophy in 
recalling man from collective irresponsibility to the 
point of individual decision, goes further than a mere 
individualism and in the Church holds out to men the
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possibility of an authentic being-with-others in which 
individual freedom can alone be made complete. An 
extravagant individualism can be as irresponsible as 
an impersonal collectivism.
Such exaggerated individualism characterises 
existentialist philosophy in general, but this is an 
accidental consequence of the violence of its reaction 
against the pressure of contemporary collectivism. The 
c o n c e p t  of an authentic being-with-others has its place 
in existentialist thought, although it has not been 
significantly worked out as yet. Thus the existentialist 
artist breaks with artistic conventions, the existential­
ist philosopher rejects the accepted moral code, the 
Christian existentialist finds no use for the organised 
Church. All of these appear to make the mistake of 
throwing out the baby with the bath-water. They are 
right in so far as they seek to emancipate the individual 
personality from something that is dead, mechanical 
and impersonal, but wrong in so far as they remain on 
the level of uncontrolled individualism.
Heidegger1s concept of das Man does fairly describe 
a way of being in which the individual loses himself 
and becomes depersonalised, but it would surely be
quite wrong to conclude that all tradition, custom, and 
habit belong to this way of being and are therefore in­
authentic. Even the everyday utterances of conscience, 
as we shall see later, are regarded by Heidegger as 
nothing but the voice of das Man - they express the public
f
code of conduct. But there can be a living tradition as 
well as a dead tradition - and the Christian must certainly 
believe so, since tradition is essential to the Church.
A  t r a d i t i o n  would be dead where it was mechanically 
and u n t h i n k i n g l y  taken over, but it is alive where each 
new generation consciously decides to receive it. Our 
Lord did not attack the religious traditions of the 
Jews as such, but o n l y  b e c a u s e  t h e y  were mechanical 
traditions without authentic obedience.
But even the unthinking habit of ,,everydaynessM 
in which there is no conscious decision is not always 
to be dismissed as worthless. The late Lord Lindsay 
gives a good illustration of the place of moral habit 
in life.* Supposing I were a person specially prone 
to the temptation to get drunk, there would be no 
virtue in going through a moral struggle and making 
a fresh existentiell decision every time I had to pass
* In his introduction to Mill1 s '‘Essay on Liberty.
a public house. That would be nothing but a waste of 
time - and a very serious waste of time in some of our 
cities where there are places of refreshment situated 
at.short intervals along the street. It is much better 
that I should form the habit of walking past without 
giving the matter a thought. Aristotle indeed went 
so far as to teach that "moral virtue comes about as 
a result of habit."* It is by doing good actions that 
a man becomes good, that is, forms good habits. But 
in that case individual decision, free from the influence 
of tradition, custom, and habit, cannot have the 
exaggerated place which the existentialist tends to 
assign-to it. -
With these qualifications, however, we recognise 
the broad truth contained in the concept of das Man.
The social unit can and always more or less does become 
collectivism rather than community, inhuman and 
depersonalised, more stupid and more immoral than the 
individual. Das Man is an existential, a possible 
way of man’s being, which means that it is man himself 
who creates the tyranny of the public. He surrenders 
his individual being to its domination in order to
* Ethica Nicomachea, 1103a.
get away from his individual responsibility and so 
lull his anxiety. He is always more or less under its 
dominance, and especially in the modem era. But this 
is not a genuine being-with-others, it is "a strained 
and ambiguous adaptation of one to the other," "enmity 
under the mask of friendship," "the secret persistence 
of envy."*
No doubt the earliest Biblical religion was in the 
main collective in its character. But if Eichrodt is 
right, the significance of the prophetic revival in 
Israel lay in the summons - or possibly the recall - 
to individual responsibility before God.** One aspect 
of the teaching of Jesus may be regarded as a renewal 
of the prophetic summons under new conditions, a 
protest against formal traditional observance coupled 
with a demand for "genuine radical obedience"*** - 
and that implies understanding and consent on the part 
of the individual who obeys. The New Testament writers 
therefore already had before them the protests of our 
Lord and of the Hebrew prophets agaipst the dangers of 
a collectivism which sheds man of his responsibility.
♦ Of. S. u. Z. , p. 175, and Jaspers, op. cit., p. 42.
** Supra, p. 32. *** Th. des NT., pp. 10-12.
In the New Testament theology proper, we find this 
depersonalised collective existence exhibited in the 
concept of the x.6«r|ud$ which is common to both the Pauline 
and the Johannine writings. We have already noted that 
in the Fourth Gospel the may mean simply the created
world,* and the same is true of a few passages in 
Saint Paulfs epistles,** though he generally uses the 
term in this sense. For neither of them however
does icHuos mean, as it did for the Greeks, the rationally 
ordered universe in which God, man and nature have all 
their place. That idea is quite foreign to Biblical 
thought, in which God stands outside the world as its 
Creator, and in which also man is discontinuous in his 
being with nature.
In the typical New Testament usage, K&TfACt is 
tfnot a cosmological but a historical concept'1 - and 
that means an existential concept, a ways of man1s 
being.*** It is the sphere of human relations, men in 
their totality. That God shall "judge the world,11 or 
that sin has "entered into the world," or that there is 
a "wisdom of the world" are statements only intelligible
* Supra, p. 89. ** E.g., Romans 1, 20.
*** Th. des WE. , p. 250 ff.
if the world is understood in an anthropological or 
existential sense.* The same is true of the Johannine 
usage, for instance in passages which speak of the 
hatred of the world for Christ's disciples.** There 
is an opposition between the world, understood as the 
human sphere, the totality of mankind, on the one hand, 
and the sphere of God on the other. It is conceived 
as under the domination of ’’the prince of this world” 
or "the god of this world (ou j^v )51 who is the enemy of 
God.*** The world dominates and rules over the indi­
viduals who constitute it. '’The spirit of the world” 
lies over men. **** ‘'This spirit,” says Bultmann, 
"expressed in modern speech, is the atmosphere to 
whose compelling influence each one contributes, and, 
at the same time, under whose influence he lies.”*****
The relation of the Christian to the world is that 
while heshas overcome the world and been freed from 
its tyranny, he remains in the world so long as he 
exists on earth, continually exposed to its threat.******
* Romans 3, 6; 5, 12; I Corinthians 1, 20.
** John 15, 18: 17, 14.
*** John 12, 31; II Corinthians 4, 4.
**** I Corinthians 2, 12.
***** Th, des NT., p. 253.
****** j Corinthians 3, 21-22; John 17, 11.
How is the KoCT^los related to das Man? Bultmann’ s 
interpretation of this New Testament concept has very 
ohvious points of contact with Heidegger’s existential 
analysis. But the New Testament concept of the world 
as a hind of organised rehellion against God is 
infinitely grander and more terrifying than the concept 
of the tyranny of the public in existentialism. That 
is because the world is a concrete ontical phenomenon 
met in actual moral and religious experience, whereas 
das Man is a formal existential-ontological concept.
Yet it is this ontological concept which makes clear 
the meaning of the ontical concept, and relates it to 
the whole structure of man’s being. Only because man 
has in the structure of his being the possibility of 
an inauthentic being-with-others, as set out in the 
existential analytic, can there be this tyrannising 
solidarity of human sinfulness which the New Testament 
calls the world. The world is the most terrifying 
manifestation and concretion of that possibility of 
man’s existence which Heidegger calls das Man. It is 
along such lines that Bultmann has conducted his 
existential exegesis of the KOoyxos. The is not
a place or a substance or an environment but a way of
man’s being in which, in his flight from his individual 
responsibility, he loses his true self. Into this 
world all men are "thrown," so that it is a factor in 
the facticity of human existence. It is in the world 
and in spite .of the world (to adapt Heidegger’s phrase 
about das Man) that men must decide for God and live 
the Christian life. This account of the /<o<rjuc$ appears 
to be intelligible, convincing, and loyal to the New 
Testament.
But what of the New Testament idea that the 
is under the dominion of hostile powers? An existential 
exegesis will find no room for demonic forces in the 
world. The question however is what the New Testament 
writers really believed about such demonic forces. They 
sometimes used, mythological language about the rulers 
of this world, but they certainly did not accept the 
Gnostic dualism of a demonic world of darkness over 
against the divine world of light. When Saint Paul 
speaks of the entry of sin into the world, he attributes 
it not to powers of darkness but to Adam.* Hence Bultmann 
seems to be justified in his conclusion that the 
authentic view of the New Testament is that it is
* Romans 5, 12.
man himself trho has given to the Kcif/uoS its hostile 
demonic character, just as we saw in the case of the 
’’Its power is derived at bottom from man 
himself,” says Bultmann, or, in Heidegger’s language,
"man has unfolded his own dictatorship. The natural 
man has decided for the world rather than for God, 
and in that act of decision he has given it its hostile 
character.
While the Hew Testament recalls the individual 
from the world to a decision for God, it does not rest 
there, hut sets over against the false community of the 
world the authentic community of the Ghurch, the 
which is called out of the world. We asked already 
whether Bultmann is not perhaps unduly influenced by 
existentialist individualism, and so fails to do 
justice to the Hew Testament conception of fellowship.
Here we may see another instance of the selective 
influence of existentialism in his thought. Alternatively 
it could be argued of course that this is simply 
the Lutheran influence in Bultmann’s thought, perhaps 
reinfoced by the existentialist tendency to individualism, 
since the prevailing German tradition in the Ghurch
* Supra, p. 88.
which in general has concentrated on individual piety 
to the neglect of Christian community.
This however takes us beyond the limits of the 
present part of the inquiry, which is into man* s 
inauthentic way of being, and the question of the Ghurch 
must be reserved until later. We now pass to a broad 
existential concept which gathers up some ofhthose that 
we have already met.
14. Fallenness.
We now summarise briefly the position so far 
reached in our survey of the analysis of existence.
Human existence has been exhibited as possibility 
conditioned by facticity. But man flees from the 
disclosure to himself in anxiety of his "being-there. '*
On the one hand he identifies himself with the world 
and becomes absorbed in "worldly” concern; on the 
other hand he sheds his responsibility in the deper­
sonalised collective way of being which we called the 
public. In his everyday talking he conceals from 
himself the challenge of his existence. In curiosity 
he substitutes the imaginary for the real. These 
characteristics are brought together in Heidegger* s
concept of fallenness (Verfallenheit) .* This is a 
fundamental way of everyday being, and with it, he 
says, we reach a sharper definition of what he means 
by inauthenticity as a basic possibility of existence.
Man’s fallenness has a twofold aspect. It is first 
a fall into the world, out of which he tries to understand 
himself. He relates his possibilities exclusively to 
things, absorbs himself in concern with them, and finds 
himself at home (vertraut) among them, thereby ob­
literating his awareness of the gulf which separates 
his being from the being of the world, and concealing 
from himself that he is not at home. This appears 
to be primarily the flight from facticity. Brunner 
has argued that it is not technology which has produced 
the problems of modern civilisation, but rather modern 
civilisation which has created for itself the problem 
of an uncontrolled technology.** Man’s intense preoccupation 
with the world of things, he believes, is simply the 
expression of his delusion that he can solve the problems 
of his existence by the mastery of things, or, expressed 
in Biblical language, his reaction to the temptation,
"Ye shall be as gods.”**5* Presumably for the gods the
* Cf. S. u. Z., p. 175 ff. *** Genesis 3, 5.
** "Christianity & Civilisation," vol. 2, Lect. 1.
limitations of facticity are removed and possibility is 
unhindered, hence we suggest that this preoccupation 
with things is the flight from facticity.
Fallenness is secondly a fall into collectivism, in 
which the individual surrenders his will to the deper^ 
sonalised mass, and follows the crowd. This appears to 
be primarily the flight from possibility, so far as 
that means responsibility. As belonging to the public, - 
the individual need not think or decide for himself, 
nor need he have any qualms of conscience, for what 
everybody does must be right. In the modern world with 
its vast technical apparatus in serving which men themselves 
become instruments, factory "hands," these two aspects 
of fellermess are of course very closely combined.
Complementary to these two positive aspects of 
fallenness is a negative one. Man is fallen away from 
himself (abgefalien), he has lest the authentic power 
to be himself (Belbstseinkonnen). His true self is 
lost and scattered in the world - that is to say, in 
the instrumental world of things and in the depersonalised 
world of the public. Tu use another metaphor of 
Heidegger, man is uprooted (entwurzelt).*
* S. u. Z., p. 177.
Heidegger’s phenomenological analysis of fallenness 
yields three important structures. The first is temptation 
(Versuchiimg). We saw already that m a n ’s existence is 
permanently threatened in virtue of his facticity. So 
long as he exists, he is alongside the world which 
invites him to surrender to its alien "being. But 
Heidegger here goes further. Man wants to surrender 
to the world. He tempts himself. He flees from himself 
and desires to fall into the world. In his everyday 
talking and curiosity, says Heidegger, he prepares for 
himself the permanent temptation to fallenness. The 
second structure is contentment (Beruhigung). As fallen, 
man is delivered from the restless ness engendered "by 
dread. In his concern with things and his solidarity 
with the public, he is no longer disturbed by the ultimate 
issues of existence - unless of course his security 
is taken away from him for some reason or other, and 
then the mood of anxiety breaks in to shatter this 
contentment. The contentment is illusory, and we shall 
return to its illusory nature later. Finally there is 
the structure of alienation (Entfremdung). As fallen,
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man is cut off from his true self and from his
authentic possibilities. The deeper his fall into the
world, the further he is from himself. And further, 
like a stone falling with increasing velocity, man 
must become more and more entangled in the world. His 
contentment does not bring rest, for he must drive 
himself further into the world and so further from 
himself.
It must be clearly understood that HSidegger here 
is dealing with a purely ontological concept. We must 
therefore beware of any facile identification of fallen­
ness with the ethico-religious concept of the fall of 
man familiar in Christian theology. Fallenness, in 
Heidegger’s sense of the terra, is not -a general property
of man, as, let us say, rotundity is of a ball. It is
an existential, a pure possibility which is open to 
man in virtue of his ontological structure. Heidegger 
himself is quite explicit on this point. He says that 
he is making no ontical pronouncement on the corruption 
of human nature.* He claitos that he has said nothing
to indicate whether ontically man is in a state of cor­
ruption, or in a state of innocence, or in a state of 
grace. All that has been said is that man is so 
constituted that fallenness, in the sense of that term
which has been explained, is a possibility for him. It 
is another question whether the possibility is actualised.
Yet there is a connection between the purely onto­
logical concept of fallenness and the ethico-religious 
concept of a fallen humanity. So far as the latter 
claims to be an actual description of m a n ’s condition, 
it already assumes the ontological concept of fallenness, 
that is to say, it assumes that man is so constituted in 
his being that fallenness is a possibility for him.
What the theologian understands by fallenness is a 
concrete existentiell situation. This understanding is 
to be validated and clarified by relating it to m a n ’s 
ontological structure, and by showing that it does 
lie within the horizons of what is genuinely possible 
for man. But these horizons are delineated by the 
existential analytic, which reveals, among other 
phenomena, this existential concept of fallenness.
Hence Heidegger’s claim that for the proper understanding 
of the ethico-religious concept of the fall, the 
theologian must consider it in relation to its ground 
in the ontological concept of fallenness.* But the 
elucidation of the ontological concept is not itself
the work of theology, but of the pre-theological inquiry 
into the ontological assumptions of all theology - in 
other words, it is the work of what Heidegger calls the 
existential analytic or (which is the same thing) what 
Bultmann more fully describes as "the philosophical 
work which endeavours to develop in suitable concepts 
the understanding of existence which is given with 
human existence."*
We must now see how Bultmann follows the method 
which he has himself prescribed in connection with the 
concept of fallenness, and we do so by considering his 
treatment of two important Hew Testament concepts - 
<*4!? and a.ucppw’jd's*. . in his exposition of these the 
influence of Heidegger’s existentialism is clearly 
discernible.
Bultmann begins with a very clear statement of his 
position.** Evil is a falling away of man from 
himself, a mistaken orientation of himself away from 
his authentic being. But this is at the same time sin, 
rebellion against God, Who as Creator gave to man his 
being. To attain or to lose his authentic being is 
equivalent on man’s part to recognising or denying
* Supra, p. 15. ** Th. des ME., p. 228.
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God as his Creator. To deny the Creator means however 
to turn to the creation. Man lives for and from the 
world. Man is thus fallen away from the authentic 
"being that God has given him into the world, in concern 
with which he seeks to live hy his own power without 
God. This is the essence of sin.
So far this looks very much like a theological 
version of Heidegger’s concept of fallenness. Bultmann 
concedes that we will not find these views so clearly 
and summarily formulated in the New Testament, hut 
nevertheless, he maintains, they represent' the understanding 
of m a n ’s fallen condition implicit in the Pauline epistles, 
and here made explicit in the light of our understanding 
of man’s existential constitution. The justification 
for his interpretation is to he sought hoth in the 
anthropological concepts already discussed, and in the 
elucidation of the two concepts of (Ttypjf and 
to the consideration of which he now proceeds.
As with and ^  , he points out that the
§*£■-
term (Tfc<p^  , the flesh, shows a variety of usage in 
the New Testament.* It seems to mean simply m a n ’s 
physical hody, in passages like those in which Saint
* Th. des NT., p. 229 ff.
Paul speaks of the “infirmity of the flesh” or of a 
“thorn in the flesh.”* In a wider sense, and following 
the Old Testament usage, , sometimes coupled with
GujLtoc 9 can stand for mankind, with reference to man s 
finite creatureliness, and implying perhaps a contrast 
with the "being of God, as for instance when Saint Paul 
says that after his conversion he went into Arabia,
and “conferred not with flesh and "blood.”** Prom this
s' iSr
it is only a step to a still wider sense in which & & P S  
comes to mean the sphere of the natural in which m a n 1s 
transient earthly existence as flesh and "blood is set. 
Thus it can "be said of believers that they “are not in 
the flesh,”*** which does not mean that they are no 
longer on earth, but that they are no longer founding 
their lives on the natural and the creaturely. In 
this sense obviously approximates to i^oCpiOS, the
meaning of which was already discussed.
The specifically bad sense of <7© has not yet 
clearly emerged. Bultmann brings it out by a comparison 
of the expressions, and . “The
life which I now live in the flesh”**** is an expression
* Galatians 4, 13; II Corinthians 12, 7.
** Gal. 1, 16. ** Rom. 8, 9. *** Gal. 2, 20.
which passes no ethical judgment. It means simply that 
so long as I exist, I exist in the sphere of the natural 
and the earthly. Within this sphere man moves, ”it 
delimits his horizon, the possibilities of his activity 
and suffering. ”* Thus i t / c R x p k . : ' simply recognises manf s 
facticity as existing in a world in which he is not at 
home and in which his possibilities are circumscribed.
The threat to his existence is already given with his 
facticity, but it is still only a threat.
But when Saint Paul says that men "are after the 
flesh” ( or ’’purpose after the flesh” or ”walk
after the flesh”** then in the characteristic use of 
this expression (for there are exceptions, as Bultmann 
recognises) it is implied that what is done is not simply 
within the sphere of the natural, but that in addition 
it is evil or sinful. Where- has the transition to 
this new meaning taken place? It lies in this, that
p
whereas to be means usually no more than to
exist in the earthly environment, to be (T tic p K *
means that man has already decided for the earthly and 
the natural, and has rejected God, and with God his
* Th. des H T., p. 251.
** Romans 8, 5; II Corinthians 1, 17; 10, 2.
own authentic being. He is not only in the world, he 
has fallen into the world.
The flesh is to be understood as a way of being, 
not a substance. Thus to say that !,in my flesh dwelleth 
no good thing”* is no Gnostic disparagement of the 
body or recognition of an inherently evil matter. What 
God has created is good, but when man decides for the 
creation rather than for the Creator, he makes it evil. 
There is no good thing in the flesh-in the sense that 
man cannot found his life upon it, and if he attempts 
to do so, it becomes evil. But this evil is not external 
to man, but derives from him as existing possibility.
Just as with the k.6&{ao$ , Saint Paul sometimes speaks
 ^Mm-
of the (FtAffjp almost as if personified, a kind of demonic 
master to whom, for instance, man may be a debtor.**
But it is man himself who has given to the (T u p jp its 
tyrannical power.
Bultmann’s existential treatment of the concept of 
©n'ables him to explain how Saint Paul brings 
together as manifestations of the life according to the 
flesh such diverse human activities as the sensuality 
of the pagans, Jewish legalism, and Gentile philosophy.
* Homans 7, 18. ** Romans 8, 12.
It would "be a gross misunderstanding to associate the
primarily with what we call "sins of* the flesh." < 
For Saint Paul the righteousness of the Jews and the 
wisdom of this world, however on the surface they 
differ from sins of sensuality, are equally a manifestation 
of'bonfidence in the flesh." They represent a falling 
away from G-od and a turning to the creature and the 
man-made.
In a way which yields results not unlike those of 
Heidegger'1 s phenomenological analysis of fallenness, 
Bultmann now proceeds to indicate some of the principal 
characteristics of the life after the flesh as these 
are found in the Pauline epistles. It is a life of 
desiring (iff*Avs-tV). Fallen man is driven restlessly 
on hy "the lust of the flesh,"*"becoming more entangled 
in the creation and further removed from the Creator.
Yet along with this goes an illusory contenment which
A
finds expression in the Boasting ( of men 
who fancy that they have mastered the problems of their 
existence hy their own creaturely devices. The Jews 
boast of their righteousness^ the Greeks of their wisdom, 
and both, by this confidence in the flesh, show their
# E.g., Galatians 5, 16.
misunderstanding of the human situation.* Two further 
characteristics of the life after the flesh have been 
noted already - fear and enslavement.
When we read Bultmann’s very carefully documented 
analysis of the Pauline concept of , it may occur
to us that he has said very little that is new. It is 
true that the different meanings that he has indicated 
can mostly be found in earlier commentators,** but what 
appears to be original in this part of Bultmann’s work 
is the way in which these different meanings for the flesh 
are brought together in the light of his concept of 
existence - and particularly the neutral meaning of 
bipjf as the natural, and the bad meaning of as
the sinful. The distinction does not lie in anything 
outside man himself, but in m a n ’s existentiell decision 
for the creaturely rather than for the Creator, which 
makes the natural evil. And further, in the light of 
the same concept of existence, the connection of Cf2<p^ 
with ( /H / jlol, */ou>5 , , KTitfiS , and is made
clear. Bultmann is here doing the proper work of 
the systematic theologian in exhibiting the Christian
* Romans 2, 17 ff. I Corinthians 1, 19-31. 
** Cf. e.g., Burton, "Galatians," p. 492 ff.
■understanding of man in a closely connected and coherent 
system of thought. He is not content to show us isolated 
aspects of man from the Hew Testament teaching, hut 
has "built up the various concepts into a unified and 
systematic anthropology. But he has only been able to 
do this because of his ontological understanding of man. 
Admittedly he appears to have derived this understanding 
from Heidegger’s existential analytic. But what can 
it be said that he has imported into his interpretation 
of the New Testament teaching except a remarkable degree 
of clarity and consistency? As Bultmann himself claims, 
the philosophy of existence does not prejudice the 
content of the answer which theology seeks from the 
exegesis of the sacred texts, but it "opens our eyes" 
to the meaning of the text. The Begrifflichkeit of 
existence, as that has been analysed and explained in 
the preceding pages, has provided Bultmann with a 
groundwork in the light of which he has gathered together 
the isolated concepts of New Testament thought and 
exhibited their structural relationships. Bultmann’s 
exposition seems to stand up to Tillich’s criterion, 
quoted earlier* - ’’the test of a phenomenological
* Supra, pp. 58-59.
description is that the picture given "by it is convincing, 
that it can he seen hy anyone who is willing to look in 
the same direction, that the description illuminates 
other related ideas, and that it makes the reality 
which these ideas are supposed to reflect understandable."
And further, although Bultmann has followed fairly 
closely the pattern of Heidegger's existential analytic, 
and has borrowed much of Heidegger's terminology, let us 
remind ourselves again that the leading ideas of the 
philosophy of existence are not peculiar to the twentieth 
century, but represent a rediscovery, in reaction to 
the extreme objectivism of modern thought, of truths 
that' first appeared long ago in the history of philosophy. 
Some of these truths - and the most important of thein - 
were familiar to the Biblical writers, and for that reason 
we were able to draw attention to several points of 
affinity between existentialism and Biblical thought.
Hence in spite of Bultmann's employment of modern 
existentialist terms - such as ontological and ontical, 
existential and existentiell - it must not therefore be 
inferred that the systematic anthropology which he has 
constructed from the Pauline concepts would be foreign 
to the mind of Saiht Paul himself. It was not Saint
Paul’s business to set forth a formal ontology, yet 
there must have been some understanding of the being 
of man underlying his thought, and Bultmann would claim 
that that understanding implicit in the Pauline writings 
is something very like the concept of existence as 
that has been analysed by Heidegger and other thinkers 
of his school. And it must be confes-sed that Bultmann’s 
remarkable success in gathering into a unity the various 
Pauline concepts and the different meanings within each 
concept argues strongly in his favour, for it is hard 
to see how he could have discovered and exhibited this 
unity, dependent on the central concept of existence, 
unless it was already there in the mind of the apostolic 
writer.
We have not yet examined the phenomenon of alienation 
which, as we saw, belongs to Heidegger’s concept of 
fallenness. With this theme we come to the very important 
Christian concept of sin (<fyuoiprfi) , which implies not 
only moral evil but alienation from God. In the 
absence of God from Heidegger’s philosophy, no genuine 
concept of sin is therefore possible for him. The 
alienation of a fallen existence is alienation from the 
authentic self, not from God. Is sin therefore a
concept which we cannot integrate with the others, or 
link up with the concept of existence? By no means.
It is clear that Saint Paul also understands sin as 
alienation from the authentic self: "It is no more I
that do it, hut sin that dwelleth in me."* The 
authentic self is lost, and the inauthentic or sinful 
self - here expressed simply as "sin" - has taken control. 
This "strife between ego and ego" as Bultmann calls it** 
is only possible because man exists in Heidegger’s 
sense of having a relation to himself, because he is 
< r S f las Bultmann understands that term. But what then 
becomes of the notion of alienation from God, which is 
quite essential to the Christian concept of sin? That 
is simply answered. So far as man is fallen away from 
his true self, he is fallen away from the being which 
the Creator has given him. He is therefore denying 
God and rebelling against God, Whose command is life - 
that is, the authentic existence for which man was 
created.** Alienation from God follows from alienation 
from the authentic self. "The carnal mind" - that is 
to say, precisely this fallen understanding of the 
self - "is enmity against God."***
* Romans 7, 17. ** Romans 7, 10. *** Romans 8, 7.
Sin in the New Testament is an ontical conception - 
it describes not only a possibility for man but his 
actual condition. "All have sinned, and come short of 
the glory of God."* What is the ground for this belief 
in the universality of sin? Saint Paul, as we saw 
already, traces the origin of sin not as the Gnostics 
dii to matter or demonic agency but to man himself, 
more precisely, to Adam.** He seems to argue there 
for a hereditary or original sin. Bultmann is unwilling 
to accept this, since it seems to him to cut away the 
ground of responsibility. He suggests - while freely 
admitting that his interpretation is here a very 
tentative one - that Saint Paul may mean that as Christ 
opens to man the possibility of life, so Adam opens 
the possibility of sin and death. This however seems 
a very strained and inadequate interpretation, since 
surely the possibility was there, as possibility, even 
before Adam realised it, and the whole point of Saint 
Paul’s teaching is that now it is more than possibility, 
it is fact. Even Heidegger in his teaching that man 
tempts himself and prepares for his own fall seems to
* Romans 3, 23.
** Romans 5, 12-19.
do more justice to the seemingly innate tendency of man 
to prefer the evil to the good. Bultmann however immediate 
ly goes on to another argument, not found explicitly in 
Saint Paul, hut derived from his concept of the /co & -ju 6$ 
as that has been already explained. Every individual 
is horn into a falsely oriented humanity. He understands 
himself in the light of this, and becomes partly re­
sponsible for it. JVhether this can he accepted as an 
adequate account of original sin is open to question, 
hut it may he said that all theologians who are not 
content with contradicting themselves have their 
difficulties in doing justice both to the evil tendency 
in man which makes him prefer darkness to light and to 
the responsibility which must he his if he is accountable 
for his existence.
For the sake of completeness, we must look also 
at the Johannine writings, which Bultmann seeks to 
interpret from the same existential point of view.
The term as Saint Paul develops it is practically
absent. When the word does occur it usually has the 
neutral sense of the natural and this-worldly, as in 
the concept of the Word made flesh to express the thought 
of God’s coming into this world in Christ.* It follows
* John 1, 14.
t h e n  t h a t  sin is not, as with Saint Paul, associated 
w i t h  t h e  f l e s h .  I t  I s ,  a s  I s  well-known, r e a d i e d  rather 
t o  unbelief. T h e  H o l y  S p i r i t  w i l l  r e p r o v e  t h e  world of 
sin ’’ b e c a u s e  t h e y  b e l i e v e  n o t  in me. 11 *  B u t  w e  saw 
a l r e a d y  t h a t  b e l i e f  o r  k n o w l e d g e ,  a s  t h e  t e r m ,  is under­
s t o o d  in the F o u r t h  G o s p e l ,  i s  n o t  t o  b e  t a k e n  in any 
n a r r o w  i n t e l l e c t u a l  s e n s e ,  b u t  t o u c h e s  o n  t h e  whole of 
e x i s t e n c e . * *  T h u s  u n b e l i e f  i s  t h e  r e j e c t i o n  o f  t h e  
^ o r d ,  a  p r e f e r r i n g  of d a r k n e s s  t o  l i g h t ,  a d e c i s i o n  
f o r  t h e  w o r l d  r a t h e r  t h a n  f o r  G o d .  O n  t h e  o t h e r  hand 
t h e  Pauline c o n c e p t  o f  the f l e s h  d o e s  n o t  d e n o t e  primarily 
t h e  s i n s  o f  s e n s u a l i t y ,  b u t  a g a i n  a  t r u s t  i n  t h e  natural 
a n d  t h i s - w o r l d l y  a s  a g a i n s t  G o d .  A l l o w i n g  t h e r e f o r e  
f o r  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  terminology, t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  under­
s t a n d i n g  o f  sin i n  t h e  J o h a n n i n e  w r i t i n g s  is capable of - 
b e i n g  e x p l a i n e d  i n  a w a y  v e r y  c l o s e  t o  t h a t  which we 
h a v e  s e e n  a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  P a u l i n e  w r i t i n g s .
We h a v e  n o w  t r a c e d  t h e  t h r e a t  t o  human e x i s t e n c e  
f r o m  its o r i g i n  I n  human f a c t i c i t y  t h r o u g h  i t s  
r e a l i s a t i o n  I n  p r e - o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  w o r l d  a n d  
d e p e r s o n a l  I s a t  I o n  i n  t h e  c r o w d  t o  i t s  full concretion 
In the f a l l e n  l i f e  o f  s i n .  T h i s  is e v e r y d a y  inauthentic
9  J o h n  16, 9 .  * *  S u p r a ,  p p .  112-114.
existence, In Heidegger1s terminology, or the life of 
the natural man, in the more familiar language of the '
New Testament. We have now to ask what is the significance 
of this way of being which has been sketched out. Has 
it any value? Is it an illusion? And of course even 
as an illusion, it might have value if that illusion 
were intended to defend man against a reality too 
terrifying to be accepted. We must also ask what is 
the alternative, and whether there is more than one 
alternative to the inauthentic existence described.
But first we turn to the question of significance.
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CHAPTER V 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EXISTENCE
15. Care.
Are we now in a position to estimate the significance 
of human existence, as it has "been analysed in the various 
existential concepts? Is there some single concept 
that will show us the meaning of existence as a whole?
And with this question goes also the question of value - 
really the question whether life is worth living, or 
whether it is a "burden that no one would desire for 
himself. Let us first "be clear that we are not yet 
in a position to answer the question fully - even 
supposing that it could "be answered fully. What we have 
examined so far is a) the "basic ontological structure 
of all human existence and "b) the ontological structure 
(together with some of its ontical manifestations) of 
that fundamental possibility of human existence which 
Heidegger calls the inauthentic mode of existence.
The present synthesis therefore cannot claim to he 
a complete interpretation of the meaning of existence,
since we have confined ourselves chiefly to the inauthentic 
way of "being, and we can only see the whole picture after 
we have examined what is meant "by the concept of an 
authentic possibility of existence.* The concept which 
Heidegger advances as an interpretation of the being of 
man, so far as that has been already described in 
inauthentic everyday existence, is care.
This comprehensive concept unifies three of the 
fundamental characters of existence. The first is 
possibility. Man is always ahead of himself, incomplete 
in his being. He stands before a Hnot yet,” he projects 
possibility. The second is facticity. Man exists as 
a fact, and his possibility is always tied down to his 
facticity. He is thrown into a situation, and his 
possibility is related to that situation. The third 
is fallenness. Man is fallen into the world in his 
practical concern with it. He is not only thrown 
into it, he has himself chosen it and surrendered 
himself to it. These three structures of the being of 
man - being ahead of himself, being already in the 
world, being concerned with the world as his home - 
together constitute care (Sorgo).* By this Heidegger
* Of. S. u. Z. , p. 192 ff.
insists once more that we are to understand a purely 
ontological concept. It is not to he confused with 
ontical anxiety, hut on the other hand it makes such 
anxiety possible for man - it is that structure of his 
being in virtue of which "he looks before and after” 
and at the same time is concerned with his world.
Is it merely by accident that at this critical 
juncture of his work, when he is concerned to put 
forward a comprehensive concept that will interpret 
the meaning of man*s everyday existence, Heidegger has 
resort to a myth? Or is this a tacit acknowledgement 
that in the communication of the kind of knowledge 
which we call existential, the myth has its own indispen­
sable function? Heidegger’s ostensible reason for 
introducing his myth is to relate the result of his 
analytic to traditional and so-called commonsense 
understandings of the being of man. After all, the 
existential analytic was supposed to exhibit the 
understanding of existence which is already given 
with existence. As existing, man is disclosed to 
himself, and the work of the analytic is simply to 
make explicit that which is already somehow understood* 
But actually Heidegger’s argument has introduced many
ideas which are quite unfamiliar to commonsense, and 
even to traditonal philosophy, and he apologises himself 
for the difficulties of his terminology in seeking to 
express his existential philosophy.* But now he pauses 
to make the claim that his interpretation of the being 
of man is an old one, and that it is faithful to the 
pre-ontological commonsense understanding which man has 
of his own being, which the philosopher has merely 
analysed and set out in a systematic Begrifflichkeit.
The Latin myth, which is attributed to Hyginus, 
the reputed compiler of a handbook of mythology from 
Greek sources in the second century of our era,** is 
worth quoting: !,When Gare once crossed a river, she
saw some clay, and with thought she took a piece and 
began to shape it. While she was deliberating what 
she had made, Jupiter came along. Gare asked him to 
confer spirit on the piece of clay she had shaped.
This Jupiter gladly granted. But when she wished to 
bestow her own name on the creature, Jupiter forbade 
her, and demanded that his own name must be given to 
him. While ©are and Jupiter quarrelled over the name,
* S. u. Z. , pp. 38-39.
** Of. Oxford Classical Dictionary, p. 443.
Earth arose also and desired that her name "be conferred 
on the creature, since she had given him a piece of her 
"body. The disputants asked Saturn to he their arbiter. 
Saturn communicated to them the following decision, 
which seemed just: *Thou, Jupiter, since thou gavest
the spirit, shalt take it at his death, and thou, Earth, 
since thou gavest the body, shalt take it. But because 
Gare first formed the nature of this creature, she shall 
possess him as long as he lives. And because there- is 
a dispute over the name, he shall be called Homo, because 
he is made of earth (humus). * ”
The importance of this myth, in Heidegger’s view, 
is not only that it perceives care to be that which 
belongs to man* s temporal existence as its distinctive 
character, but also that it connects care with the 
common view of the constitution of man as spirit and 
body. But whereas spirit and body are mistakenly under­
stood as substances, they are to be properly understood 
as possibility and facticity, two of the constitutive 
elements of care - as indeed we suggested in connection 
with the Genesis account of man* s creation out of the 
breath of life and the dust of the ground.* This raises
* Supra, p. 149.
the further question how far Heidegger’s myth is comparable 
to the Old Testament story. We must note two very 
significant differences. The first is the crude poly­
theism of the classical myth, which attributes the spirit 
to Jupiter and the body to Earth, a dualism which is 
reflected in Heidegger’s own inability to bring together 
Existenz and Vdrhandenhfelt. In contrast the Bible 
shows us the entire man as the work of the Creator God,
Who is the ground of his being both in his possibility 
and in his facticity. The second difference is that 
the Latin myth depicts man as already fallen. His 
origin is care, and fallenness is a necessary element 
in care. There is a distinct strain of peesimism in 
the view of man taught in this myth. The Bible on 
the other hand shows us man as created in the image of 
God before there was any mention of a fall. Man was 
not therefore created for a life of care but for an 
authentic existence, and so far as such an existence 
is withdrawn from fallenness, it is also withdrawn 
from care. "Take no thought, saying, What shall we 
eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Wherewithal shall 
we be clothed?’* Jesus taught his disciples, thus
* Matthew 6, 51.
recalling them from a life of care in which the self 
is scattered in a multiplicity of concerns to the life 
of faith in God.
Oaring is, as Bultmann points out, a
characteristic of the fallen life in the Pauline 
teaching.* We should he careful to note however that 
the New Testament is not Heidegger’s ontological
concept of care, hut an actual or ontical concern for 
’the things of the world,”** through which concern 
man falls into the world and attempts to build his life 
on it rather than on God. This is therefore
nearer to what Heidegger calls practical concern (Besorgen) 
than to care as such (3orge)- though Heidegger explicitly 
recognises the close connection between the two concepts.*** 
Since such caring belongs to the life after the flesh,
Saint Paul’s prayer is that the converts may be “without 
carefulness”**** and elsewhere he even bids the Christians 
”be careful for nothing.”*♦***
If the concept of care occupies so central a place 
in the existential analytic as the interpretation of the 
meaning of everyday existence, and if, as has been 
claimed, there is an affinity between the existentialist
* Th. des NT., p. 237. ** I Cor. 7, 33. *** S.u. Z. , P. 57.
**** I Corinthians 7, 32. ***** Philippians 4, 6.
and the New Testament understandings of the being of 
man, then why, it may be asked, does this concept enter 
so slightly and so ambiguously into the New Testament 
teaching about man? That question however raises no 
serious difficulty for the main argument. It is to 
be answered by repeating something that has been said 
several times already, namely, that the New Testament 
writers are not concerned to expound an ontology as 
such. Their interest is not primarily existential 
but existentiell, that is to say, they are not trying 
to teach the philosophy of the good life but the living 
of the good life. Thus Saint Paul is rightly far more 
concerned with the ontical concept of sin than with any 
ontological concept, and has more to say about it. But 
it is the business of the theologian to go behind these 
ontical concepts to the underlying ontological 
assumptions, if he would rightly understand them and 
exhibit them in their connection together. That is 
the work of systematic theology. It is something like 
the ontological concept of care, the unity of possibility, 
facticity, and fallenness in the being of man, which 
shows us how sin, as Saint Paul understood it, is 
possible for man, and which enables us to integrate
most fully the many different concepts which Saint Paul 
employs to describe the life of man under sin.
In such a fallen existence vt hen, man bears a burden 
of care (a phrase not unfamiliar in Christian devotion), 
or rather, he is his own burden of care. Is this then
the significance of man’s everyday fallen existence? -
for it was from the question of significance, it will 
be remembered, that we set out in this discussion of 
care. Or have we found that existence to be devoid of 
significance altogether? Before we can fully answer 
that question, we must turn to yet another phenomenon 
which seems to stultify even further the everyday 
existence of the natural man. This other phenomenon 
is death.
16. Death.
Natural death is something of a mystery even to
the physiologist. It is as yet by no means clear to
biological science why the higher organisms should 
become senescent and eventually die. Here however we 
are not concerned with death as a natural happening, 
but with death as an existential phenomenon - and to 
Heidegger must go the credit of having drawn attention
in recent times to this way, long neglected, of under­
standing death.
As a preliminary definition of death, we may say 
that it is loss of being.* Death is the end of man as 
“being-there” or “being-in-the-world. “ Heidegger is 
careful to point out explicitly that this does not 
prejudge the question whether man has another being 
after death, whether he can be elsewhere or in another 
world. “Only when death is fully grasped in its onto­
logical character are we justified in asking what is 
after death.”** To begin with we are approaching the 
problem of death purely as a phenomenon of human 
existence. Neither is Heidegger concerned with what 
he calls a metaphysic of death - how and why it came 
into the world, its significance as an evil, and so on.
These questions also presuppose an ontological understanding 
of death, and until we have clarified that, we cannot 
hope to answer them - or even understand them properly.
But how can we hope to arrive at a full existential 
concept of death? Death as a natural phenomenon can 
be investigated by the normal methods of science. But 
death as an existential phenomenon must be investigated
* S. u. Z., p. 237. ** S. u. Z., pp. 247-248.
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by the phenomenological method, that is to say, man*s 
experience of death, this "being considered to stand 
outside nature, is to "be analysed. Clearly there is 
a difficulty here which did not arise with any of the 
other phenomena of existence. Death "being "by definition 
loss of his "being, anyone who experiences death seems 
thereby to "be robbed of the possibility of understanding 
and analysing it. He has ceased to be - at any rate 
in the sense of having the kind of being that we know 
in this world - therefore he has ceased to be disclosed 
to himself, and has no possibility of understanding 
what his death has been.
May info mat ion be obtained from considering the 
death of others? We observe them ceasing to exist, 
going out of the world. But the death of others is 
experienced as the loss sustained by those who remain 
behind, and not as the loss of being which the deceased 
himself has sustained. Nor ftan he any longer communicate 
with us to describe that loss of being. So it would 
seem that inquiry into the death of others, while it 
may teach us much about death considered as a natural 
phenomenon, can never disclose the existential concept 
of death. There is contained in this seemingly
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negative result however one positive character of death, 
namely, that it is always my own, since it cannot he 
experienced vicariously. It therefore shares one of 
the fundamental characters of existence - Jemeinigkeit. 
"No one can die for another. He may give his life for 
another, hut that does not in the slightest deliver 
the other from his own death. "* Death is untransferable, 
and isolates the individual. He must die himskl-f alone.
Is there any analogy which might throw light on 
death? We think of death as the end of man as being- 
in-the-world. This end is not something added on, so 
to speak, it belongs itself to the being of man. In 
that respect it might be compared to the ripeness of 
a fruit, which is not something added to the fruit in 
it’ immaturity, but means "the fruit itself in a specific 
way of being."** The analogy breaks down at that point, 
for whereas ripeness is the fulfilment of the fruit, 
the end may come for man when he is still immature 
or it may delay until he is broken down and exhausted 
with his fulfilment long past. But here again one 
positive result emerges. Death belongs to my possible 
ways of being - though in a unique kind of way, since
* S. u. Z., p. 240. ** S. u. Z. , p. 243.
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it is the possibility of ceasing to he. It is already 
a possibility present in existing, so here again it shares 
a fundamental character of existence, and as a present 
possibility it is disclosed to me and can be analysed. 
Combining the two results, death appears as my own 
present untransferable possibility of being no longer 
in the world.
Heidegger clarifies this preliminary understanding 
of death as an existential phenomenon by referring it 
to his interpretation of the being of man as care. It 
will be remetaberM that care had a threefold structure - 
possibility, facticity, and fallenness. Death belongs 
to man’s possibility - it is indeed his most intimate 
and isolated possibility, always his own. We may note 
in passing that at this point Sartre disagrees with 
Heidegger. For him death is not a possibility but the 
cancellation*of possibility. Yet this is not very 
different from what Heidegger expresses paradoxically 
by saying that death is ’’the possibility of the im­
possibility of existence.”* And further, by possibility 
Heidegger does not mean simply a contingency that may 
happen to me, but a genuine possibility of existence
* S. u. Z. , p. 262.
which, as will he seen later, man may in a certain way 
choose for himself. Death always confronts me as my 
own isolated possibility.
This possibility of death is not accidental or 
occasional. It belongs to man’s facticity. He is 
always already thrown into the possibility of death, 
as existing. His being, whether he is always conscious 
of it or not, is a “being-unto-death” (Sein-zum-Tode). 
This possibility is therefore on the one hand certain - 
it is the one possibility of which we may be quite 
sure that it will be actualised. Yet at the same time 
it is on the other hand always indefinite, because as 
possibility it is already present, I am already thrown 
into it, and we never know when it will be realised. 
“Man is always old enough to die.”
Fallenness is related to the flight from death.
In his everyday inauthentic existence man avoids the 
thought of death, and conceals from himself its real 
significance. We are all familiar with symptoms of 
this flight from death. Some people have a horror of 
cemeteries, or even of going to see their friends in 
hospital. The very word death is avoided, and some 
euphemism substituted for it - “passing away,” “being
at rest," and so on. Since fallen man is concerned 
with the world and has founded his life on it, to go 
out of the world means for him the shattering of his 
existence, and he does not wish to think of it. "People 
die" - that much is recognised, hut in this way death 
is depersonalised. The impersonal way of speaking serves 
to conceal the real issue, which is that I die, and that 
my death is disclosed to me as a present possibility.
In everyday talking of death it is generalised and 
reduced to a natural phenomenon, and thus it is robbed 
of .its sting, and its significance for my existence 
is evaded. As Heidegger says, it is made to assume the, 
character of escaping notice (Unauffalligkeit) which, 
as we saw,* belongs to that which is immediately to 
hand in the world.
It is obvious that for the interpretation of the 
Biblical thought of death, it is the existential and 
not the natural phenomenon that is relevant. Death 
is understood in its significance for human existence, 
in relation to man’s possibilities and projects over 
which hangs "the shadow of death." Death is not 
merely an observable happening, but a problem for
man1s existence. In the Psalms particularly there is 
"a clear facing of the facts of life and death"* - and 
that by men who, like Heidegger in our time, had no
assurance of any life to coine. Man is bidden to return
to destruction, to the dust from which he was formed, 
which seems to stultify his existence; no sooner does 
he flourish than he is cut down and withered; he may
prolong his life for seventy or eighty years, yet the
best of his days are labour and sorrow, and the inevitable 
end comes suddenly.** And these thoughts the psalmist 
relates to his own existence. Such a concept of death 
is existential, and might quite fairly be analysed as 
the concept of my own certain untransferable and ever 
present possibility.
As well as this clear facing of the existential 
significance of death, we also find that note is taken 
in the Bible of the other side of the picture - 
fallen man’s flight from death, and his avoidance of 
it in the understanding of his own existence. The 
best illustration of this is our Lord’s own story 
of the rich man who proposed' to build more commodious 
bams in which to store his expanding possessions,
* Oesterley, "The Psalms," vol. II, p. 407.
** Psalm 90, vv. 3, 6, 10.
intending to live at his ease for many years.* Death 
overtook him before his plans were carried out. Absorbed 
in his concern with the world, he understood all his 
possibilities in terms of the world, and overlooked 
his capital and nearest possibility - that of his own 
death. Death can be overlooked in spite of its impor­
tance precisely because man wants to overlook it. It 
is depersonalised and objectified, the mystery and the 
imminent threat are taken out of it, it becomes just a 
natural event in the familiar world of events, and as 
such it is made to share the character of escaping 
notice (UnauffaJigkeit) which belongs to the everyday 
understanding of the world and which serves to mask 
the hostility of what is within the world.
This Biblical teaching on death does not accord to 
it the exaggerated place which it holds in Heidegger’s 
thought, nor does it encourage the kind of preoccupation 
with death which, as we shall see, Heidegger advocates. 
But there is agreement in the call to face death 
squarely as an issue touching my individual existence, 
and in the condemnation of man’s tendency to conceal 
from himself the ever present possibility of his death. 
This traditional Biblical understanding of death is
already assumed in the New Testament theology of death, 
but here the central problem is the relation between 
death and sin. The connection of the two was of course 
already familiar from the Old Testament, in which death 
was conceived as a punishment for sin.* Saint Paul 
also thinks of death in this way. Sinners are "worthy 
of death" in the judgment of God, death is "the wages 
of sin."** There is however another line of thought 
in Saint Paul which represents death as the necessary 
consequence of sin. It is not simply a legal punishment, 
something added to sin from outside, so to speak. It 
is conceived as the specific fruit of a life after the 
flesh, arising necessarily from sin and with sin. Thus 
Saint Paul can say that "he that soweth to his flesh 
shall of the flesh reap corruption," and "the sinful 
cravings, which were by the law, did work in our members 
to bring forth fruit unto death."*** Bultmann thinks 
that these two lines of thought - death as punishment 
for sin, and death as inherent consequence of sin - 
are left unreconciled in Saint Paul’s teaching.**** But 
it could be argued that the second is but an inter-
* E.g., Genesis 3, 19. ** Romans 1, 32; 6, 23.
*** Galatians 6, 8; Rom. 7, 5. **** Th. des NT. , p. 244.
pretation of the first, a deeper insight into the tradi­
tional belief that death is the punishment of sin. On 
this view death is already there as punishment with the 
sin itself. The punishment is contained in the sin, it 
id not something externally added. So Dante in his de­
scription of hell interprets the specific punishment of 
each sin as nothing other than the disintegration of 
personality which arises out of the sin itself.*
But whether the two lines of thought are reconciled 
or not, it seems clear that it was to the second that 
Saint Paul attached the chief importance. Because death 
is the fruit of sin, it follows that death is, in a sense, 
already present. He can say of sin not only that it 
has deceived him, but that it has already slain him.**
And at this point we may widen the scope of the argument 
to take in the non-Pauline writings of the New Testament, 
for the understanding of death as the present consequence 
of sin appears to extend through almost the whole range 
of New Testament thought. In the first of the Johannine 
Epistles we read that "he that loveth not his brother 
abideth in death,"*** while in the Epistle to the 
Ephesians (which Bultmann does not acceptsas Saint Paul’s)
* Of. e.g., "Inferno" cantos V, XXIII. ** Rom. 7, 11.
*** I John 3, 14.
we find possibly the clearest formulation of all: "dead 
in trespasses and sins."*
This idea of the close connection between sin and 
death appears therefore to be of considerable inportance 
for the understanding of New Testament thought, yet it 
is an extremely difficult one. Is it anything more than 
a figure of speech? We can understand what is meant 
by saying that the sinner is spiritually dead - that 
is a metaphor, and admittedly a very vague one, but it 
does suggest to the mind a condition into which men may 
fall. Yet leaving such figures aside, is it possible 
to show some genuine relation between sin and death, 
in virtue of which death could be understood as somehow 
the consequence and, as it were, the punishment of sin, 
and in the light of which death could be understood as 
already somehow present in fallen human existence?
We can of course understand that in particular cases 
there may be acconnection between sin and death — 
excessive drinking, for instance, might lead to death. 
But that is a natural, indeed a causal connection, 
whereas we are looking for an exx&tenfciallconnection.
We are concerned not with deaths a natural phenomenon
* Ephesians 2, 1.
but with death in its significance for existence* And 
in any case something much wider than such isolated 
cases as a man drinking himself to death was implicit 
in the New Testament thought of a connection between 
sin and death, and it is that wider connection which we 
must seek to explain.
We orient the discussion again to the existential 
analysis which, it was argued, has enabled Bultraann to 
show to a remarkable extent the interrelations of the 
various anthropological concepts of the New Testament.
The fallen life was shown to be the scattering of the 
self in the multiplicity of worldly concerns. It is 
m8nf s fall away from his true being, and it is therefore 
the loss of his being. In Bultmann’s words, "man ’sold 
under sin’* has lost himself and is no longer at one 
with himself (bei sich selbst)."** ^he aspect of sin 
brought out here is loss of being. But death, considered 
as an existential phenomenon, was also defined as loss 
of being.*** So it is no mere metaphor to say that 
in the life of sin death is already present as the 
consequence - or rather, the concomitant - of sin, 
since both sin and death are characterised ontologically
* Rom. 7, 14. ** Th. des NT., p. 244. *** Supra, p. 204.
by loss of being. In his "trespasses and sins" man is 
already in a condition of death in so far as he has 
sustained a loss of being.
With physical death, the loss of man’s being as 
we know it in this world is complete. The body has 
ceased to belong to an existing Dasein and has become 
a mere thing - at first something still organic, but 
in course of time indistinguishable dust with nothing 
left to show that it ever existed and stood apart from 
the inanimate nature of which it has now become a part.
As Heidegger remarks, death shows us "a remarkable 
phenomenon of being, which may be defined as the transition 
from man’s way of being (Existenz) to the way of being 
of a thing (Vorhandenheit). The end of the entity qua 
Dasein is the beginning of the same entity qua Vor- 
handenes."* But that remarkable transition from the 
being of a man to the being of a thing may be regarded 
in one sense as nothing other than the fulfilment of 
the life of sin. Man in his fallen existence has 
surrendered himself to the world, has identified himself 
with it and projected his possibilities upon it. He 
has understood himself as belonging to the world, as
* S. u. Z. , p. 238.
one object among others. Now death has indeed made him 
a part of the world, and has thus fulfilled the tendency 
of sin. The argument stated here is fuller and more 
explicit than can be found in Bultmann, but that it is 
simply a development of his position may be seen from 
his treatment of the New Testament teaching that death 
is already present in sinful existence, and in his 
statement that as man* s authentic striving is towards 
life, "so it follows that a false mistaken striving 
pursues the way to death."*
It is of course a fact that the Christian is 
subject to natural death equally with the man who lives 
after the flesh. But the Christian presumably has been 
turned from a wrongly to a rightly directed striving, 
he has, in Johannine phrase, "passed from death unto 
life."** Does this not seem to argue against the 
New Testament contention for a connection between sin 
and death? If it were true, would not the Christian 
be exempt from death? The question seems to depend 
on a confusion of the natural and existential concepts 
of death. No doubt there were some Christians in
* Th. des NT., p. 242.
** John 5, 24. I John 3, 14.
New Testament times who believed that they would not "taste 
of death," in the sense of being exempt from natural 
death, and at one time possibly Saint Paul himself was 
of their number.* But did the disappointment of their 
expectation refute their belief in the connection between 
sin and death? To this question two answers can be given. 
The first is that the Christian is never free from his 
share of guilt so long as he exists in the Ktcrpos* For 
the KbCfx&p as we saw, enters into the facticity of 
existence to narrow down man’s possibilities, and even 
if the Christain is no longer of it, he cannot esacape 
from the sin and death which characterise it. He cannot 
contract out of war, for instance. The second answer 
is that although the Christian is not exempt from death, 
he is assured of its conquest, and precisely because 
through his faith in Christ he has gained the being 
which he had lost under sin. Just as death is already 
present in the life of sin, so eternal life is already 
present in the experience of faith. But this second 
answer can only be properly expounded at a later stage 
when we have outlined the characteristics of an authentic 
existence and understood what is meant by faith.
* Mark 9, 1; I Thessalonians 4, 15.
Sometimes Saint Paul has a way of speaking very 
paradoxically of the Christian life itself as a death 
in one of its aspects - the Christian is dead to sin.*
The meaning is plain enough. The Christian has withdrawn 
from the life after the flesh, he has lost his sinful 
being, therefore he is dead to sin. The paradox arises 
from the fact that what the Christian has lost was 
itself a loss, that to which he has died was itself 
death. The usage here might seem to be very confusing, 
but on the other hand, as we shall see, it links up 
with Saint Paul’s thought on the significance of the 
death of Jesus. In any case it makes no difference 
to the broad interpretation of the New Testament under­
standing of death.
17. The Quest for Meaning.
A.
With this discussion of death we have come to the 
end of the analysis of inauthentic existence, the life 
of the natural man. It is a way of being directed 
towards the world, misunderstanding and deceiving 
itself, dehumanised and fallen. Or more summarily, 
its significance may be described as a life of care
* Romans 6, 2.
terminated by death* Both Christianity and existentialism 
are agreed that such a life is meaningless and worthless - 
it is inauthentic existence, and worse still, it is sin 
and enmity against God. Whatever value it may claim 
is ‘based upon illusion, and from that springs its 
contentment and pride of achievement. The illusion 
is that man is master of his own destiny and of his 
world. Sometimes the mood of anxiety 'breaks in to 
disclose to man that he is not at home in the world, 
and that he is not master of his existence. But man 
flees from this disclosure into the further illusions 
of collective self-deception - organised illusion, it 
might "be called. Yet all illusions are finally 
shattered "by death. The life that was founded on the 
earthly and the transient ends in nothingness.
Christianity and existentialism are further agreed 
that in such an existence as has "been described man 
has lost himself, he has somehow missed his true being. 
There must therefore be an alternative to that fallen 
existence - the spiritual man is set over against the 
carnal man, authenticity over against inauthenticity.
And this implies that man stands in need of conversion.
His whole being must be turned round in a new direction.
But when we inquire about that new direction, we find 
that Heidegger and the New Testament give quite different, 
answers.
Let us first see how Heidegger would direct us to 
an authentic existence. For his thought, death itself 
supplies the clue. Instead of fleeing from death, man 
is to look death in the face, and more than that, he 
is to accept and choose it as his own pre-eminent possi­
bility. He is to live in the anticipation (Vorlaufen) 
of his own death.* To anticipate death, we are told, 
means neither to commit suicide nor to brood over death, 
but to make death the unifying factor in my existence, 
to relate all my possibilities to this one capital 
possibility. In other words, it is to see and to 
accept the nothingness of my existence. Admittedly 
such an acceptance will deliver me from concern with 
the world and from the tyranny of the public. It will 
detach me from the pursuit of the earthly and the 
transient. It will free me from the illusions of the 
rich man who dreamed of future ease, and also from 
those of the man who built his house on the sand. But 
it will only devalue the worldly existence because at
the same time it devalues all existence. It will only 
deliver from illusion by substituting for it an open- 
eyed despair. To be myself, free from the lures of the 
world, free from the illusions of the crowd, may sound 
very fine - but to be myself, even my authentic self, 
is to be nothing, and Brunner is surely right in saying 
of Heidegger1s attempt to find a meaning for life, and 
of variations upon Heidegger1s theme, such as that of 
Sartre, that they present us with 11 a philosophy of 
despair, hidden in a number of more or less subtle 
evasions of the problem (of meaning).***
Indeed, with such a radical devaluation of values, 
it is hard to see why the term authentic should be 
reserved for Heidegger1s alternative rather than given 
to the everyday existence of the natural fallen man 
(for the notion of authenticity seems to imply some 
kind of value-judgment). True, Heidegger claims to be 
free from illusion. But the natural man might reply 
that illusion is a useful defence-mechanism to render 
existence tolerable. That is what we meant when we said 
that inauthentic existence could have value even as 
an illusion.** If every existence amounts to nothing 
at the end, then what is there to choose between one
* Christianity & Civilian., I, p. 73. Supra p. 194.
way of being and another? Let those who wish choose 
heroic despair and resignation - that may please the 
eccentric minority of existentialist philosophers. But 
those who have no taste for that sort of thing will 
prefer to eat, drink, and be merry, shutting out the 
disclosures of anxiety till the last possible moment, 
refusing to acknowledge their nothingness till death 
knocks on the door, making life supportable by the 
carefully nurtured illusion that they are at home in 
the world.
The Christian alternative to the inauthentic 
existence of the natural man is of course entirely 
different from Heidegger’s. The parting of the ways 
first appeared in the discussion of the concept of 
anxiety. For Heidegger, anxiety disclosed man as 
thrown into a world in which he is not at home; on 
the Christian interpretation, anxiety does more than that 
it also sets man in quest of the ground of his being, 
it directs him to Cod. And further, the Christian 
believes that God meets man in his quest, that He 
has revealed Himself in Jesus Christ, and that through 
Christ there is opened to man the possibility of an 
existence in which not only is he delivered from the
illusions of a worldly existence, but death itself Mis 
swallowed up in victory.1 * The Christian alternative 
therefore is characterised "by hope, while that offered 
by atheistic existentialism sticks in despair.
Does that mean then that from this point onwards 
the philosophy of existence has nothing further to 
offer to theology in the elucidation of its problems?
Do we find that the influence of Heidegger* s philosophy 
upon Bultmann* s thought comes to an end when we complete 
the analysis of the false existence that leads to death, 
and enter upon the theology of the life of faith? Even 
Bultmann*s most severe critics might be willing to 
admit that there has been some value in his use of the 
philosophy of existence to interpret the Hew Testament 
understanding of man without faith. And the unprejudiced 
reader might be prepared to go even further, and say 
that thanks to his employment of concepts derived from 
this philosophy, Bultmann has presented an extra­
ordinarily clear view of the Hew Testament conception 
of fallen man, at once intelligible to modern minds 
and apparently faithful to the authentic intention 
of the Hew Testament writers themselves. To dismiss
* I Corinthians 15, 54.
Bultmann* s work as destructive, as some seem inclined 
to do, is simply to fail to appreciate the very con­
siderable positive contribution that he has made to 
the elucidation of the Christian theology of man. But 
how can existentialism and its concepts be used for 
the interpretation of New Testament teaching on the 
Christian life itself? Surely to permit its influence 
to extend into that side of New Testament theology, 
bearing in mind how Heidegger conceives an authentic 
existence, would be to introduce something utterly 
incommensurable with Christian teaching, and therefore 
misleading.
The question however is not to be settled so 
simply as that. We are still approaching the New 
Testament with the question of human existence in our 
minds, While the preceding analysis has been in the 
main directed to the inauthentic way of being, it 
has also had to examine the fundamental ontological 
structure of man, which lies before authenticity or 
inauthenticity, and makes it possible for man to be 
either the one or the other. To that basic ontology 
belongs, for example, the concept of existence itself, 
also concepts like understanding, disclosure, affective
state, and so on. In the New Testament terminology,
Vou$ 9 , are such ontological concepts. In
his formal ontological structure, man is the same 
whether he is Christian or pagan, whether his existence 
is authentic or inauthentic. It is that in virtue of 
which it can he said that he is a man.
This may appear to "be a dangerous statement, and 
it may he questioned in soine quarters. Does not Saint 
Paul say that 1 if any man he in Christ, he is a new 
creature?*'* But what exactly does that mean? Does 
it mean that the whole constitution of .the man’s 
former being is abolished, and that he has been constituted 
afresh and differently? In that case we cannot speak of 
conversion. Here we would have no genuine conversion, 
but the substitution - by inscrutable and indeed in­
conceivable means - for the former man of an entirely 
new and different man. Saul of Tarsus and Saint Paul 
the Apostle would be different persons altogether.
No doubt in a sense they were different persons. But 
it seems equally indubitable that in another and very 
important sense they were one and the same person —
Paul’s existence was always somehow his own. The
* II Corinthians 5, 17.
change was an ontical one - the radical re-orientation 
of a personality which yet retained the same basic 
ontological structure. But what does a radical re­
orientation of the personality mean? Bultmann called 
it a new understanding of the self, and from what we 
have learned of the existential concept of understanding, 
we take that to mean: the projecting of the self on
new possibilities. But where do the new possibilities 
come from? Were they there already?
This is the really crucial question, and we must 
be careful about the answer which we give. Ontically 
speaking, the answer is No. Fallen man has lost the 
existentiell possibility of gaining or regaining his 
true existence. That possibility (as will be argued 
in detail later) is given to him by the grace of God 
in Jesus Christ. But ontologically speaking, the 
answer must be Yes. God's gift is only possible in 
so far as man can appropriate it - that is to say, make 
it somehow his own, so that it must fall within the 
horizon of his existential possibility. Otherwise we 
are not talking about an entity that exists, but about 
a mere thing, to which properties may be added or taken 
away, as a car may be painted blue or red. But if
man's ontological structure persists through conversion, 
then the ontological concepts already sketched will 
have their place in interpreting the New Testament 
theology of the Christian life.
Further, although the content of Heidegger*s concept 
of authentic existence is so utterly different from that 
contained in our understanding of the Christian life, 
there may prove to be certain formal structural affinities. 
Conscience, decision, the unity of the self - these are 
instances of subjects on which both the existentialist 
philsopher and the Chrsitian theologian have something 
to say in describing what they conceive to tbe the 
true life for man. Here again therefore the theologian 
may find that the philosopher* s analysis of these 
phenomena helps to elucidate his own problems.
Finally, let it be said that we were not altogether 
fair to Heidegger in the brief summary which we gave 
of his concept of an authentic existence, since we 
said nothing there about his very important analysis 
of the temporality and his toricity of man. That 
subject also will call for attention, and it is one 
of vital importance for the theologian, and one that 
has been particularly influential with Bultmann. For
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the Christian religion rests upon historical events,
"the mighty acts” hy which, the Christian believes, God 
changed man1 s situation and made possible for hi&i the 
new life. For the theological understanding of these 
events, there is necessary an understanding of man's 
existence in its temporal and historical character.
Thus although after their common rejection of a 
life founded upon the world Christianity and existentialism 
take different paths in their quest for meaning, there 
is still a wide area for interaction between the two, 
and in particular there are still points at which 
Christian theology may find it necessary to clarify 
some of its presuppositions by existential analysis.
To these problems we must now address ourselves.
PAST TWO
THE CHRISTIAN LIFE 
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CHAPTER VI
THE TRANSITION TO 
AN AUTHENTIC EXISTENCE
18. The Idea of an Authentic Existence.
The problem is now to describe an authentic existence, 
or to answer the question, What is man*s true life? This 
question, remarks Zehrer, ”is the most natural, but also 
the most radical question man can ask. For which reason 
he seldom asks it, preferring to assume that the answer 
is known. When as an individual he asks this question, 
one can infer that something which gave him security 
has come to an end. When the question emerges in the 
historic course of a given culture, it is a sign that 
the foundations of the culture have become faulty, and 
that people are no longer unselfconsciously at home in 
it.”* So long as man is lulled into that contentment - 
however illusory - which belongs to an existence founded 
on the world, he is untroubled by ultimate questions 
about his whence and whither, his why and wherefore - 
indeed, asr we have seen, he avoids such questions. But
* ”Man in this World,” p. 28.
when the mood of anxiety breaks in to reveal that he is 
not at home in the supposedly secure world which he has 
constructed, when everyday existence is disclosed as a 
life of care terminated by death, the question of existence 
forces itself upon him. And of course that is precisely 
what is happening on the continent of Europe in the 
twentieth century. Traditions and institutions which 
long gave security to life have been largely swept 
away. Man is stripped and isolated, confronted with the 
question which he fomerly concealed from himself: What
is my true life? The life of material security is one 
built upon the sand. Is there an authentic existence, 
founded, so to speak, upon a rock - or is there just 
nothingness?
To this most radical of questions Heidegger and 
Bultmann - and of course many other contemporary thinkers 
besides - have sought to give an answer. Heidegger* s 
answer, so far as it goes, is ambiguous. He does hold 
out the possibility of an authentic existence, and 
thus far his philosophy opens a way of salvation to 
man in his fallen condition. And yet, since that 
authentic existence appears to be acceptance of 
nothingness, it is no true salvation that is offered.
God is ”not yet” in Heidegger’s thought, and therefore 
he has not passed beyond the first shock of despair 
which comes when the illusory and inauthentic character 
of an existence founded on the world is disclosed. 
Bultmann on the other hand goes to the Christian re­
velation for his answer to the question. He believes 
that God has spoken and acted decisively in Jesus 
Christ, and that therein lies the clue to the problem 
of human existence. Like Barth therefore he looks to 
the revealed Word of God as the source of truth. But 
in a way which goes beyond Barth, he approaches that 
source of truth out of the human situation, from the 
question of the meaning and end of existence that is 
agitating a dread-filled mankind.
Let us examine more closely this idea of an authentic 
existence. That which is authentic is genuine or 
original (ursnrunglich - a term sometimes used by 
Heidegger). An inanimate object can, strictly speaking, 
be neither authentic nor inauthentic. Its nature is 
purely given, and it simply is what it is. True, we 
can speak of a signature as being authentic, but that 
implies a reference to human existence. Considered 
simply as ink on paper, one signature is as real,
genuine, and original as another. Authenticity is 
properly a character of something which is not given 
in its nature, hut stands before different possibilities 
of being. It is therefore a character of man (and 
perhaps also of living things besides man, but that does 
not concern us here). Man exists authentically when his 
original possibilities, belonging to his being as man, 
are fulfilled. His existence is inauthentic when his 
possibilities are projected on something alien to himself. 
In that case the self is lost and scattered. Even his 
original possibilities may be lost or rendered in­
accessible. That is fallenness. To restore authenticity 
would mean; to unify the scattered self so that it 
is withdrawn from false concerns and stands in its 
original possibilities.
This idea of authenticity is readily applicable to 
the Biblical understanding of man. We are told that 
man was formed in the image of God.* His original 
possibility is to be the child of God. But by worshipping 
and serving the creation rather than the Creator, man 
has lost that possibility and fallen away from his 
original being - though we understand, of course, that 
the tern "original” here may not necessarily have
* Genesis 1, 26.
temporal significance. The Christian religion claims to 
restore to man his original "being, and his lost possibility 
of heing the child of God and enjoying communion with 
God, Understood in this way as deliverance from fallen­
ness, sin and death, together with the restoration of 
the original possibilities which God gave to man at 
his creation, the Christian life may fairly "be called 
the authentic existence of man. In it man gains his 
true being, and the intention of the Creator is realised.
In the Hew Testament various terms are used for 
such an authentic existence. Sometimes it is called
j). This term is not used for the natural 
living principle in man - denoted rather by faxtf “ But, 
in Bultmann’s own words, stands for “the authentic being 
of man.“* The commandment of the Creator is life.**
Whereas man in his fallen existence loses his being and 
runs into death, when he exists according to the command 
and intention of the Creator, he gains his being and 
attains to life in the fullest sense.
Just as we noted that the idea of the connection 
of sin and death is common to both the Pauline and the 
Johannine writings, so we find that this opposite idea
simply life
* Th. des HT., p. 228. ** Romans 7, 10.
of life as man* s authentic possibility is also common 
to these two major streams of New Testament thought.
In the Fourth Gospel Christ summarises the aim of his 
mission as the bringing of life to men: “I am come that 
they might have life, and that they might have it more 
abund-antly. “* The concept of life is of course central 
to the whole Johannine teaching. Christ gives life to 
the world; he is the bread of life; his words are life; 
he is the resurrection and the life.** The purpose of 
the writer of the Fourth Gospel is “that ye might believe 
that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that 
believing ye might have life through his name.”***
Here too is the thought that the command of God, the 
authentic intention of the Creator for man is life:
“His commandment is life everlasting. ”**** Such life, 
understood not as a natural phenomenon but as man’s 
authentic God-given existence, is eternal or everlasting, 
because, being the opposite of death, the concomitant 
of sin, it is therefore immune from death. Thus the 
believer has even now eternal life.*****
* John 10, 10.
** John 6, 33; 6, 35; 6, 63; 11, 25.
*** John 20, 31.
**** John 12, 50.
***** John 3, 16; 5, 24; 6, 47; 17, 3.
Another concept which is used in the New Testament 
to express the thought of man’s authentic existence is 
f a • Man’s fallen existence is an existence “after 
the flesh.“ In Saint Paul’s thought, spirit is con­
trasted with flesh. Thus man’s authentic existece is 
“after the spirit" (tt<#Ti The Christian walks
“not after the flesh, but after the spirit."* And 
just as meant not a substance but a way of man’s
being in which he is oriented to the world, to the 
visible, the tangible, and the temporal, so 77't£vjU.<x is 
not a substance either, but that way of being in which 
man is oriented to God, to the invisible and eternal.** 
For Saint Paul, an authentic existence after the spirit 
means as radical a devaluation of the things that are 
cherished in man’s fallen existence as we find in 
Heidegger’s authentic existence in the face of death - 
a Christian nihilism concerning the things of the 
world, if you like: “Let they that have wives be as 
though they had none; and they that weep as though 
they wept not; and they that rejoice as though they 
rejoiced not; and they that buy as though they
* Romans 8, 4.
** Cf. Th. des NT., p. 331.
possessed not; and they that mix in the world as though 
they were not absorbed in it: for the fashion of this 
world passeth away.“* The difference is that Heidegger’s 
devaluation is made before nothingness, Saint Paul’s 
before God. It is not everything which is devalued here, 
for if “the things which are seen are temporal, the 
things which are not seen are eternal.”** The authentic 
existence offered by the Christian Gospel is not only 
deliverance from the tyranny of the world and the flesh 
but positively a new way of being oriented to God - 
in other words, life in the sense of that tem already 
explained. And indeed the two concepts of and
are explicitly connected by Saint Paul, with the im­
plication that this connection is parallel to that 
between sin and death: “to be carnally minded is death;
but to be spiritually minded is life and peace.”***
The detailed structure of the spiritual existence, 
the eternal life, which the New Testament promises, 
will only emerge as the argument proceeds. For the 
present we simply note that it is the opposite of that 
fallen carnal existence already analysed, and that it 
claims to be for man his authentic existence, for 
which he was destined by his Creator.
* I Cor. 7, 29-31. ** II Cor. 4, 18 *** Rom. 8, 6.
19. Conscience.
The immediate problem is the manner in which the 
transition is made from the one way of being to the 
other - from the false to the true, the fallen to the 
original, the inauthentic to the authentic. It is 
common ground to Christianity and existentialism that 
such a transition or conversion is possible. The 
Gospel promises that through faith man may be brought 
from death to life. Heidegger too b©li©ves that man 
may be recalled from his fallen existence. “Inauthenticity 
denotes a way of being in which man may go astray, and 
generally does go astray, but in which he need not 
necessarily and always go astray.”*
But if man’s fallen existence is death, and his 
true existence is life, and these two are opposites, 
how can the gulf between them be bridged? Bultmann 
acutely observes that it was when Saint Paul saw most 
clearly the gap between the true self and the self 
that is lost that he came nearest to Gnostic dualism.**
Yet dualism is no final solution, and it is certainly 
not the Pauline or the Christian solution. We are not
* S. u. Z., p. 259. ** Th. des NT., pp. 195-196.
dealing with two completely different and mutually ex­
clusive worlds, hut with one world which is still the 
creation of God even where it is fallen into sin. We 
saw already that while the Christian may he spoken of 
as a new creature, nevertheless there must he some 
continuity with his former being, in so far as he is 
the same man whose individual existence is always his 
own. Something which belongs to him and constitutes 
him passes from death unto life, and is still his on 
both sides of the transition.
To use a somewhat gross analogy, let us imagine 
a local authority engaged in slum clearance. There is 
a derelict property on a certain site. The authority 
has several possibilities open to it. The slum may 
be pulled down, the debris carted away, and an entirely 
new building erected on the site. Or again, the old 
building might be repaired and modernised, so that it 
would remain substantially as it had been, but brought 
up to present-day requirements and rendered habitable 
for a few more years. Or finally, the building might 
be pulled down to its foundations, and the old material 
perhaps stonework fashioned by masons of several 
generations ago who were masters of their craft -
used to put up a new house on a different and altogether 
"better plan.
Applying this analogy to the problem of conversion, 
it may "be said that in the first case, in which the old 
is replaced "by something entirely new and different, there 
is no true conversion. That is so because there is no 
continuity, and the process would have to be described 
as substitution or replacement. In the second case 
there is no true conversion either. The old remains 
essentially as it was, and all that has taken place is 
a measure of rehabilitation, a temporary readjustment.
In the third case we do seem to have something which 
could properly be called conversion. There is con­
tinuity in so far as the same material has been used, 
yet there is also discontinuity in so far as the old 
house has been demolished and a new house conceived 
entirely afresh has been put in its place. What persists 
through conversion is, so to speak, the material of 
man*s being, his basic ontological structure as being- 
in-the-world, but ontieally his being is entirely re­
oriented so that there is a genuine break with the 
past, and he is at once the same person and a different 
person.
Our problem is now more sharply defined. It is 
to explore the character of this ontical or existentiell 
re-orientation, which, we may find, is effected from 
outside man altogether; and at the same time, to show 
how this re-orientation lies within the horizon of 
man1s existential possibilities, so that what is described 
is a genuine conversion and not a substitution.
We begin the discussion with an examination of 
Heidegger’s view of the way in which the transition 
from an inauthentic to an authentic existence is to 
be effected. Man is lost - he is scattered in the 
public and in the world of concern. His possibilities - 
his rules, tasks, standards and so on - are already 
decided for him. His is a life without genuine choice, 
decided by no one in particular - and yet in a sense 
he has himself chosen that irresponsible existence.
To exist authentically he must return from this lost 
condition to his original possibilities - which means 
that he must recover choice. But in order to find himself, 
Heidegger thinks, he must be shown to himself in his 
authentic possibility. Is there any testimony in 
man’s own being which directs him to his authentic 
possibilities? Heidegger thinks that there is. Such
a testimony, he claims, is given "by what we call the 
voice of conscience.*
So what we have here is a continuation of the exis­
tential analytic. Another phenomenon, conscience, is 
to "be analysed. It will - so it is contended - show 
man his authentic possibilities, and through heeding 
its voice, he will enter into these possibilities. We 
refrain from criticism for the present, until we see 
how Heidegger1s approach to the problem develops.
Conscience is a notoriously difficult phenomenon 
to understand. Butler made it central in his ethical 
theory, but he seems simply to have assumed it, and 
gave no clear statement of what conscience is, or how 
it is related to man1s nature as a whole. Kant identi­
fied conscience with practical reason, and so gave it 
a definite place in his scheme of human nature. Yet 
conscience is surely not reaon alone. We associate 
it with feeling also - with remorse and uneasiness, 
for instance. On the other hand we find Mill con­
centrating on this element of feeling in conscience 
to the neglect of the cognitive aspect of the phenomenon. 
Conscience is 1 a feeling in our own mind," according 
to his view, and particularly the feeling of pain
* Cf. S. u. Z. , p. 268 ff.
which accompanies any violation of duty. Whatever 
criticisms we may make of Heidegger’s view of the function 
of conscience, we shall see that at least he introduces 
some clarity into the very confused notions that have 
"been held as to what conscience is. His ingenious 
theory of conscience succeeds in relating it to the 
whole structure of the being of man, and does justice 
to "both the cognitive and affective aspects of the 
phenomenon.
Heidegger’s analysis of conscience begins from the 
fact that it gives us to understand something.* It 
discloses, and therefore it belongs to that group of 
phenomena already discussed which together constitute 
the disclosure of man to himself - understanding, mood 
or affective state, anxiety or dread. Conscience gives 
man to understand something, and that something is 
himself - it is an important way in which man is disclosed 
to himself.
Conscience has the character of a call or summons.
Who is it that is called? Quite clearly, the call is 
addressed to man - to fallen man lost in the crowd and 
intthe world. He is summoned out of his worldly concern,
his self-deception, his irresponsibility, his false 
security, to his original possibilities that have been 
lost to him. Who is it that calls in conscience? Not
someone else who is with me in the world, not some
external power breaking in upon me. Man is the caller 
as well as the called. It is the authentic self that 
calls. But if man has lost himself, how can there 
be an authentic self to summon him? That question 
rests on the misunderstanding that the self is an 
object, a thing of some so,rt. But if the self is 
possibility, then the authentic self is still there 
as possibility even when man has lost himself. So 
long as he exists and is man, he has the basic possibilities 
of being himself or losing himself. That still belongs 
to his ontological structure even when the ontical 
possibility of being:his true self has been lost. If 
the voice of conscience seems strange and external to
man, that is because he has fallen so far into the
world that he has forgotten and ceased to understand 
his authentic possibilities. He is estranged from himself, 
and can no longer recognise his true self. But when, 
in the mood of anxiety, he is isolated from the crowd, 
when he is confronted with the fact of his own individual
existence, when his sense of security and "being at home 
in his world is shattered, this call is heard in the 
distance - the summons to his original possibilities.
Conscience therefore, on Heidegger1s view, is the 
call of the self to the self - the authentic self to 
the fallen self. It belongs to the very structure of 
man1 s being as having a relation to himself. When he 
falls away from himself, the being of man becomes more 
or less split - an idea familiar to Saint Paul also 
who conceived the life after the flesh as the strife 
of self against self. It seems to be an intelligible 
idea only if the self is conceived as possibility. How 
otherwise could we conceive the self as splitting into 
an authentic self and an inauthentic self, which are 
two in so far as they are at war with each other, and 
yet one in so far as they are both always mine. But 
if the self is possibility, we can understand how the 
authentic self is still there as possibility even 
when I have decided for the world and my actual self 
is fallen and inauthentic.
Corresponding to the call of conscience, there 
must be a hearing, an understanding of the summons.
It is recognised that conscience may be - and perhaps
often is- mistaken. It is open to perversion. The 
deception of conscience, Heidegger thinks, lies not in 
the call, hut in how this is heard and understood. It 
may, for instance, he distorted by the influence of 
the public. What the crowd does is assumed to be right.
But if conscience is ever to be genuinely understood 
at all, it follows that even in his fallenness man 
must have the possibility of an authentic hearing.
Without that possibility of understanding and appropriating 
the call, man can never be summoned out of his fallen 
way of being back to his original possibilities. This 
is an important point, and we shall meet it again when 
we come to consider Bultmann* s view of the transition 
to an authentic existence.
This authentic hearing understands the call of 
conscience as a summons to guiltiness (Schuldigsein).
Here we meet what appears to me to be possibly the 
most obscure and paradoxical of all Heidegger* s con­
cepts. It is paradoxical because we do not think of 
conscience as summoning to guilt, but rather to its 
opposite. It is obscure because Heidegger understands 
guilt in a sense so entirely removed from the common 
understanding of the tern that it may well be asked
whether he would not have been wiser to employ some 
different term. To be guilty, in the commonsense under­
standing of the expression, implies that something is 
owing for which I am answerable. But this, Heidegger 
thinks, is an interpretation based on the claims and 
counter-claims of practical concern - that is to say, 
it is a fallen understanding of guilt, related to the 
world out of which fallen man "understands himself.
G-uilt may be the failure or lack of something that can 
and ought to be, but this idea must be detached from 
the realm of practical or worldly concern and understood 
in relation to the individual’s own being. What is it 
then that is lacking? It is not authentic being either. 
Guiltiness, we are told, does not belong to fallen 
existence, any more than it is understood in fallen 
existence. The summons of conscience to guiltiness is 
precisely a summons out of the fallen existence that 
is based on worldly concern. What is lacking appears 
to be the power to master the possibilities for which 
conscience demands that we accept responsibility. For 
"Dasein projects himself upon possibilities, but they 
are the possibilities into which he is thrown. The 
self has never power to be the ground of its possibilities,
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it takes over the ground. This negation of power belongs 
to man’s facticity.,f* Guiltiness thus comes before 
every guilty act. As soon as I accept responsibility,
I am guilty, because I already understand that I lack 
the power to discharge my responsibility. Therefore 
I usually flee from my responsibility.
What of conscience as we commonly understand it?
We speak of experiencing a good conscience or a bad 
conscience. We think of conscience as warning us 
against some wrong action that is contemplated, or as 
causing remorse for wrongdoing committed in the past. 
Conscience is understood as a kind of internal censor 
the function of which is to conform us to moral courses 
of action. But Heidegger thinks that the usual pro­
nouncements of conscience are nothing but the voice 
of das Man. the standards and customs of the crowd 
into which the individual has merged himself to be rid 
of his own responsibility. The genuine utterance of 
conscience is heard when in the mood of anxiety the 
individual is isolated from the crowd and confronted 
with his own being as possibility thrown into the 
world.
* Of. S. u. Z., p. 884.
The idea that the day to day pronouncements of 
conscience are nothing hut the voice of the crowd, and 
therefore worthless as reflecting the rules of a fallen 
humanity is, it need hardly he said, an extremely 
dangerous one. There could he an echo of Nietzsche 
here, and something not unlike the Nazi idea, derived 
rightly or wrongly from Nietzsche’s teaching, that 
the masters, those who have resolved to fulfil the 
possibilities of their being, are emancipated from 
the shackles of a Slave-morality. What the doctrine 
actually means for Heidegger remains obscure, and it 
would of course be most unfair to interpret his teaching 
in the manner just suggested, but at the same time it 
must be pointed out that it opens the way to such 
dangers - a kind of moral nihilism. There is however 
another interpretation of Heidegger’s teaching which 
is more likely to commend itself to Christian thought.
Is it not the case that conscience has been heard at 
its purest when it speaks as the conscience of an 
individual protesting against that which is accepted 
by the conscience of the mass? That has been true even 
within the Christian Church. The great Reformers of 
the sixteenth century - Luther’s ’’Here I stand. I can
do no other. So help me" God,” comes to mind - or more 
recently the pioneers of social amelioration in the 
nineteenth century were men and women whose consciences 
rebelled against the code of conduct which the Ghurch at 
large accepted. The voice of conscience stands in 
real danger of being perverted so as to become simply 
the reflection of the conventions and usages of the 
social environment. It could express the rules of 
fallen humanity, based on the claims and counter­
claims of an existence based on worldly concern. Our 
Lord in speaking of the Mosaic laws of divorce remarked 
that they had been given ”for the hardness of your 
heart”* - they were laws adapted to man’s fallen 
condition. His own moral teaching is based on the 
law of love which called men to go beyond the accepted 
code, and their own consciences so far as they were 
moulded by that code. Heidegger’s views here may 
therefore be interpreted not so much as an attack on 
moral codes as an appeal to let conscience be heard 
as it arises out of the being of the individual, 
uninfluenced by the conventions of the crowd. Conscience 
speaks authentically in the isolation of the individual 
from fallen society - and for the Christian, this
* Mark 10, 5.
isolation comes about when he stands in his individual 
responsibility before God. We notice here of course 
the absence in Heidegger*s theory of an authentic 
community, a group which is not fallen. The excessive 
individualism of his view of conscience would seem to 
need correction from the Christian point of view, which 
sets forth the Church as such an authentic society, 
reinforcing and if need be correcting the consciences 
of its individual members. But how far the empirical 
Church measures up to this standard is another question 
altogether, as the illustrations given above of men 
whose individual consciences rebelled against the practice 
of the Church showed.
In the critical examination of this original theory 
of Heidegger on conscience, let us first set down what 
appears to be of value in it. a) Conscience is here 
clearly related to the whole structure of man’s being.
As existing, man has a relation to himself, and con­
science arises from the tension between the basic possi­
bilities of his being - to exist authentically or to 
exist inauthentically, to be himself or to lose himself, 
b) Conscience is a mode of disclosure, involving both 
cognitive and affective elements. It is related to 
that basic anxiety in which man is confronted with his
own being. In conscience, what is disclosed is the 
possibility of the authentic self, and man is summoned 
from fallenness into that original possibility, cj 
Man’s impotence is recognised, ^or man, to be respon­
sible is equivalent to being guilty. He is free and 
yet not master of his freedom, and before any act of 
guilt he is already guilty because he has accepted a 
responsibility which he cannot fulfil.
Our criticism of Heidegger concerns not so much 
his actual concept of sonscience as the function which 
he assigns to it in making it the bridge from fallen 
to authentic existence. Is conscience able to play 
the part which, on Heidegger’s theory, is demanded of 
it? If we can show that it is not, serious damage will 
have been done to Heidegger*s argument at this vital 
point where it makes the transition from the analysis 
of fallen existence to that of authentic existence.
Everything turns on the question of how far the 
fallenness of man’s being is conceived by Heidegger to 
have proceeded. In some passages he seems to make it 
quite clear that fallenness, first introduced into 
the existential analytic as a bare possibility of 
existence, is in actual fact radical and universal.
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Fallenness is one of the three constituent structures 
of care, which is the everyday "being of man. '‘Fallenness 
belongs to care itself, and is never merely accidental 
in all understanding of the self.'1* The understanding 
is fallen, conscience itself is'fallen. But in that 
case, could there be any way out from fallenness at all?
There may be a way out because, on Heidegger* s 
view, there remains to fallen man the possibility of 
an authentic hearing of the call of conscience. That 
possibility arises when the individual is isolated in 
the mood of anxiety from the crowd and from preoccupation 
with the world, and brought to face the question of 
his own existence. The Christian theologian also must 
allow some kind of authentic hearing even to fallen man 
if the message of the Gospel is to reach him.
But here again the difference between ontological 
and ontical possibilities is relevant. &ven in his 
fallen condition, man can still hear the call of the auth­
entic self, because, so long as he is man, authenticity 
and inauthenticity are possible ways of being for him.
But while authenticity remains an ontological possibility 
in fallenness, it has ceased to be an ontical possibility. 
That is to say, it is a bare formal possibility for
* S. u. Z. , p. 295.
man, in the sense that he is so constituted in his being 
that he might existe authentically. It is not however 
a concrete existentiell possibility for which he can 
decide now, because as fallen he has come into a situation 
in which that possibility is no longer open to him. As 
Heidegger himself says, fallen man is deprived of the 
power of choosing his original possibilities.* To 
recover the choice of these possibilities would mean 
in the first place to choose choice (again this is 
Heidegger* s own phrase) but that is precisely what is 
impossible when the power of choice is lost.
Conscience, as Heidegger has described the phenomenon, 
can at best awaken in fallen man the awareness of a 
lost possibility of being. It can disclose to him his 
ontological possibility of authenticity. But it cannot 
by any means empower him to choose that possibility. It 
cannot bring before him the existentiell possibility of 
authenticity for which he can decide. And it now 
appears that only some Power outside man, some Power 
not fallen as man is fallen, can bring to man this 
concrete possibility of regaining his authentic being.
And yet even such a Power could only hold out that
* S. u. Z. , p. 268.
existentiell possibility because it falls within the 
horizon of man’s existential possibility of authenticity, 
and can therefore be appropriated by man and made his 
own.
Here for the second time we observe Heidegger’s 
existential analytic approaching to the very frontiers 
of religion. His deep understanding of the fallenness 
of man, and of man’s impotence so that responsibility 
already implies guilt, are factors in his thought which 
seem to demand for their completion a doctrine of God.
On Heidegger1s own view of man, it seems to me that man 
cannot lift himself, and that his authentic being can 
only be restored if at all from outside himself. Yet 
once again Heidegger does not cross the frontier when 
he'reaches it, but turns aside to this unconvincing 
theory of the function of conscience as bridging the 
gulf from fallenness to authenticity. And again 
Heidegger's thought takes the direction that it does 
because of precisely the same emphasis which we noted 
on the previous occasion when the existential analytic 
came very close to a religious interpretation of 
existence - namely, in connection with the phenomenon 
of anxiety. There Heidegger saw man disclosed in his
facticity, adrift on the sea of what is, whereas the 
Christian sees man disclosed in his creaturely relation 
to God, the ground of his being. Here also it is facticity 
which dominates Heidegger1s thinking - man accepting 
possibilities into which he is already thrown, powerless 
to order an existence for which he is none the less 
answerable. The Christian on the other hand turns 
again to the ground of being, and finds that God 
supplies the power which he lacks in himself.
Conscience cannot support the weight which Heidegger 
seeks to rest upon it. Even if it discloses to man his 
authentic being and summons him to his original possi­
bilities, it does not empower him to attain to them.
Fallen man needs not the disclosure of a bare existential 
possibility, but the placing of an existentiell 
possibility within his grasp. And if he is told that 
the former is sufficient, then one who has known the 
frustration of the struggle between self and self • 
might r^ply with Augustine, “Where was my free will 
all these years?'* Conscience gives only the former, 
it cannot give the other.
Yet setting aside the exaggerated claims which 
Heidegger makes for it, conscience obviously has its
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own function in the transition from inauthentic to 
authentic existence. That function is preparatory in 
its nature. The call of the authentic self (if this 
"be accepted as a suitable description of the basic 
phenomenon of conscience) creates dissatisfaction with 
a fallen existence. It arouses uneasiness, it dispels 
the contentment of a life preoccupied with the world, 
it awakens responsibility, and directs man to the quest 
of his authentic being and original possibilities.
The function of conscience therefore resembles that 
of the closely related phenomenon of anxiety, in the 
isolation of which the voice of conscience is heard.
But whereas anxiety discloses to man his finitude - 
or in theological language, his creatureliness - con­
science discloses to man his fallenness - or in theo­
logical language again, his sinfulness. Both initiate 
the quest for a new orientation of the being of man.
But conscience of itself cannot, any more than anxiety, 
effect such a re-orientation. It discloses the possi­
bility, but that possibility is not one which is as yet 
within the reach of fallen man. At the most, man is 
disturbed by the call of conscience and directed away 
from the world in which he has lost himself, but he
is impotent to withdraw himself from concern with the 
world. He has lost the existentiell possibility of 
authenticity, and while the testimony of conscience 
prepares him for the understanding and accepting of 
such a possibility were it somehow to be presented to 
him from outside himself, that testimony cannot itself 
make the possibility an- actual one for man in his 
fallen situation. If we were to use the metaphor which 
Saint Paul employed to describe the function of the law, 
we might say that conscience is 1 our schoolmaster to 
bring us unto Christ.”* The analogy must not be 
pressed too far, but it serves to indicate that the 
work of conscience must be completed by religion. Just 
as we suggested that anxiety is met by God’s act of 
revelation, so conscience is met by His act of grace.
This would certainly seem to be in line with the 
New Testament understanding of conscience. There 
conscience appears as a universal phenomenon of human 
existence, rooted in the structure of man’s being as 
such. It is found in Jews and Gentiles alike, and 
its function is to bear witness, as if it were a kind 
of law written in the heart.** There are two points
* Galatians 3, 24. ** Romans 2, 15.
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of contact "between this New Testament view of conscience 
and that of Heidegger. In "both cases its utterance is 
described as a testimony arising out of man’s own being, 
and in both cases also it is specifically connected with 
the affective state in which man’s being is disclosed 
to himself - Angst in Heidegger, in the New Testa­
ment.* But the function of conscience is differently 
understood in each case. For the New Testament, it 
brings before man the demand for righteousness, but 
there is no suggestion that conscience can make man 
righteous. Indeed it is recognised that conscience can 
be weak and its pronouncements variable.**
Bultmann believes that the concept of conscience
-S) is one which 3aint Paul may have introduced 
into Christian thought, although of course the phenomenon 
of conscience had always been known. His treatment of 
conscience is interesting, because here we see very 
clearly the influence of Heidegger upon his thought.
As the concept of (Ttj)*** was interpreted to mean that 
man has a relation to himself, so he now interprets 
the concept of < r u y f t t as ’man* s knowledge of his
* For the connection of these concepts, see supra, p. 114 ff.
** I Corinthians 8, 7.
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own relation.”* ^his is practically Heidegger’s theory 
of conscience read into the New Testament, hut it would 
he difficult or impossible to find any passage in Saint 
Paul’s writings to show explicitly that hy he
understood man’s consciousness of his own relation. Here 
Bultmann’s philosophical presuppositions have heen 
allowed to fill the gaps in exegetical evidence, which 
is a very dangerous procedure. On the other hand of 
course it may he argued that Saint Paul does not put 
forward any theory of conscience (which it was not his 
concern to do) bt$ simply uses the concept without 
troubling to define it. And in that case Bultmann* s 
definition is as good as any - it is not repugnant to 
anything that Saint Paul says about conscience, and at 
the same time it clearly relates this concept to the 
other anthropological concepts of the New Testament.
But Bultmann should have heen more careful here to point 
out the nature of the inference hy which he reached 
his definition, instead of presenting it as if it were 
the obvious interpretation of conscience which anyone 
might he expected to find on reading the Hew Testament 
with no special philosophical assumptions.
* Th. des NT., p. 213.
While Bultmann accepts Heidegger's theory of the 
nature of conscience, he is as clear as anyone about 
the inadequacy of conscience to fulfil the function 
which Heidegger assigns to it, and is fully aware that 
at this point existentialism and Christianity go different 
ways* Indeed there could be no more searching criticism 
of this side of existentialist teaching than that which 
Bultmann himself has given us.* Briefly his argument 
runs as follows, Christianity and existent11ism are 
agreed that man is fallen, and that his salvation must 
lie in a radical surrender (Hingabe) of his self-made 
world and its fancied security. But existentialism 
seeks salvation in a self-made righteousness to which 
man is directed by conscience - for example, the dis­
illusioned acceptance of death in Heidegger's thought.
But this self-made authenticity is no true surrender.
It is still this-worldly in its orientation, it rests 
on human power as much as does the self-made instrumental 
world. It is on a level with the righteousness of the 
Jews or the wisdom of the Greeks, both of which Saint 
Paul regarded as being at bottom subtle manifestations 
of that confidence in the flesh which is at the root
* Kerygma und Mythos, vol. 1, pp. 37-38.
of fallenness. Man's salvation must come from beyond 
man himself. But here, as Bultmann points out, we 
touch on a difference not only between Christianity 
and existentialism, but between religion and all philo­
sophy. Philosophy believes that if man is shown the good 
and if he understands it and recognises it to be good, 
he will follow it, and there is nothing to prevent his 
attaining it if only he sets his will upon it. Religion 
with its deeper insight understands that man may know 
the good and even will the good, and yet depart from 
it and be powerless to attain it.
We conclude therefore that conscience has its part 
to play in effecting the transition from fallen to 
authentic existence, as indeed the New Testament 
recognises, but that part is subordinate and pre­
paratory, and cannot have the place which existentialist 
philosophy assigns to it. Salvation comes from beyond 
man himself, not from anything in his own being.
Here therefore the existential analytic can no longer 
help us. It shows us indeed man's impotence, but the 
answer to his situation lies outside its reach. And 
with this we pass from conscience to the religious 
concept of grace.
20. Grace.
If conscience is one of the most obscure and 
confused concepts in the realm of ethics, the same 
might be said of grace in the realm of theology. On 
some theories it appears as a mysterious power - which 
comes near to being hypostatised - that enters men 
in some undefined way and takes control of them. As 
such it can be "conveyed” in the sacraments, it can be 
"latent” or "active,” it can be "stirred up,” it can 
"infuse” righteousness. These all look like animistic 
ways of speaking, and while no doubt they point to 
realities of Christian experience, they can hardly be 
said to bring conceptual clarity to the understanding 
of what the experience of grace is. Or again, grace 
may be said to be a quality of G0d, and may be contrasted 
with His wrath. But to speak of grace as a bare 
quality does not explain the experience of it in 
Christian living. A quality is perceived, but experience 
of divine grace is more than the perception of a 
certain quality in God.
Bultmann says that grace is not a special quality 
of God, and the New Testament does not suggest that we
are to think of Him as gracious rather than wrathful.* 
But wrath is not a quality of God either - it is an 
event, namely, His judgment. God has created man re­
sponsible, with the possibility of gaining his true 
being or losing it. Man's responsibility is not only 
to himself but to his Creator. He is placed before 
God, and, as we already noted, to fall away from himself 
is to fall away from God, and to defy the conlmand of 
God which is life. In Saint Paul's words, "Everyone 
of us shall give account of himself to God."** My 
existence is not purely my own affair, ^hen I lose 
myself, at the same time I lose God and am cast off 
from Him, I undergo His judgment and experience His 
wrath.
To believe in the grace of God, in Bultmann's 
view, is to believe in the possibility of being saved 
from His wrath. Grace also then is an event, which 
corresponds to that other event which v;e call the 
wrath of God. Grace is the event in which God restores 
to me and places within my grasp my lost possibility 
of authentic being, that is to say, the being which 
God intended in creation and from which man has fallen 
away into sin. Such grace is an act of forgiveness
* Th. des HT., p. 283. ** Romans 14, 12.
which delivers from past guilt and breaks the power of 
sin over human life. For it was because of past sins 
that man was fallen into a situation in which to choose 
his authentic being was no longer an existentiell 
possibility for him. But into that situation came the 
event of God1s grace restoring the possibility and there­
fore blotting out the past, in the sense that man was 
delivered from that alienation from himself and from 
God into which his past had brought him. The event of 
grace therefore means both a deliverance from the past - 
forgiveness - and a new possibility for the future, 
from which, because of his past, man was hitherto cut 
off, so that it could only be restored to him from 
outside himself.
With the concept of grace (j(<xp t5‘) we see h°w ^Be 
New Testament - and with it, of course, Christian 
thought in general — understands the possibility of a 
transition from fallen to authentic existence, and the 
irreducible difference which here separates Christian 
theology from atheistic existentialism, ^or the 
Christian it is God Who gives to man the existentiell 
possibility of authentic being, though admittedly the 
gift can only be given because man in his fallen
existence retains the existential possibility - if not, 
he would have ceased to be man. And with that existential 
possibility goes the possibility of having conscience, 
and the possibility of understanding and appropriating 
the gift of grace. But the fuller discussion of that 
belongs to the analysis of faith, ‘^or the present we 
simply note that in all genuinely Christian theology, 
the transition from fallen to authentic existence is 
the work of God, not man. Hence Saint Paul could say,
"By the grace of God I am what I am."*
Closely connected with the concept of grace is the 
other New Testament concept of justification, the 
making just or righteous of someone who was
in the opposite condition, which also implies a notion 
of transition. It is in connection with this concept 
that the contrast of the Christian view of man's 
attaining his true being through grace with all other
possible views comes out most clearly. The Jews
sought a legal righteousness, based on fulfilling the 
demands of the law. The non-theistic existentialist 
seeks a righteousness or authenticity based on effort 
of will and stern resolve. Both depend upon human
* I Corinthians 15, 10.
striving, yet both are impossible of attainment because 
of human fallenness. Saint Paul on the other hand says, 
”We conclude that a man is .justified by faith without 
the deeds of the law."* The kind of righteousness 
visualised here is neither legal nor ethical, but, in 
Bultmann's phrase, forensic. It implies a new relation 
of man to God, Who is his Judge. And the new relation 
consists precisely in this, that man counts for nothing 
all his own striving and achievement, and recognises 
that his true life is God's gift to him. He ceases to 
live by his own power, and surrenders himself to God.
And this understanding of the Christian life is one on 
which Bultmann lays great emphasis.
Grace, on Bultmann1s interpretation, is to be 
understood as an event. But what event? It is the 
event constituted by the mighty acts, the saving events 
(Heilgeschehen) which God wrought in Jesus Christ. These 
mighty acts, coming into the human situation from outside, 
that is to say, from God Himself, made possible forgive­
ness, in so far as man was delivered from enslavement 
to his own past, from which he could never have freed 
himself, and at the same time made possible a new life
* Romans 3, 28.
in so far as Christ brought back to man his lost 
possibility of authentic existence as the child of God. 
For Bultmann therefore the work of God in Jesus Christ, 
or in other words, the grace of God given in Christ, 
is unique and decisive for human existence, and con- 
stitues the only way to man's salvation. This is 
worth pointing out, because Bultmann's radical criticism 
of some traditional elements in the Christian faith 
may cause the careless student of his thought to lose 
sight of the fact that on this central issue Bultmann 
stands firmly on the ground of historic Christian 
conviction. Bultmann - and here again we point out 
that he has much in common with Barth - is actually 
far more orthodox, in the best sense of the term, than 
much of the liberal theology of last century which 
tended to think of the coming of Christ as simply the 
highest manifestation of God, continuous with and not 
differing in kind from the manifestations of God in 
conscience, in nature, and in non-Christian religions. 
But for Bultmann it is an event on a different plane 
altogether. It may be called supernatural in the sense 
that it is a true intervention from outside into man's 
situation - and in no other way can man be saved, if
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the preceding analysis of his heing is anywberee near 
the truth at all. Bultmann is influenced "by existentialism 
and he makes no secret of it, as we know, hut that does 
not prevent him from seeing perfectly plainly the place 
where Christianity and exist entialian part company, and 
the distinctive indispensable element in Christianity 
as a supernatural religion which no philosophy can 
supply.
To return to the argument, grace is an event, 
namely, the act of G-od in Christ. But is not that a 
past event, whereas grace is surely present? Can we 
accept this simple identification of grace with the 
saving event which occurred once for all nearly two 
thousand years ago? Bultmann* s reply to that would he 
that grace - and of course that means the saving event 
itself - is present whenever the Word is proclaimed and 
authentically heard, so that to the hearer of the Word 
is restored his lost possibility of gaining his true 
heing. That possibility is placed before him as something 
for which he can decide - and for which he may in fact 
decide in the act of faith. It is in this way that 
the mighty acts touch his existence now, and so grace 
is present.
Here we have evidence of the strong evangelical 
and Protestant influence in Bultmann1 s thought. His 
concern is with the proclamation of the Gospel to the 
world. It follows that he attaches great importance 
to preaching, and the sacraments also he regards as 
ways of proclaiming the Word. No doubt the Word can be 
proclaimed and heard in other ways also - for instance, 
simply in the reading of the New Testament. But in 
whatever way the Word .may be:ap rod aimed and heard, the 
point is that in such proclaiming and hearing, grace 
is present to me, the saving events are significant to 
my existence now. To say that anything is significant 
for my existence means that it presents me with a possi­
bility - and that is precisely what the divine grace 
does, as we have seen. It presents to man the possibility 
of attaining his true being. We noted, at the very outset 
that Bultmann goes to the New Testament with the 
question of human existence in mind. The question is,
What does this mean for my existence? or alternatively, 
What possibility is presented to me here? If the saving 
events are considered merely as objective historical 
happenings which occurred some nineteen centuries ago,
I might be filled with admiration on hearing the record
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of them, just as I might he by reading of the trial and 
death of Socrates in Athens at an earlier time. But 
that is very different from my heing given a present 
possibility - indeed I might rather despair because, let 
us say, the possibility of Socrates* courage and nobility 
is one which would be beyond me. In the case of the 
mighty acts, in order that a possibility may be presented 
to me now, or - which is the same thing - in order that 
the event may be significant for my existence, it is 
necessary, as Bultmann contends, that grace, which is 
itself the saving event, should be present to me in the 
proclaiming and hearing of the Word. But if that is so, 
then the saving events are not merely past historical 
happenings - not just facts of history, as we commonly 
understand that expression. Thus of the Eesurrection 
of our Lord, Bultmann claims that belief in the Ee­
surrection is identical with the belief that the Risen 
One is present in the Word now proclaimed.* The past 
event is at the same time present event, and it is the 
present event that is significant for my existence - it 
is the grace by which I can experience forgiveness and 
have the possibility of new life.
* Th. des NT., p. 301.
But is this not the abandonment of the position 
stated earlier, when it was said that Bultmann identified 
grace with the saving events wrought by God in Jesus 
Ghrist? These events had a once-for-all character 
(Einmaligkeit) and can be assigned to a definite period 
of history. But now it appears that grace is a whole 
series of events, and repeats itself every time the 
Word is proclaimed and heard. But Bultmann would deny 
that there is any contradiction here. We have not a 
series of different events, but one event - albeit an 
event of a peculiar kind. Bultmann calls it an eschato- 
logical event. It is past, in the sense that some 
nineteen centuries ago God acted in a decisive way 
and intervened in man* s situation. It is present, not 
merely in the sense that there remain with us the 
abiding consequences of what happened in the past, but 
more importantly in the sense that God acts now in a 
decisive way and intervenes in my situation, and only 
for that reason can the event be called a saving event, 
significant for my existence and relevant to men to-day.
But what meaning can we attach to this concept of 
an eschatological event? How is it possible for such 
an event to be both past and present - and presumably
future also? Before we can answer these questions or 
go more fully into Bultmann’s treatment of the mighty 
acts, it will he necessary to revert to the existential 
analytic, and consider Heidegger’s views on the nature 
of history, which, I "believe, have had considerable 
influence on Bultmann at this point. For already a 
wide vista of new problems has opened out before us - 
the problems of the understanding of human existence 
in its temporality and historicity.
CHAPTER VII
EXISTENCE AS 
TEMPORAL AND HISTORICAL
21. Temporality and Historicity.
The "being of man was defined "by Heidegger as care. 
But it was pointed out that this could not "be regarded
as the final analysis, "because the argument had "been
confined to man*s everyday inauthentic existence. We 
must now see how Heidegger goes on to the question of 
a more original interpretation of the "being of man. Or
to put the question in another way, What makes care
possible?*
It will "be remembered that care, whilst it is a 
unity, has a threefold structure, and is constituted by 
possibility, facticity and fallenness. To show what 
makes care possible would be the same as showing what 
articulates these three structures in the unity of care. 
Then we would have penetrated to the original being 
of man in virtue of which his existence can be either 
inauthentic - characterised by care - or authentic.
\
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Possibility implies something which is ahead, and before 
which man stands. In his everyday fallen existence man 
has lost his authentic possibilities and has fled from 
his responsibility. But so far as his possibilities are 
restored to him, he stands before a future. Thus 
possibility is grounded in the future. Facticity on 
the other hand implies something which is already there. 
Man always finds himself already in a situation. Again 
in his everyday existence he flees from the disclosure 
of his true situation. But so far as he is brought to 
face the disclosure of his situation, he understands 
that what he is relates to what he has been. His 
facticity is grounded in the past. Fallenness is 
primarily related to the present. Avoiding acceptance 
of either his authentic past or future, man loses 
himself in the concerns of the present, scatters and 
dissipates his being in the possibilities that are 
to hand.
This past, present and future which emerges from 
the threefold structure of care Heidegger calls 
temporality (Zeitlichkeit). This is the original 
being of man. It makes care possible as his inauthentic 
way of being, and it must make possible also his
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authentic way of heing, though we have still to see 
how exactly the latter is constituted. Yet to say 
that man is temporality does not mean that he exists 
as an object in time. Man’s past and future belong to 
him in a way in which the past and future cannot belong 
to a rock, let us say, or to any object within time.
And in man lies the possibility, as we shall see, of 
bringing his past, present and future into a unity.
Because man is temporal in this special way, he 
is also historical (geschichtlich). History is possible 
for him because his temporality is not just a being 
within time (Innerzeitigkeit) but rather a being consti­
tuted by past, present and future in such a v/ay that 
at any given moment not only the present but the past 
and future as well are disclosed to him and are real 
to him.
But what is history?* Here we have a term fre­
quently used by theologians but rarely examined and 
subjected to that ontological analysis which we saw 
to be the prerequisite to clear theological thinking.
The term has an obvious ambiguity (which can be avoided 
in German where there are two possible terms) in that
* Gf. S. u. Z. , p. 378 ff.
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it may mean either the historical reality (Geschichte) 
or the scientific study of it (Historie). Heidegger 
is concerned with history in the former sense, that is 
to say, with the stream of historical happening. How 
is it to he understood?
He distinguishes four meanings that are commonly 
attached to history, a) The tern is used for the past, 
as when we speak of something, rather contemptuously 
perhaps, as '’"belonging to history. * We mean that it is 
no longer relevant, and no longer affects the present, 
h) But the term can have the opposite meaning as well, 
in common speech. When it is said, for instance, that 
we cannot escape from history, here history still means 
the past, hut the past as somehow still alive and present 
with us. The past has therefore a double sense - it 
belonged to a time beyond recall, yet something of 
the past may still be with us, such as an ancient poem. 
Thus in the second sense history is regarded not so much 
as the past simply as past, but rather as that which has 
its origin in the past and is still present. History 
is understood as becoming, a connection of events 
extending through past, present and future, c) History 
may again be understood as the development of human
relations, man’s culture in its many forms as distinct 
from nature, though in a way the latter can also belong 
to history as battlefield, site of a cult, and so on. 
d) The historical is identified with the traditional, 
whether the origin of ifhe tradition is understood or 
not.
Conflicting though these different common under­
standings of the meahingoOfhthe: term ”history” are in 
some respects, Heidegger notes that they all have some­
thing in common - they relate to man as the subject of 
historical happening. But if that is the case, then 
history is to be understood existentially. That means 
that it is not to be understood under the categories 
applicable to things - causality and so on - but under 
the existentials which describe the possible ways of 
being of man. History is nothing but man’s way of being 
as historical. But why then is practical historical 
research generally directed to things - tools, works 
of art, places of worship and other material objects 
that have survived from some ancient culture? That 
is because man is not a bare subject, but always being- 
in-the-world. These tools and other objects which are 
of historical interest Heidegger calls the secondary
historical. The primary historical is man himself.*
This is an important distinction for our purpose.
Let us now try to see the significance of this 
distinction. Suppose we are in a museum of antiquities, 
say, household utensils. ** They belong to a past time, 
yet they are still extant in the present. What makes 
them historical? Certainly they have changed with age - 
they are worn or broken or worm-eaten - but that does 
not in itself make anything historical. They are no 
longer in use, yet that of itself does not make anything 
historical either. ’‘What then is past in them?” asks 
Heidegger. "Nothing other than the world within which 
they belonged to an instrumental system, and were to 
hand and were used by Dasein in his concern with the world. ” 
The world is no longer, but the object that was within 
that world is still extant. And the object is now 
accounted historical solely because it belonged to a 
past instrumental world of men. It historicity is 
derivative or secondary, and stems from man who is 
the primary historical.
But if this be so, then history cannot be an 
objective connnection of events. Objects only enter
* S. u. Z., p. 381. ** S. u. Z,, p. 380v
into history so far as they have been of concern to man, 
and man himself, the primary historical, is never an 
object. Man exists, he stands before possibilities.
The stuff of history - if we may so apeak - is therefore 
existence, and that means possibility. But Is this not 
absurd? Surely history is constituted by fact, not 
possibility. But in what sense is man a fact? Not as 
an object with fixed properties, but as an existent 
projecting himself on a chosen possibility.
With this existential understanding of the historical 
in view, Heidegger contends that the science of history 
(Historie) is concerned with the study of the possible.*
It is the disclosure of man in his historic possibilities, 
and the more history understands possibilities, the 
more penetrating it is. But history is not concerned 
with all and every possibility. It is - as is universally 
recognised - selective. According to Heidegger it is 
concerned with man in his authentic possibilities, 
when he has risen above the level of everyday existence 
to something great and heroic. And further, it is 
argued, history is concerned with such authentic 
possibility as repeatable (wiederholbar), as possibility
* S. u. Z., p. 394.
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for man existing to-day. Thus history is oriented to 
the future. The possibility which is studied hy history 
is not taken as a shadowy example, but disclosed as 
resolved destiny which can be repeated so that the power 
of the possible is felt in present existence, that is 
to say, belongs to it in its futurity.”* Though past 
worlds have lost their significance for our present 
existence and the objects that have survived from them 
are consigned to the museum, man's authentic possibilities 
do not perish with his instrumental world but can be 
present to us in our world.
Heidegger's own attitude to the history of ontology
might be taken as an example and application of his
understanding of the character of history in general.
He tells us that he is attracted to the philosophising 
of the Greeks, which he understands as the restless 
quest for being.** But the original sources of philosophy 
have been covered up and concealed by the deadening 
influence of tradition, which is accepted without being 
understood and appropriated.*** His own philosophy he
understands as an attempt to recover the original
possibility of an inquiry into being as such.
* S. u. Z, , p. 395. ** S. u. Z., p. 2. *** S.u.Z., p. 21.
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Strange and paradoxical as it may seem at first 
sight, Heidegger’s philosophy of history will hear closer 
examination, and is not to he lightly dismissed. If the 
subject of history is man, and man as existing differs 
in his heing from nature, then it follows that the 
methods and concepts employed by the historian must he 
suitable to his subject, and must differ from those 
employed in the scientific investigation of nature. In 
other words, the historian must use the concepts (Begriff- 
lichkeit) of existentiality. Actually Heidegger was not 
the first to realise that. He openly acknowledges his 
debt to Dilthey and Yorck,* who were already aware that 
history does not lend itself to the scientific methods 
which are applicable in the study of nature.
And it could be argued that much actual historical 
study has followed the lines indicated by Heidegger, even 
if unconsciously and with no explicit theory in mind. The 
historian must select his material. But what is the cri­
terion of his selection? He would say that he selects 
what he considers to be significant. The question is 
then, Significant for what? It is surely reasonable to 
say that it is what is significant for human existence.
* S. u. Z., p. 398 ff.
But we saw already that to he significant for existence 
means simply to present a possibility to the existence 
of someone.* Thus such history as we have described 
does have as its theme the possible. The lessons of 
history, as we call them, may be understood as simply 
the understanding of authentic possibilities (whether 
realised or not) which were once actually open in an 
existentiell situation, and which are still repeatable 
and so present.
Let us now return to Bultmann. While he does not 
explicitly mention Heidegger* s philosophy of history, 
it is not difficult to show that some such understanding 
of history underlies his interpretation of New Testament 
theolpgy. And indeed that is to be expected in the 
existential approach to theology, in which the theologian 
goes to the pages of the New Testament, including its 
historical passages, with the question of human existence 
in mind. In the first of his two essays on demytholo- 
gising, Bultmann describes the world which we meet 
in the writings of the New Testament.** It is 
essentially the world of Babylonian cosmology - the
* Supra, p. 271.
** Kerygma und Mythos, vol. 1, pp. 15-16.
flat earth surmounted by the inverted bowl of the 
firmament, and sandv/iched between heaven above and 
the underworld below. Strange invisible powers are 
at work both in human affairs and natural events, angels 
from above and demons from below. Miraculous and 
occult happenings are attributed to their agency - 
yes, and everyday happenings too, such as illness.
As he moves through this world, the modern man, it 
would not be unfair to say, finds himself back in 
Heidegger’s museum of antiquities, for it is a world 
which is no longer. Its concepts are as remote from 
his understanding as the flint tools in Heidegger’s 
museum are from his daily occupation. They represent 
the projects of a former understanding of the world, 
but they are unintelligible to the man of to-day.
When he is ill, he sends not for an exorcist (if any 
can be found) but for a medical practitioner. The 
world of the New Testament has passed away and ceased 
to be meaningful. The Oopemican revolution and all 
the discoveries that have been made since then have 
changed the world-view of the ordinary man completely.
Bultmann says that the world-view of the New 
Testament is mythical. No doubt it is, but it would
be misleading not to realise that the modem world­
view has its myths as well, and may be perfectly un­
intelligible to men who live two thousand years after 
our time. A strange object in the sky is not interpreted 
now as a sign from the gods, but as a flying saucer.
But this is incidental, and not the point at issue here. 
Whether more or less mythical than the world-view of 
modern men, the world of the New Testament is not our 
world but a museum of antiquities.
But of course it does not therefore follow that 
the New Testament has nothing to say that is significant 
to-day. What we have considered is, in Heidegger’s 
terminology, the secondary historical. It is in the 
New Testament only the background for what it has to 
say about the saving events. Yet even these events 
are interwoven into the background. The story of the 
Ascension, for instance, as narrated in Saint Luke’s 
Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles, implies the New 
Testament world-picture. As far as the type of mythical 
element that we have so far considered is concerned - 
for we shall see that there is another - the problem 
of demythologising might be expressed as the problem 
of disentangling the primary historical from the
secondary historical in the New Testament. The primary 
historical consists of possibilities of existence which 
are repeatable, present to me to-day as they were 
present to others in the past. The central theme of 
the New Testament is such a possibility - the possibility 
of forgiveness and the new life which God offers to men 
in Christ. It is that in the New Testament history 
which is significant for the existence of modern man, 
that is to say, a present posssibility of decision for 
him. What Bultmann is striving to do is to spotlight 
this essential primary historical in the New Testament, 
to separate it from the now meaningless secondary 
historical, and so make it a real possibility of decision 
for man to-day. And if that be so, his work is not 
destructive of the historical element in the New 
Testament, but the reverse.
We are now also in a position to understand better 
what Bultmann means by an escbatological event. It 
appears to be very close to Heidegger’s concept of 
repeatable authentic possibility, which for him is 
the most important element in history. Such a possibility, 
as we saw, is understood by Heidegger as one ’’which 
can be repeated so that the power of the possible is
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felt in present existence/1 Even so the power of divine 
grace and the possibility which it restored to man, 
first actualised in the coming of Christ, is felt again 
whenever the Word- is proclaimed and heard. In the way 
the event of grace can "be understood as both past and 
present. But at the same time we must remember that 
for Bultmann the eschatological event has a unique 
character in so far as it proceeds from God, whereas 
for Heidegger there have been no doubt many authentic 
repeatable possibilities in history. Thus the two 
concepts - eschatological event and authentic repeatable 
possibility, though structurally similar, are not quite 
identical.
Having thus clarified the existentialist understanding 
of history, we turn now to the task of examining more 
closely the concepts of the mythical and the historical, 
before we go on to see how the view of history outlined 
in the preceding pages may be used for the interpretation 
of the mighty acts.
22. The Mythical and the Historical.
God has acted in a decisive and unique manner in 
Jesus Christ. That is the foundation of the Christian
religion, and because of that it stands on a different 
level from all human philosophies, actual or possible.
But how are the mighty acts to be understood theologically? 
Bultmann1s interpretation seems to depend on the 
possibility of distinguishing three elements in the 
New Testament account of these acts of God.
Firstly, there is the mythical element. But what 
is a myth? The term seems to be a very confused one.
The mythical is defined by Bultmann as a way of thinking 
in which the other-worldly and divine are represented as 
this-worldly and human.* But this is scarcely a wide 
enough definition, for as Professor Henderson points 
out, there are secular myths, such as the Nazi myth 
of the master-race and the Marxist myth of the classless 
paradise into which the divine does not enter at all.**
This objection would also apply to the definition of 
myth as stories of the gods. Bultmann himself says 
that the world-picture of the New Testament is a mythical 
one.*** But whst does he mean by myth in this sentence?
He goes on, as we have seen already, to speak of the 
flat earth under the vault of the firmament - in other
* K. u. M., vol. 1, p. 22 note.
** "Myth in the New Testament," pp. 52-53.
*** K. u. M., vol. 1, p. 15.
words, the Babylonian cosmology. But this is not myth 
within the sense of his own formal definition. It is 
primitive science or primitive world-view, not a description 
of the divine in terms of this world, but a description 
of this world itself as these early thinkers imagined it 
to be.
Having regard to this confusion in Bultmann1s 
usage, we shall have to look for the meaning ?/hich he 
attaches to the term myth not only in his formal definitions 
but also in the broad way in which he speaks of the mythical. 
We are not attempting a definition of myth in general, 
but simply describing what Bultmann - consciously or 
unconsciously - comprehends under the term, as that is 
sufficient for our purpose here. We take it to include: 
a) what might be called myth proper, the representation 
of the divine and other-worldly in human and this- 
worldly terms; b) everything in the New Testament which 
implies those first-century concepts which now belong 
to a world that is no longer, and are not acceptable 
or intelligible to the modern mind.
To the first type of myth we shall return later.
As to the second, a difficulty immediately arises, for 
who is going to say just what is and what is not
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acceptable and intelligible to the modern mind? On some 
matters there might he fairly general agreement. The 
story of the Ascension which we already instanced is 
literally intelligible only if we accept the Babylonian 
cosmology, and since we live in the post-Oopernican era, 
it is literally unintelligible to us - though of course 
that is not to deny that it may be intelligible in some 
other way. There are other matters on which there would 
be very little agreement. Consider for instance the 
miracles of Jesus. Bultmann apparently rejects them 
as not acceptable to the modem mind. ,fWe cannot use 
electric light and wireless, or claim modem medical 
and clinical treatment in cases of illness, and at the 
same time believe in the New Testament world of spirit 
and m i r a c l e . B u t  that is to ignore the fact that in 
this scientific age thousands go to Lourdes every year, 
and that in Protestant churches also there is a very 
real interest in what is called spiritual healing. There 
seems to be nothing inacceptable about it to many modern 
minds. And apart from that, many of us have no difficulty 
both in appreciating the developments of modem thought 
and the advance of medical science, and in believing
* K. u. M. , vol. 1, p. 18.
that our Lord had a power of spiritual healing - without, 
of course, necessarily "believing in demons!
The truth is that at this point we perceive in 
Bultmann*s thought not the influence of existentialism 
hut the hang-over of a somewhat old-fashioned liberal 
modernism. He is still obsessed with the pseudo-scientific 
view of a closed universe that was popular half a century 
ago, and anything which does not fit into that tacitly 
assumed world-picture is, in his view, not acceptable 
to the modem mind and assigned to the realm of myth.
Let us frankly acknowledge that there is myth in the 
Hew Testament, in both sense of the term which we 
described, but Bultmann himself is perhaps too ready 
to assign to the mythical element in the Hew Testament 
narrative events which may really belong to the second 
element, to which we now turn.
This second element we shall call the objective- 
historical (historisch). The narrative element in the 
Hew Testament, as Bultmann acknowledges,* is entirely 
different from the mythical narratives of Greek or 
Hellenistic deities, since it centres in a definite 
historic person, Jesus of Hasareth. The mighty acts
* K. u. M., vol. 1, p. 41.
may therefore he studied as objective happenings by 
the scientific historian, as indeed the Apostles* Greed 
implies when it states that our Lord 1 suffered under 
Pontius Pilate.rt The event is given a definite place 
in world history.
Among the mighty acts, the Gross is the one which 
can most readily be understood as an objective-historical 
event. That Jesus aroused opposition by his teaching, 
that he was betrayed, arrested, tried and put to death - 
there is nothing mythical about that, considered as a 
fact and apart from interpretations of it. It is 
perfectly intelligible and acceptable as it stands, 
whether one* s world-view is that of the first or the 
twentieth or any other century. But is theology 
particularly interested in the objective-historical?
Faith in the Gross is something entirely different 
from a belief that the Gross is a fact of history, 
and it is with the exposition of the content of faith 
that theology is concerned.
Attempts have of course been made to isolate the 
objective—historical element in the Hew Testament, and 
the results of this research are very interesting. As 
a good illustration, we might take the work of the
French scholar Guignebert.* Applying the most rigorous 
methods of scientific history and textual criticism, 
Guignebert has pretty well dealt the death-blow to all 
theories which regard the figure of Jesus as a purely 
mythical construction, and has proved beyond all reasonabl 
doubt his objective-historical reality. Beyond that 
however the positive results of his investigation are 
meagre in the extreme. With a ruthlessness which goes 
far beyond anything in Bultmann, he destroys the New 
Testament record, and presents us withethe allegedly 
historic Jesus - an attenuated figure very far removed 
from the Jesus of Christian faith.
But let us suppose for a moment that the results 
of his investigation had been different - and of course 
different conclusions have been reached by scholars of 
a more conservative mind than Guignebert. Suppose he 
had proved not only the objective-historical reality 
of Jesus, but had also substantially verified the New 
Testament record as a ?rhole and shown that it gives 
an account of events which actually took place at a 
given time in world history. Would that really make 
much difference for religious faith or for theology?
* See his book, MJesus.,f
It would not, and frankly, it would be intolerable if 
it did. For then not only the theologian hut the 
ordinary Christian believer would be at the mercy of 
the historian. Faith would be founded on historical 
research, on the probability of certain events having 
taken place at a certain period in world history. That 
certainly seems to be the unenviable position in which 
those theologians find themselves who stake their 
case on the objective-historical. But we say that the 
results of historical research would not make much 
difference, one way or the other, and for this reason. 
Guignebert approaches his subject-matter with the 
most admirable detachment - and of course that is the 
only proper attitude for the scientific historian.
His investigation is purely objective. But as we saw 
already the theologian is never detached from his 
subject-matter.* As the interpreter of faith, he 
speaks from within faith. His relation to his subject- 
matter is not objective but existential. And should 
he come to understand it objectively, he has ceased to 
be a theologian and has become a philosopher or an 
anthropologist. Now in particular, the mighty acts,
* Supra, p. 97.
when regarded as objective events or objecitve-historical 
happenings, cease to be saving events - but it is precisely 
in their character as saving events that theology is 
interested.
That is not to say of course that there is no value 
at all in the objective-historical understanding of 
the New Testament record. There could only be saving 
events if there had been certain objective events - a 
point which Bultmann is perhaps inclined to overlook.
The objective historical does have a certain relevance 
to theology, as we shall see. The full understanding 
of the mighty acts as saving events is bound up with 
the understanding of them as objective events in the 
world, related to certain prior, contemporary and 
subsequent events. Yet we begin with saving events 
which imply objective events - not with objective 
events which are transformed into saving events. It 
is not the objective-historical element in the mighty 
acts that is of primary importance for theology.
This primacy belongs to the third element, which 
we shall call the existential-historical (geschichtlich).
By this we mean that element in them which makes them 
significant for my existence, that is to say, which
sets before me a present possibility. In Heidegger’s 
language, it is ’’the authentic repeatable possibility” 
which lies in the mighty acts, in Bultmann’s language - 
it is their eschatological character in virtue of which 
they are not merely past happening but God’s present 
act of grace in my situation.
Heidegger, as we saw, makes the existential-historical 
the primary subject-matter for all historical study.
History (Historie), he maintains, when it is authentic 
history, is concerned not with facts but with the possible. 
Its primary task is not to investigate past events as 
such, or to show their origins, relations, interactions 
and consequences, but rather to disclose man in his 
historic possibilities, and above all in his authentic 
repeatable possibilities. Presumably he would approve 
of the historical work of Spengler, for instance, who 
analysed the destiny of ancient cultures to elucidate 
the future possibilities of Western culture. Such 
history ceases to be a purely academic or objective 
study, and acquires a certain pragmatic character. It 
is, Heidegger claims, concerned with the future more 
than with the past. No doubt there are historians who 
will disagree with Heidegger’s view of their subject,
just as there are some who accept it, hut they can he 
left to argue the matter out among themselves, since the 
wider question of history in general does not concern 
us here.
Our business is with the more limited application 
of the existentialist philosophy of history to the 
historical events which enter into the field of Christian 
theology, and here it does seem true that it is the 
existential-historical understanding of these events 
which is of importance. In so far as the Cross and 
Resurrection are saving events and proclaimed as such, 
they are not past occurrences of world history but 
open to man present possibilities - namely, of forgiveness 
and a new life. They are thus understood as existential- 
historical happenings.
This follows also from one of the first principles 
of the existential approach to theology which we noted 
at the very outset. There it was said that in this 
type of theology the orientation of the question 
(Fragestellung) is to human existence, and we noted 
Bultmann* s statement that when he goes to'the Bible 
the question to which he seeks an answer is the question 
of human existence. Or in the New Testament language,
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the question may he expressed, ’’What must I do to he 
saved?”* The answer to that question is not simply that 
great events - the Gross and Resurrection - once took 
place, hut that great events - forgiveness and the new 
life - can take place now. That alone gives the questioner 
a possibility of salvation for which he can decide. But 
the events are here understood in their existential- 
historical character. The historical statements of the 
New Testament are understood not as the record of past 
ohjective occurrences, hut as significant for my existence.
But does the primacy of the existential-historical 
for theology mean that we can do without the ohjective- 
historical and the mythical altogether? In the New 
Testament the three elements are all interwoven. Can 
theology either dispense with any one of them or isolate 
any one of them?
We "begin again with the mythical element, hearing 
in mind the confusion in Bultmann’s use of this term, 
and that it covers for him hoth concepts which belong 
to the first-century world-view, and ways of speaking 
in which the divine is represented as this-worldly.
We note to begin with a fundamental difference between
* Acts 16, 30.
the positions of Bultmann and Guignebert as regards 
their attitude to the mythical element in the New 
Testament. Guignebert is interested only in the 
objective-historical, and the mythical element in the 
record is dismissed by him as without significance, a 
mere legendary accretion which has to be removed in 
order to reveal the objective-historical content of 
the New Testament. On the other hand, while Bultmann 
also counts much of the record as mythical, he does 
not deny that it has value, and his aim is to restate 
its content in a fora free from mythical expression, 
if that is possible. The value of myth lies for him 
in this, that it seeks to express the existential- 
historical content of the event of which it speaks, 
to point to the significance of the event for human 
existence. But he thinks that myth is a very imperfect 
instrument for the purpose which he assigns to it.
The myth is therefore to be translated into a statement 
which concerns my existence. And further, Bultmann 
thinks that the New Testament itself leads the way in 
demythologising, in that it sometimes expresses the 
significance of the myth for human existence in a form 
which does not appear to be mythical.
We have had an example of such demythoiogising 
already in connection with Saint Paul's concept of 
the creation. He speaks in some places in Gnostic terms 
of the world having fallen under the dominion of 
demonic powers. We understand these demonic powers 
not as external to man hut as proceeding from him in 
his fallen condition. And since Saint Paul himself was 
no dualist, we may accept Bultmann's contention that 
the Gnostic terminology was already demythologised 
for him. He gives me to understand what happens when 
I worship and serve the creature more than the Creator - 
and here it is Saint Paul himself who supplies the 
demythologised or existential interpretation of the 
demonic. Again, preachers for generations before 
Bultmann have no doubt demythologised the story of the 
Ascension, so far as it implies the Babylonian cosmology. 
It has been interpreted in its significance for the 
existence of the believer, as symbolising the lordship 
of the risen Christ over the world. But this inter­
pretation also is already found in Saint Paul* - though 
admittedly in a passage which contains obvious reference 
to the first-century world-view.
* Philippians 2, 9-11.
It will "be noted however that hoth of these examples 
concern only one of the two types of myth which we saw 
to he comprehended under Bultmann’s loose employment of 
the term - namely, concepts belonging to the first- 
century world-view. It would therefore seem possible 
to eliminate that mythical element in the New Testament 
which arises from the use of such concepts by the New 
Testament writers. Such concepts belong to a world that 
no longer is, they are not meaningful for us, and, as 
in the examples given, they can be removed and the 
meaning of the New Testament teaching is thereby made 
intelligible to modern minds.
But what about myths of the other type, in which 
the divine is represented as this-worldly? This is 
myth according to Bultmann’s own formal definition, 
and perhaps it is the only myth in the New Testament 
in the strict sense of the term, for Bultmann1s 
extension of the term to cover first-century world- 
concepts is perhaps unfortunate. Gan this other type - 
the more important type of myth - be eliminated?
Bultmann himself seems to concede that we can 
speak of God’s actions only in mythical terms.* And
* Of. K. u. M., vol. 1, p. 40.
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the reason for that has already been stated.* The 
everyday categories of human understanding are applicable 
to objects in nature (Vorhandenheit). The existentialists 
have tried to analyse the categories - or existentials - 
applicable to the being of man himself (Existenz).
But that still leaves us without categories applicable 
to the ground of being, being itself beyond both Vorhan­
denheit and Existenz, that is to say, God. We can only 
speak of Him by analogy or symbolically in categories 
drawn from Vorhandenheit or Existenz, as when we say 
that H e is the First Cause or that He is our Father in 
heaven. But already in the use of such symbols we are 
into the realm of the mythical. Even to make such a 
simple statement of the Christian message as that 1,(^ od 
has sent His Son” involves a) a symbol drawn from 
Vorhandenheit, the idea of sending or transferring from 
one place to another; and b) a symbol drawn from 
Existenz, the idea of sonship, a relation between two 
human beings. But clearly it is impossible to get away 
from such metaphors, so long as we seek to speak 
directly of God and His acts. Human thinking is such 
that here myth and symbol are inevitable.
* Supra, pp. 132-133.
But it may Be replied that we need not and ought not 
to speak directly of the acts of God. We can express it 
all in terms of the significance for our existence of 
His acts. That God has sent His Son can he translated 
into statements about the possibility for me of forgiveness 
and a new life.
Leaving aside for the moment the question whether 
we can so easily surrender the possibility of speaking 
directly about the activity of God, what happens when 
we confine ourselves to making statements of an existential 
order? Do we really get away from myth even then? We 
saw earlier the difficulties which beset the communication 
of existential knovirledge, ''and that it is frequently 
expressed in poetry, stories, myth and so on rather 
than in the exact propositions suitable to the 
communicating of scientific knowledge. It seems that 
as soon as we cease to speak of stocks and stones we 
must begin to use symbols and metaphors. Heidegger 
himself has confessed the difficulty of communicating 
the findings of his existential analytic, and has 
excused the strangeness of his terminology.* Even 
in his exact analysis of existence, there is an
* S. u. Z., pp. 38-39.
abundance of symbolic language, borrowed from the world 
of nature. Man is ”being-in-the-world” but in a non- 
spatial sense, his existence is characterised by “thrown- 
ness,” he ‘’projects’1 his possibilities, he is ”falien. ” 
These are only a selection from his metaphors, some of 
which are crude enough. And at the most crucial part 
of his argument, it will be remembered, he fell back on 
an ancient classical myth for the clarification of his 
meaning.* Hence we conclude that even if it were 
possible to translate all statements about the activity 
of God into statements about the existence of man in 
relation to God, it would still not be possible to get 
away from symbols, or from the myths which are con­
structed out of symbols.
We therefore reject the project of a demythologised 
Bible. Such a Bible would presumably be an analytic 
of Christian existence - almost a baptised version of 
”Sein und Zeit,” as Bultmann seems to imply when he 
says that ’’Martin Heidegger1 s existential analysis of 
man seems to be only a secular philosophical exposition 
of the Hew Testament view of man.”** But this would 
defeat Bultmann* s own purpose of rendering the teaching
* Supra, pp. 197-199. ** K. u. M., vol. 1, p. 33.
of the Bible intelligible to the ordinary man of the 
twentieth century, because if the symbolic language of 
the Bible is difficult for the m o d e m  mind to grasp, 
the symbolic language in which any existential exposition 
must be couched is even more difficult. If the Bible 
is remote from the thinking of men to-day, an existential 
analytic is even more remote. Heidegger’s work is 
difficult enough for anyone with a training in philosophy, 
and to the man in the street it must seem like a book 
sealed with seven seals. Yet a demythologised Bible, 
in which everything was translated into existential 
statements, could scarcely be less difficult. It 
would require to use the same obscure symbolic language 
as Heidegger employs, or language very like it. And 
because that language would be symbolic, it would be 
more accurate to speak of transmythologisation than 
of demythologisation.
Compare the two statements, that man in his being 
is compounded of possibility and facticity, and that 
man was formed of the dust of the ground and into 
his nostrils was breathed the breath of life. We 
would certainly agree that to the trained mind the 
first of these statements is more exact than the
second. But to the ordinary man of the twentieth century 
the first statement would he unintelligible. He might 
misunderstand the second statement by taking it literally, 
but there is a reasonable chance that its relatively 
simple symbolism would still convey to his mind the 
meaning which is intended, without his having to master 
existentialist terminology. It would certainly seem 
far easier to convey the meaning to him by explaining 
the symbolic language of the Biblical writer than by 
replacing that language by a new and more difficult 
way of speaking.
But we have still to discuss the important question 
whether in fact we can give up speaking directly about 
God’s activity, and confine ourselves merely to making 
statements about human existence. And it must be 
denied that we can. Bultmann believes - as every 
Christian theologian must - that God has acted in 
Jesus Christ. All existential analysis of Christian 
faith and experience assumes this proposition. If it 
is taken away, Christianity ceases to be a religion 
and becomes another philosophy of existence - which 
Bultmann expressly denies that it is. Yet the pre­
supposition itself can only be expressed in mythical
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form - as that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, or that 
God has sent him. We can never therefore eliminate the 
mythical, and indeed we reach the conclusion that all 
existential exposition of the Christian faith rests 
upon an assumption which is only capable of mythical 
or symbolic expression.
We have here criticised some of the excesses to 
which Bultmann1s theories are inclined to lead him.
This is simply part of the wider criticism that Bultmann 
tends to over-emphasise whatever in Christian teaching 
is congenial to existentialist treatment, and to pass 
over whatever resists such treatment. We maintain 
thst the mythical element cannot be eliminated - apart 
possibly from some first-century concepts which we have 
agreed to include under the heading of myth in the 
widest sense. Yet when that criticism has been made, 
and the limits of demythoiogising laid bare, we can 
now acknowledge the value of Bultmann1 s teaching on its 
positive side. The myth must be related to my existence — 
and indeed to treat it as literal statement of fact 
might amount to a kind of idolatry. The business of 
the preacher is to present the myth in its existential 
significance, the business of the theologian is to
analyse the experience of faith. Yet on the other hand 
we deny that the myth is exhausted in its existential 
significance. It conceals and at the same time expresses 
the real activity of God beyond my existence or any 
existence.
We turn next to the objective-historical. Gan it 
be eliminated? The argument here follows a similar 
line to the one employed to show the indispensability 
of myth. There it was maintained that every existential 
proposition about the Christian faith implies a mythical 
proposition about the real activity of God. Here it 
is argued that every existential-historical event 
implies an objective-historical event. That is made 
quite clear in Heidegger* s philosophy of history. He 
tells us that history is concerned with the possible.
But that does not mean that history can roam where it 
will, or that it is indistinguishable from legend and 
fiction. History is concerned with repeatable possibility, 
and for a possibility to be repeated, it is necessary 
that it must once have been actual. To say that history 
is concerned with the possible does not release it 
from the course of real happenings, that is to say, 
from the facts.
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Bultmann frankly acknowledges that the existential- 
historical significance of the Gross has its origin in 
the objective-historical event of the crucifixion of 
Jesus.* But he makes it clear that he attaches little 
importance to the objective-historical happening as 
such. That may have meant much to the first preachers 
of the Gospel who had themselves witnessed it, but now, 
he considers, our concern is with the existential- 
historical aspect of the Gross, and the objective- 
historical happening has only academic interest for 
historical research.
We would be perfectly willing to agree with Bultmann 
that Christian theology and Shristian preaching must 
be primarily concerned with the Gross as an existential- 
historical event, for only so can it be a saving event 
and significant for my existence to-day. Yet we must 
protest at the tendency here to exclude the objective- 
historical element altogether. True, Bultmann is 
right in refusing to make theology - and Christian 
faith - dependent on historical research. But there 
is a sense in which the existential—historical implies 
the objective—historical. To preach the Gross as saving
* K. u. M., vol. 1, p. 43.
event is to propagate an illusion unless the origin of 
that saving event was an actual happening - namely,
God* s once-for-all act at Calvary. Bultmann, I believe, 
recognises this, but tends to obscure it by excessively 
subordinating the objective-historical to the existential- 
historical. The question arises even more acutely in 
connection with the Resurrection, but that will be dealt 
with later.
The argument here links up with and reinforces an 
earlier criticism of Bultmann.* It was said that he 
stripped our Lord of the numinous character which the 
records assign to him, and represented him as little 
more than a teacher of practical philosophy, and we 
contended that this picture of the historic Jesus is 
inadequate. We now see more clearly why that is so.
The existential-historical (the Jesus of faith) pre­
supposes an objective-historical origin (the Jesus of 
history). Admittedly we are primarily concerned with 
the Jesus of faith. The Fourth Evangelist represents 
our Lord himself as having said, HIt is expedient for 
you that I go away,11** and this seems plainly to
* Supra, pp. 37-38.
** John 16, 7.
indicate the transition from the objective-historical 
life of Christ, limited as to time and space, to the 
existential-historical life which is not so limited.
Yet the latter implies the reality of the former, which 
cannot be dispensed with.
We cited the work of Guignebert as typical of the 
most radical scientific historical criticism to which 
the Hew Testament records can be subjected, and we 
noted his acceptance of the objective-historical reality 
of the life of Jesus, though he reduces that historic 
life to even more shadowy dimensions than does Bultmann. 
But it appears to me that as soon as the historian 
admits the objective-historical reality of the figure 
of Jesus, he must also admit that he was a big enough 
figure to found the Christian religion - or to put the 
same thing in another way, he must recognise an objective- 
historical which can support the weight of the 
existential-historical. This would certainly seem to 
be applicable to Bultmann1s thought, for his recognition 
of the existential-historical significance of the life 
of Jesus implies a sufficient objective—historical 
origin. That is not to say of course that every 
incident recorded about Jesus must be objective fact,
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"but it does argue that there must "be a greater degree 
of continuity "between the Jesus of history and the 
Jesus of faith than Bultmann seems willing to allow. - 
In answering in the negative the questions whether 
we can dispense in theology with the mythical and the 
o"b.jective-historical, we have also answered our third 
question, which was whether the theologian can isolate 
the existential-historical. We have seen reason to Believe 
that this is the primary concern of theology in its 
treatment of the mighty acts, "but that it cannot "be 
the exclusive concern follows from the indispensability 
to theology of "both the mythical and the objective- 
historical. For it has been shown firstly that every 
existential statement of the content of Christian faith 
assumes a proposition about the real activity of God, 
a statement about God which is not reducible to a 
statement about human existence, and which, from the 
very nature of our thought and language, is necessarily 
symbolic or mythical in its formulation; and it has 
been shown secondly that every existential-historical 
event has its origin in an objective-historical event 
which took place once for all in world history, and 
ip that connection were absent there would be no genuine
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existential-historical happening hut only a philosophical 
speculation, perhaps an illusion, a floating possibility 
unrelated to reality.
23. The Mighty Acts.
Having now clarified the three possible ways in 
which the theologian may speak of the mighty acts, and 
having shown that all three ways are, in varying degrees, 
relevant to theology, we return to the mighty acts 
themselves. But immediately one further preliminary 
problem confronts us. We generally speak of the mighty 
acts in the plural. Bultmann prefers to think of one 
unitary act centred in the Gross, to which both the 
Resurrection and the Incarnation must be related for 
them to have significance. This concept of a unitary 
act in which the Cross is pre-eminent seems at first 
sight acceptable enough. Clearly the mighty acts are 
a unity in that they all belong to Christ. And further, 
as Bultmann shows, their unity is explicitly stated in 
the I\Tew Testament. Saint Paul frequently brings Cross 
and Resurrection together in a unity, and nowhere more 
significantly than in his remarks on baptism.* Cross
* Romans 6, 2-5; cf. also Romans 4, 25; I Cor. 15, 3-4.
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and Incarnation are likewise brought together.* Thus 
it would seem legitimate to consider the mighty acts 
as a unity centred in the Cross.
But we have mentioned this apparently minor point 
■because, as it appears to me, Bultmann goes on to make 
a somewhat doubtful use of his unitary conception of 
the saving events. Why is he so insistent on this concept 
of a unity in which the Incarnation and Resurrection 
are subordinated to the Cross? Partly no doubt the 
reason is simply that Bultmann recognises in the Cross 
the essence of the Christian Gospel - the radical 
surrender of self-sufficiency on the part of the Christian, 
which is at the same time a surrender to God. The 
Resurrection as the new life follows from acceptance 
of the Cross, and the Incarnation means that God 
Himself has spoken and acted in the Cross. Yet the 
reason seems also to be partly that, as noted already, 
the Cross is the mighty act which is most easily 
intelligible as objective-historical happening. And 
while Bultmann tends to give a very subordinate place 
to the objective-historical or even to pass over it, 
we saw that he does recognise that the existential- 
historical has its origin in an objective—historical
* Cf. II Corinthians 8, 9 ; Philippians 2, 6 ff.
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happening. Now he appears to he unahle to believe that 
we can attach any objective-historical meaning to the 
birth and resurrection stories of the New Testament.
Yet since he certainly does attach existential-historical 
significance to these stories, he must find some objective- 
historical event as their origin. Hence the importance 
which he attaches to the unity of the saving acts and 
the primacy of the Gross, which provides - in his view - 
the objective-historical origin for Incarnation, Atonement 
and Resurrection alike. But this is a very doubtful 
proceeding, and it is questionable whether the objective- 
historical event of Calvary by itself can bear the 
weight of the whole eschatological event of Incarnation- 
Atonement-Resurrection. We shall return to Bultmann’s 
use of the unitary concept of the mighty acts and our 
criticism'.of it when we discuss the Resurrection.
But first we consider the Gross. It may readily 
be understood as objective-historical event, but clearly 
such understanding does not take us very far by itself.
The non-Christian as well as the Christian may believe 
that Christ ”suffered under Pontius Pilate,’’but so long 
as attention is confined to the objective—historical, 
the Gross has not the character of a saving event.
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The New Testament speaks also of the Gross in 
symbolical or mythical terms, drawn from the Jewish cult. 
Christ is the sacrifice whose blood atones for sin. He 
bears the punishment of sin in the sinner’s stead, and 
so releases the sinner from the punishment that is his 
due. The complicated history of the doctrine of the 
Atonement in Christian theology shows the extraordinary 
difficulties which beset the theologian when he tries 
to interpret such statements as statements of fact.
When it is realised that we are dealing with what is 
called myth, two courses are open. One is the way of 
liberal modernism which either strains to breaking pointt. 
or simply disregards the New Testament teaching, and 
finds the meaning of the Cross in its moral influence 
or in the principle of self-sacrifice, or in some such 
’’modernist myth” as Taylor has called such a theory.*
The other way is the way of Bultmann who does not discard 
the mythical but seeks to translate it into the 
existential-historical.
And it is the New Testament itself, he claims, 
which gives the lead here in translating the myth into 
existential terms. Saint Paul bursts open the categories
* ’’The Atonement in New Testament Teaching, p. 62.
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of Jewish thought. "Christ hath redeemed us from the 
curse of the law . . . that we might receive the promise 
of the Spirit through faith."* The thought of the death 
of Jesus as a sacrifice which frees from the punishment 
of sin is here translated into the understanding of 
his death as "the means of liberation from the powers 
of this world, the law, sin and death."** In this way 
the cosmic dimensions of the Cross are made to appear.
To believe in the Cross of Christ is not to believe 
that an objective event once happened (which even the 
non-Christian believes) nor yet is it to believe in 
a mythical representation of that event, but, in 
Bultmann*s words, it is "to accept Christ’s Cross as 
one’s own, to be crucified with Christ"*** - and here 
again of course the existential interpretation of the 
myth is found in the New Testament itself.**** In 
this way the Cross is present to me, it is no mere past 
event but an eschatological event, the authentic 
repeatable possibility which was first given to man 
at Calvary and is still offered to him in the proclaiming
* Grklatians 3, 13-14.
** Th. des NT., p. 292.
*** K. u. M . , vol. 1, p. 42.
**** Galatians 2, 20.
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of the Word. It offers to me now the possibility of 
forgiveness and liberation from the powers of this world - 
and that for my existence, Bultmann would say, is the 
significance of the myth of the atoning sacrifice.
But does this existential interpretation exhaust 
^the myth? Certainly it makes clear its significance 
for me, it makes it meaningful, and Bultmann is to be 
congratulated in drawing attention to the primary im­
portance of this aspect of the saving events for 
Christian theology and preaching. Yet it seems to 
me that there is a residual truth in the myth which 
cannot be translated into any existential foim because 
it refers to something beyond existence. The truth 
is that this act of forgiveness cost something to Cod, 
that there is a mystery of divine activity here which 
cannot be expressed in any other way than by myth 
and symbol. It was the Son of Cod who died, and with 
this we come to the Incarnation.
Clearly we have here no objective-historical 
event comparable to the Gross. The evidence of the 
birth-stories is scanty and conflicting. Their 
meaning would appear to be that the person and work 
of Jesus Christ do not originate from within the
world but from God. Precisely in that lies the hindrance 
to any objective-historical -understanding of the event 
of the Incarnation. Because it is an intervention into 
world history, it is different from any event within 
world-history, and therefore is to be differently under­
stood. It is an activity of God and therefore cannot 
be expressed except mythically. "The Word was made 
flesh,*’ ”God sent forth his Son,” ”God was in Christ”* - 
these are different symbolic ways of expressing the 
truth of the Incarnation, the last of which is perhaps 
the most literal expression that could be found, though 
the symbolic element is there also in the preposition. 
Here is a mystery of the divine activity which the 
categories of human thought cannot grasp, so that we 
must be content with the mythical expression. Nor 
can we here translate into existential terns the entire 
truth of the myth. If we say that Christ is for us 
God, that still implies that God was in Christ, and 
we cannot get away from it. Even if he does not say 
so explicitly, it seems clear that Bultmann recognises 
that at this point demythoiogising is impossible. We 
noted his criticism of the existentialist attempt to
* John 1, 14; Galatians 4, 4; II Corinthians 5, 19.
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reach authentic existence out of the resources of fallen 
human existence, and the place which he gives to God's 
act of grace intervening in the human situation. It is 
that act of grace - the sending of Christ and giving 
him up to death on the Cross - that must he expressed 
in mythical form since it enshrines the deepest mystery 
of the Christian religion, that God was in Christ.
Must we have an understanding of Christ as the Son 
of God, that is to say, must we "believe in the Incarnation, 
before we can perceive the Cross as saving event? If 
that w e r e true, it would considerably upset Bultmann* s 
arguments, and particularly his view of the unity of 
the mighty acts as centred in the Cross. Bultmann 
himself is very much aware of this problem.* His 
argument is that it is because God speaks to us in the 
Cross, and offers us there a new understanding of our­
selves and a possibility of new life, in place of the 
old life of self-sufficiency, that we recognise the 
Crucified One as the Son of God. This argument appears 
to me to be sound, except that I think it should be 
expanded to include not only the Cross, admittedly the 
climax, but the total person and work of our Lord. It
* Cf. Th. des NT., p* 298 ff.
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must have been the numinous character of his life and 
ministry as well as of his death which created belief in 
his divine provenance. That numinous character is plainly 
discernible in the Gospel records, and it must have been 
discernible in the historic Jesus also. So again we 
find ourselves returning to the attack on Bultmann*s 
picture of the historic Jesus, and being compelled to 
maintain that there must be sufficient continuity 
between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith 
to account for the origin of that faith. The Cross 
must have been the culmination of a process of revelation 
already going on. Yet as the culmination, the final 
unfolding of the mystery, the Cross holds the key 
position, since it is in the light of the Gross that the 
whole mission and destiny of Ghrist become intelligible 
to us, and we can recognise that “God was in Christ,“ 
restoring to man his lost possibility of being the child 
of God.
We turn finally to the Resurrection. Can we have 
any objective-historical understanding of it? Bultmann 
thinks not. “Is it not a completely mythical event?’* 
he asks.* And here we must take Bultmann to task for
* K. u. M., vol. If p« 44.
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what appears to he an entirely arbitrary dismissal of 
the possibility of understanding the Resurrection as 
an objective-historical event. He dismisses it because 
of some prior assumption in his mind. What is that 
assumption? It is not the influence of existentialism 
here, because existentialism has nothing to say about 
the possibility of such an event at all. It is the 
other influence which we noted before, the hang-over 
of liberal modernism, as we called it. The Resurrection, 
however we might understand it, would be miraculous in 
character, and Bultmann has decided in advance that 
in this scientific age we cannot believe in miracles, 
and therefore we cannot believe in the Resurrection 
as an objective event that once happened, even if we can 
believe in it in some other way.
The fallacy of such reasoning is obvious. The 
only valid way in which we can ascertain whether a 
certain event took place or not is not by bringing in 
some sweeping assumption to show that it could not have 
taken place, but to consider the historical evidence 
available, and decide on that. But Bultmann does not 
take the trouble to examine what evidence could be 
adduced to show that the Resurrection was an objective- 
historical event. He assumes that it is myth. On his
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own theory therefore it is to be translated into the 
existential-historical. But we saw that every existential- 
historical event implies an objective-historical event 
as its origin, and Bultmann seems to have cut away 
any objective-historical ground for the Resurrection.
He tries to get round this difficulty however by 
referring it back to the Gross as its objective-historical 
origin. ’‘Can mention of the Resurrection of Christ be 
anything other than the expression of the significance 
of the Cross?"* It was for this reason that we 
questioned his insistence on the unity of the mighty 
acts. Can we in fact rest everything on the objective- 
historical event of the Cross alone? Would not the 
Cross by itself have meant the defeat of good by evil, 
so that it could not serve as the origin for saving 
events? We are reminded of Saint Paul’s argument: "If 
Christ be not raised, your faith is vain."** And that 
he believed in an objective-historical Resurrection in 
some sense or other seems clear from his appeal to 
witnesses*** - though Bultmann dismisses the significance 
of this appeal in a remarkably arbitrary fashion.****
* K.u.M., v. 1, p. 44. ** I Cor. 15, 17.
*** I Cor. 15, 5-8. **** Th. des NT., p. 300.
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Our argument that the Resurrection must he understood 
in some sense to have heen an ohjective-historical event 
is therefore twofold. Firstly, the question is to he 
decided not on general grounds of probability - for 
after all, we remember that these were unique events 
in which God was at work - hut on the historical evidence 
available. Slight though it is, it seems to me that 
the Easter stories together with Saint Paul*s appeal 
to witnesses make it undeniable that Ghrist appeared 
to his disciples after his death - in what way we do 
not presume to say, nor do we think it needful to inquire. 
And secondly, to accept the Resurrection as an existential- 
historical event seems to me to make it necessary to 
postulate am objective-historical event additional to 
the Cross as its sufficient origin. No doubt there is 
a mythical element in the New Testament ways of speaking 
of the Resurrection, but to suggest that here we have 
something entirely mythical with no objective-historical 
basis additional to the Gross seems quite unwarranted.
However, having once criticised Bultmann for what 
we consider to be his reckless and arbitrary denial of 
an objective—historical element in the Resurrection, we 
now turn to the appreciation of his positive teaching
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on the subject. Briefly that teaching is that for 
Christian faith and for theology as the exposition of 
Christian faith the primary understanding of the 
Resurrection is the understanding of an existential- 
historical or eschatological event. Just as faith in 
the Gross was said to be not simply the belief that 
Jesus was once crucified but rather that in the Cross 
God offers me a possibility of existence now, so belief 
in the Resurrection is not simply belief that a miracle 
once happened but belief that a miracle of new life 
can happen now for me - though in both cases, as we 
have specifically argued, the latter belief implies 
the first.
But the objective-historical understanding of either 
the Cross or the Resurrection has no more than academic 
interest. When we spoke before of the difference 
between objective and existential knowledge,* we said 
that the knowledge of God is existential, the understanding 
which belongs to a divine-human encounter, and that 
when God is objectified, as for instance in the philosophy 
of Descartes, He ceases to be God in the religious sense 
and becomes yet another object in the world of objects.
* Supra, p. 95 ff.
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Presumably something of that kind was meant when someone 
said that the next greatest folly to denying God's 
existence is the attempt to prove it. Much the same 
might be said of the Resurrection. Attempts to reach 
an objective understanding of it, to prove that the 
tomb was empty, and so on - of which there are not a 
few examples in the commentaries - are simply beside 
the point, for in its character as saving event the 
Resurrection is to be understood existentially. Bultmann 
says of such attempts to reach an objective understanding 
of what happened on Easter morning that they Mcan neither 
be proved nor made illuminating.They cannot be proved 
because they all involve very doubtful speculation on 
matters about which the New Testament writers deemed it 
wise to say little or nothing. They cannot be made 
enlightening, because even if a complete pro^f and a 
convincing account of the Resurrection as objective 
event were to be reached, it would neither increase 
nor diminish the faith of the believer, who is concerned 
not with past happening but with that which is significant
for his existence now.
For faith, the Resurrection is present. It is 
understood not as past objective happening, but as the
* Th. des NT., p. 300.
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present possibility of new life which God offers in 
Christ, and for which man may decide. This is the 
existential-historical understanding of the Resurrection 
which is an eschatological event, an event containing 
authentic repeatable possibility. "The belief in the 
Resurrection of Christ," says Bultmann, "and the belief 
that in the proclamation of the Word Christ himself - 
yes, God Himself - speaks, are identical.!l* Bearing in
mind the reservations that we have made earlier, we may
\
say that this statement sets out the essential signi­
ficance of the Resurrection for Christian faith. We 
do not prove - or accept without proof - that something 
once happened, and go on to deduce what that happening 
now means for us. We begin with the present possibility 
which Crhsit offers in the proclaiming and hearing of 
the Word, and from that we infer that something did 
once happen, but precisely what that something was is 
a matter for academic speculation only and of no particular
relevance to faith.
We have endeavoured to analyse the mythical, the 
objective—historical, and the existential—historical 
elements in the mighty acts. We have seen that none
* Th. des NT., p. 301.
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of* these three elements can he dispensed with, hut that 
for the understanding which belongs to faith the exis­
tential-historical has the primary relevance. In such 
understanding God1 s act of grace in Christ is present 
to me. In the proclaiming of the Word God sepaks to me 
through Christ, and summons me to accept the possibilities 
of forgiveness and renewal made available in the Gross 
and Resurrection.
Does Bultmann destroy the historical element in 
Christianity - as for instance Thielicke has argued?* 
Christianity is distinctively a historical religion, 
and we have on several occasions protested against 
Bultmann’s excessive devaluation of the objective- 
historical origins of Christian faith, which he tends 
to reduce to a very insignificant place. He does not 
however eliminate this element, nor can he eliminate it, 
since his existential-historical interpretation implies 
an objective-historical happening which took place 
once for all. He asserts, as. we have seen, that the 
mythical element in Christianity differs altogether 
from the myths of Greek religion in that it refers to 
a definite historical person. And his whole argument 
as to the distinction between Christianity as a religion
* Cf. his essay, K.u.M., p. 159 ff.
330
and existentialism as a philosophy rests on the belief 
that in Jesus Ohrist God entered world history in a 
special and decisive way.
The question however must he carried further than 
that. When it is asked if Bultmann destroys the 
historical element in the New Testament, it is implied 
that we know what is meant by the historical element, 
that is to say, the question already assumes an understan­
ding of what the historical is. And further, the 
question seems to Understand it as what we have called 
the objective-historical, the facts of world history.
But we have already outlined Heidegger’s philosophy of 
history, and seen that on his view the concern of 
historical study is not with fact but with possibility. 
Clearly some such understanding of the historical is 
operative in Bultmann’s thought. It was not our 
business to pronounce upon the validity of Heidegger’s 
view as a theory of history in general, but we did say 
that it was the kind of history that is relevant to 
theology. The question of existence is not answered 
by a fact but by an existentiell possibility. Now 
if we accept such a view of the historical and identify 
this much abused tern with what we have called the
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existential-historical, then Bultmann is so far from 
destroying the historical element in the New Testament 
that it might rather "be claimed that he is making clear 
for us what the genuine historical element in the New 
Testament really is.
Lest there he any misunderstanding on this point, 
let us he quite clear how widely Bultmann,s attitude 
to the historical differs from another attitude with 
which the careless reader might confound it, because of 
certain very superficial resemblances. I refer to the 
attitude to the historical of nineteenth century ab­
solute idealism, and of the theology which fell under 
its influence.
That attitude is stated by one of our most noted 
English idealist philosophers, F. H. Bradley, with his 
usual admirable clarity.* Christianity, he supposes, 
is a universal and eternal truth, ”conscious of itself 
above time, and yet revealing itself in the historical 
growth of spiritual experience.” Suppose one were 
asked to compare such a conception of truth with the 
truth about some happening in time. ”1 will not 
instance such events as the virgin birth and bodily
s1?--—— — --- —— —--    1 ■ 7”7
* In Terminal Essay VIII, appended to Second Edition 
of ’’The Principles of Logic,” pp. 688-690.
332
ascension of Jesus of Nazareth, hut I will take the 
historical assertion that Jesus actually at a certain 
time lived and taught in Galilee and actually died at 
Jerusalem on the Gross. And hy 1 actually1 I mean that 
if we had heen there, we should have seen these things 
happen. All such events are, if you view them as 
occurrences, of little importance. Inquire hy all 
means whether and how far there is good evidence for 
their happening. But do not imagine that Christianity 
is vitally concerned with the result of your inquiry. 
Ghristianity as I conceive it covers so much ground, 
fills such a space in the Universe, and makes such a 
difference in the world that, without it, the world 
would he not so much changed as destroyed. And it 
counts for much that this eternal truth should have 
appeared on our planet (as presumably elsewhere) and 
should here (we hope) he developing itself more and 
more fully. But the rest, if you will take it as mere 
event and occurrence, is an affair so small - a matter 
grounded hy the very nature of its world on so littlfe 
that between the two things there can hardly he a 
comparison.M
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This might fairly "be called a destruction of the 
historical element in Qhristianity. It is based on the 
assumption that truth is not to be found in the realm 
of the temporal. There we can only have symbols pointing 
to some eternal truth. Christianity is identified with 
a philosophical truth which, apprehended in its purest 
form, would no longer have need of Christian symbolism 
and would make no reference to Christ, or his life or 
death. Whether Christ actually lived or not is - on this 
view - of no moment, since religious events have no 
value in themselves, but are symbols only which stand 
for timeless truth, 1 incarnations of eternal reality.
But this view of the idealists is poles apart from 
Bultmann1s position, The idealist identifies the essence 
of Christianity with a high philosophy of the Universe, 
but for Bultmann Christianity is a religion with saving 
power. For the idealist the mighty acts become mere 
optional symbols of supra-rational truth, but for 
Bultmann they constitute God* s unique act of grace.
For the idealist the significance of these acts for 
the individual is a purely intellectual one, but for 
Bultmann they summon to a decision, in so far as they 
present a possibility of existence. Thus when his
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vie?; is compared with that of idealist theologising, 
it will be seen that it is not Bultmann who destroys the 
historical. His aim is not to destroy the historical 
foundation of our religion but to exhibit it in its 
cosmic dimensions as authentic repeatable possibility, 
significant for the existence of men to-day. In his 
own words, it is the case "of a historical Person 
and his Bestiny being raised to eschatological rank."*
* Th. des NT., p. 301.
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CHAPTER VIII 
CHRISTIAN EXISTENCE
24, Faith.
We have seen how, according to the New Testament 
teaching, God has in Jesus Christ intervened in the 
human situation and restored to mankind the existentiell 
possibility which had been lost through sin of gaining 
his authentic being, that is to say, of becoming the 
child of God. For the individual, this is a possibility 
that is offered now when he hears God speaking to him 
in the proclamation of the Word. With respect to the 
past, it is the possibility of forgiveness. The sin 
which cut him off from his true life is blotted out 
by God1s act of grace in restoring that true life as 
a possibility within his reach. With respect to the 
future, it is the possibility of entering on a new 
life. To accept the Cross and Resurrection of Christ 
is to surrender self-sufficiency and to live in 
dependence on and in communion with God. We must now 
attempt the existential description of this new life, 
the authentic existence of man as the Hew Testament
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understands it to "be, and we begin with faith, which is 
the attitude in which man enters upon it.
Bultmann gives a preliminary definition of faith 
in the following terns: ,fFaith is the decision in face 
of the grace which confronts us in the proclamation of 
the Word.11* On this view therefore faith is closely 
connected with decision - and in our quotation, almost 
identified with it.
It may at once he asked however whether the important 
place here given to decision in the Christian life is 
legitimate. Is it true to the New Testament teaching, 
or is it even consistent with Bultmann’s own interpretation 
of that teaching? A genuine decision is something that 
a man must make for himself - it is his ovm, if anything 
is. If therefore decision is the essential step towards 
entering the true or authentic existence for man, does 
that not imply that entry into such an existence is 
something which man must do for himself? And is it 
not the teaching of the New Testament, as Bultmann himself 
understands and expounds it, that that is exactly what 
man cannot do, and that God alone can do for him? If 
decision plays the part here assigned to it, what becomes 
of the concept of grace?
* Th. des NT., p. 265.
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And 'further, does this not look like an improper 
influence of existentialism upon Bultmann*s interpretation- 
of New Testament thought? For decision or resolve 
(Entschlossenheit) has a very important place in 
Heidegger’s concept of an authentic existence.* The 
fallen self, it will he remembered, dwells in the present.** 
But this was described as an inauthentic present, in so 
far as absorption in immediate possibilities implies a 
flight both from the past and from the future. It is 
a flight from the past because it is a forgetting of 
facticity. It is a flight from the future because it 
is an avoiding of possibilities, and especially the 
capital possibility of death. But when man authentically 
hears the call of conscience (for there is a possibility 
of authentic hearing even in fallen man***) he is 
brought into the authentic present which is the moment 
(Augenblick) of decision. The moment differs from the 
inauthentic present in this, that it is not a bare 
present but carries with it a disclosure of the past 
(what has been, the limitation of facticity) and of 
the future (what can still be, the possibility that
* Of. S. u. Z., pp. 295-313.
** Supra, p. 276. *** Supra, p. 246.
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remains open). Fallen man who is in the inauthentic 
present is characterised "by irresolution - he jumps 
from one immediate possibility to another. His 
existence is not his own hut is at the mercy of chance 
circumstances in the world on which it is founded, and 
so it lacks coherence. But when conscience summons man 
into the moment of decision, and his total situation 
is disclosed to him, genuine resolve becomes possible. 
Such resolve unifies the self which is scattered in the 
irresolution of fallenness. The unification is brought 
about because in resolve past, present and future, the 
threefold structure of existence as temporality, are 
brought together. Resolve looks to the past in accepting 
facticity. That means that a genuine resolve is never 
for an impracticable ideal, but for a possibility which 
is still open in the situation. Resolve looks to the 
future because it is the projecting of the self forward 
on such an authentic possibility. And the resolve is 
accomplished in the authentic present, the moment of 
decision in which both past and future are disclosed.
We have attempted here to give a purely formal 
account of the concept of resolve. In Heidegger, of 
course, resolve is related to the concrete situation
339
of the anticipation of death, it is anticipatory resolve 
the projecting of the self upon the capital possibility 
into which it is thrown, namely, death. But not all 
existentialists would accept this connection of resolve 
with death, and therefore we may find it convenient 
to have before us the bare formal existential structure 
of resolve, as outlined above, without reference to 
Heideggers view that it is the resolute acceptance of 
death and the nothingness of human existence that 
constitutes authentic existence. That will be especially 
the case if we use the existential concept of resolve 
to elucidate the place of decision in Christian existence, 
which is directed not to death but to life.
Clearly resolve is, in Heidegger’s philosophy, a 
purely human phenomenon. It represents indeed man1 s 
extreme effort in the direction of self-sufficifency, 
his ultimate striving to rise above the void into 
which he is thrown. He is ”condemned to be free,” in 
Sartre* s well-known phrase which neatly combines the 
facets of facticity and possibility, and he decides 
to accept his fate. For even the resolve which accepts 
death as the capital possibility in the light of which 
all possibilities are to be evaluated is not a passive
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acceptance of nothingness. It is despairing man* s 
last endeavour to he superior to his destiny. It 
makes him, says Heidegger, "powerful to exist, it 
scatters every concealment of himself, and along with 
dread there is joy in this possibility."* Now quite 
obviously decision can have no such place in the 
Christian life which denies man’s self-sufficiency 
and asserts that he cannot of himself attain to an 
authentic existence. Has Bultmann therefore been led 
away by the influence of Heidegger at this point to an 
exaggerated emphasis on decision?
That does not necessarily follow. Let us not 
overlook the great difference between Heidegger and 
Bultmann on this matter of decision. The possibility 
upon which man projects himself in authentic resolve 
is, according to Heidegger, a possibility derived entirely 
from his own resources. But the authentic possibility 
for which, on Bultmann* s view, man is summoned to 
decide, is one entirely derived from God, presented 
to man by God’s act of grace in Christ. In a sense 
therefore the decision itself is God’s gift, in so far 
as God’s grace alone makes possible the decision.
’fc S. u. Z., p. 313.
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This is explicitly recognised hy Bultmann himself:
’’Faith is the work of God, in so far as the grace which 
comes from Him first makes possible the human decision, 
so that this decision itself can he understood only as 
God’s gift, without on that account losing its character 
as decision.”* This last clause has its importance 
also, for some element of genuine decision there must 
he. Man is not an object, he exists. If God therefore 
will give to man salvation, He cannot impose it upon 
him as He might impose a property upon an object - at 
least, not without taking away man’s distinctively 
human character, his existence, and so reducing him to 
the level of an object or an automaton. God’s gift 
of salvation can only be given as a possibility for 
which man can decide. The decision itself may be con­
sidered to be God’s gift, since God alone made it 
possible, yet on the other hand it is also man’s own 
since he had the alternative of rejecting the possibility 
which God offers.
No doubt in actual Christian experience the 
element of decision is sometimes more, sometimes less 
pronounced and present to consciousness. Yet some
* Th. des NT., pp. 325-326.
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genuine decision there must always he, an accepting and 
appropriating of the gift of grace which comes to man 
as possibility. That would he true even of those brought 
up in a Christian environment who might find it difficult 
to recall any definite act of decision. In their case 
the moment of decision, as Heidegger calls it, has been 
of extended duration. Yet genuine decision there must 
have been if they have appropriated the gift of grace 
and are not passive inheritors of a dead tradition. 
G-oethe’s well-known lines are relevant here:
"Was du ererbt von deinen Vatera hast,
Irwirb es, urn es zu besitfcen."*
But if decision has its own place in the Christian 
life, and if to accord it that place is not inconsistent 
with recognising the place of the divine grace - as 
we have tried to show - then it would be unfair to say 
that by emphasising decision Bultmann has fallen back 
into the belief in man’s self-sufficiency, which he 
himself has been at such pains to oppose. It might 
however be fair to say that Bultmann tends to over­
emphasise the importance of decision, as in the sentence 
we quoted in which he states bluntly that faith is the
* Faust, Part I.
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decision which man makes in the face of grace. The 
exaggeration of the place of decision is probably due 
to his preoccupation with existentialism. Yet too 
much importance should not be attached to what is 
intended as merely a preliminary definition of faith. 
Bultmann modifies his position later, as when he speaks 
of the decision itself being in a sense the gift of God, 
and more especially in his phenomenological analysis 
of faith, at which we must look shortly, and in which 
he draws attention to other constituent structures of 
faith besides decision. Bearing this in mind, we may 
agree with Professor Henderson that *’to emphasise 
decision is not to do something alien to the Christian 
tradition - provided one does not neglect other elements 
equally vital in that tradition.”*
Does Heidegger’s existential analysis of the structure 
of resolve, considered formally and apart from its 
connection with death, shed any light on the character 
of ChsPi&tian decision? It may be said that it does in 
two ways. Firstly, it was said that in the moment of 
resolve man’s total situation is disclosed to him - 
the past (facticity) which in his fallen existence he
* ’’Myth in the New Testament,*’ p. 24.
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forgets and the future (possibility) which he avoids. 
Saint Paul* s entire Epistle to the Romans may serve as 
an illustration. In it the situation of mankind - which 
is also the situation of the individual* - is brought 
before us. Man is disclosed in his facticity, which 
the Christian interprets as creatureliness, and in his 
sin, which consists in worshipping and serving the 
creature more than the Creator. And it is in the 
disclosure of this situation, with man stripped of his 
illusions and made aware of his own helplessness, that 
the message of the Grhsitian Gospel is exhibited as 
the only genuine future for mankind, involving an 
acceptance of creatureliness, a surrender of self- 
sufficiency, and a dependence on God. It is surely not 
unreasonable to say that Saint Paul’s exposition 
brings the reader into the moment of decision, and that 
this moment displays the characteristics revealed in 
Heidegger’s analysis - a disillusioned awareness of ray 
total situation, past, present, and future.
Secondly, there is the point which Heidegger 
makes about the relation of resolve to the unity of 
the self. In resolve, the self which was scattered
* Th. des NT., p. 266.
345
in fallenness is integrated. So in the act of faith or 
committal there is a unifying of the self which was 
dissipated in the world. The self is now projected on 
its authentic possibility of life in dependence upon 
God. Yet this unity also may be thought of as the 
gift of God since His act of grace alone makes it possible 
for man to commit himself to Him. Thus Saint Paul says:
”1 am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live: yet 
not I, but Christ liveth in me."* The self when it 
seeks to be sufficient unto itself disintegrates, but 
the Cross and Resurrection afford the possibility of 
a reintegration which so transforms the self that here 
Saint Paul can say that it is not he who lives but 
Christ who lives in him. We shall return to the question 
of the unity of the self in connection with the subject 
of hope.
We must now turn to the other elements in faith 
besides decision. Christian faith, as Bultmann points 
out, is always related to a quite definite ground - it 
is faith in the saving work of Christ. ”It is therefore 
not piety or a general trust in God, but the receiving 
of the Word.”** To receive the Word means that it is
* Galatians 2, 20. ** Th. des NT, p. 313.
authentically heard or understood, so that another con­
stituent element in the structure of faith must he 
understanding. “Faith cometh by hearing,”* and to hear 
means to understand and make my own the knowledge which 
God has gifted to man through Christ.
What is this knowledge? Bultmann describes it as 
a new understanding of the self. The old understanding 
of the self as sufficient to itself is given up. That 
old understanding may have taken several different forms 
concern with the world and striving for the mastery of 
things, or the Jewish quest for righteousness through 
observance of the law, or the confidence of the Greeks 
in human wisdom, or even, we might add, the existentiell 
resolve of man to be himself from his own resources.
All are in different ways a trusting in the flesh, in 
Pauline language. To accept the Cross and Resurrection 
of Ctefcist is to abandon all such understandings of the 
self, and to enter into a new understanding in which 
the self is seen in relation to Christ, surrendered to 
him and living not in its own power but in the power 
of God. The clearest New Testament statement of the 
change from the old to the new understanding of the
* Romans 10, 17.
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self is perhaps that in which Saint Paul, speaking of* 
"the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my 
Lord,” expresses for himself the wish that he may ”be 
found in him, not having mine own righteousness, which 
is of the law, but that which is through the faith of 
Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith: 
that I may know him, and the power of his resurrection, 
and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made con- 
fomable unto his death.”*
Is this interpretation of faith as a new under­
standing of the self too intellectual? We must recall 
the earlier discussion of understanding.** There we 
distinguished between objective understanding and 
existential understanding - the understanding of things 
and the understanding of existence. And just as 
religious faith is not belief in a set of propositions 
but faith in a Person and his work, so the understanding 
which is a constituent of faith is not objective or 
academic understanding of a fact, but an existential 
understanding, a disclosure of the self to itself in 
every aspect of its existence and in its relations 
to God and the world. It is in fact that understanding
* Philippians 3, 8-10. ** Supra, p. 91 ff.
348
of myself which "belongs to the disclosure of my total 
situation given in the moment of decision, as already 
described. The understanding of the self of which 
Bultmann speaks is a practical understanding, closely 
related to decision. To have a new understanding of 
the self, in the sense in which Bultmann and Heidegger 
use the expression, does not mean to adopt a new philo­
sophy of life but to undergo a complete re-orientation 
of the self. By speaking of a new understanding of the 
self Bultmann makes it clear that he means a change in 
which "the new ’I’ is constituted in place of the old,*1 
or again, ,fthe direction of the will is reversed.,f*
The charge of intellectualism in stressing the element of 
understanding in faith can only be made if understanding 
is taken in the narrow sense of objective understanding - 
which it often is in common speech. But it is precisely 
against this narrow intellectualism that Heidegger and 
the existentialists in general have protested, and their 
broader use of the term is clearly the one which 
Bultmann has in mind when he speaks of that new under­
standing of the self which belongs to faith as one of 
its basic structures.
* Th. des NT., p. 311.
The practical character of such understanding is 
made evident when we consider its close relation to 
obedience, which Bultmann considers to be another important 
element in the New Testament concept of faith.* The 
promotion of obedience "to the faith" was understood 
by Saint Paul to be a main purpose of his apostolate.**
In surrendering his self-sufficiency, man commits himself 
to God for the direction of his life. The new understan­
ding involves a new way of life. And it is in this act 
of obedience that Bultmann considers that man enters 
on an authentic existence, in the existentialist sense 
of that expression - that is to say, man becomes himself. 
The free act of obedience is "a deed in the authentic 
sense, in which man is himself in what he does."***
We have insisted on the existential character of 
the new understanding which comes with faith, and have 
shown that its practical expression is obedience. Since 
however it is understanding, it ought to be possible to 
say what is understood. There is genuine knowledge 
contained in faith. This knowledge is recognised in 
the New Testament as a gift of the Spirit.**** It is
* Th. des NT., p. 310. ** Romans 1, 5.
*** Th. des NT., p. 312. **** I Corinthians 12, 8.
a gift because man has not discovered it for himself, 
it has been revealed to him by God in His act of grace. 
Yet it is recognised also that the Christian can and 
should increase in such knowledge.* Thus Bultmann says 
that as well as being a gift, it is a task.** It is 
a task confronted by all the difficulties which beset 
the expression and communication of an existential 
knowledge, and we have only to read Saint Paul's own 
Epistles to understand how difficult the task is.
For here we have come to the relation of theology 
to faith. Christian theology proper - as distinct from 
the pre-theologieal inquiry which clarifies and secures 
the ground for it - is the systematic elucidation and 
exposition of the knowledge that is given with faith.
It is not speculation separated from faith, but rather 
faith explaining itself. "The Christian knowledge is 
the understanding of the self under divine grace . . . 
an existentiell self-understanding in faith."***
Bultmann sums up his existential interpretation of 
faith by saying that faith is not only a relation of 
man to God, but a relation of man to himself.**** That
* Rom. 12, 2; Phil. 1, 9. ** Th. des NT., p. 322.
*** Th. des NT., p. 323. **** Th. des NT., p. 319.
man always has a relation to himself was, of course, 
an idea contained in the basic concept of existence 
which was examined at the beginning of our inquiry and 
which was verified, so far as New Testament thought is 
concerned, *by the analysis of the Pauline concept of
In the treatment of faith we began from the thought 
of man* s new relation to God made possible by God’s 
act of grace. That new relation is the condition of 
man’s .justification, and of the life of obedience in 
which he attains his authentic being. But in attaining 
his authentic being, he has entered into a new relation 
with himself. The basic possibilities for man are 
that he can be estranged from himself (inauthentic 
existence) or at one with himself (authentic existence), 
and it is only his relation to God in faith that can 
give him a right relation to himself, or make him at 
one with himself.
Here the argument has followed a direction 
opposite to that which was used in the consideration 
of sin. We began then from the thought of man fallen 
away from himself, at war with himself (the relation 
which characterises an inauthentic existence) and 
proceeded to the conclusion that he was also fallen
away from God, at war with God, since he had defied God’ 
command to life. In the consideration of faith we have 
begun with man’s reconciliation to God, and have worked 
back from the new relation to God to his new relation 
to himself in an authentic existence in which he is at 
one with himself.
Faith, as it has been described, is not an act 
that takes place once for all, but issues in the life 
of faith - the steady orientation of the self to the 
authentic repeatable possibilities made available to 
man in the Gross and Resurrection of Christ. So long 
as he is in the flesh, man is never delivered from the 
temptations of the world, and since he has no power 
in himself to overcome them, he is always in danger 
of slipping back into an inauthentic existence.* But 
so long as he looks to God he has a power not his own 
and exists authentically as the child of God. This 
authentic existence is actualised in the concrete 
relations of the individual life, and at some of these 
we must look in the following pages. But this authentic 
existence may be fairly described as man1 s recovery 
of his true being, made possible by God’s act of grace
* Cf. I Corinthians 9, 27.
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in Jesus Christ. Thus Bultmann can say that "salvation 
is nothing else than the fulfilment of man* s authentic 
intention to life, to his true self, which had Been 
perverted By sin."* God has given to man the power 
to fulfil His own command unto life - the indicative 
is joined with the imperative. God has granted what 
He Himself commanded when He created man in His own 
image and set him Before his possiBilities.**
It will have Been oBserved that in the preceding 
argument the quotations have Been taken exclusively 
from the writings of Saint Paul, so far as the New 
Testament is concerned. The reason is simply that 
Saint Paul has worked out the concept of faith more 
fully than have the other New Testament writers, But 
of course it would Be quite wrong to suppose that it 
is peculiarly his. Some such concept of faith must 
Be found in all genuinely Christian theology.
With differences of emphasis and terminology we 
find a very similar understanding of faith and its 
importance for Christian existence in the Johannine 
writings. There the verBal form - "to Believe" - is
* Th. des NT., p. 266.
** Cf. Augustine*s Confessions, X, 40.
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preferred to the noun. "That ye might believe" is a 
continually recurring phrase to express the purpose of 
Christ's works and mission, and to express the purpose 
of the writer himself in composing the Fourth Gospel.* 
This faith, just as much as the faith of Saint Paul, 
is existential in character, and so is the knowledge 
which it apprehends.** The truth which enlightens the 
heliever is not a bare intellectual truth but the truth 
of existence, not a philosophy but a saving knowledge. 
This truth is identified with Ghiiiat himself - he is 
the truth. To believe on him is nothing other than 
to accept and make one's own the possibility of life 
which he came to make available to men. Here in 
somewhat different language we have essentially the 
same understanding of faith as we find in the Pauline 
writings.
Even Bultmann who - in spite of the title of his 
book - believes that the New Testament contains several 
theologies rather than a single theology capable of 
being expounded as a whole, recognises the essential 
agreement between the Pauline and Johannine concepts
* John 1, 7; 11, 42; 17, 21; 20, 31: etc.
** Cf. supra, pp. 112-114.
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of faith, though terns used "by the former (grace, justi­
fication) are lacking in the latter.* But though they 
do not use these terms, the Johannine writings make 
their own valuable contribution to the understanding 
of the life of faith. The allegory of the vine and its 
branches, for instance, brings out in its own way the 
relation of indicative and imperative as clearly as 
does Saint Paul in his more technical theological 
language. ** But it is sufficient for our purpose here 
to note that the Johannine understanding of faith or 
believing does not contradict in any material particular 
the concept of faith already set out from the Pauline 
writings.
25. Characteristics of the Life of Faith.
We must now try to set out some of the characteristics 
of the life of faith as we find them described in the 
New Testament, comparing them where necessary with the 
corresponding characteristics of authentic existence as 
conceived by existentialist philosophy. And first 
among these characteristics we shall examine the thought 
of freedom.
* Th. des NT, pp. 416-423. ** John 15, 1-8.
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The "being of man is such that we cannot conceive 
an authentic existence for hifa unless in that existence 
he is free. He can only he truly himself when he stands 
before genuine possibilities of decision. Thus 
Heidegger claims that the act of anticipatory resolve 
in the face of death brings freedom - freedom from 
illusion and from the tyranny of the public, freedom 
for the world and for death itself.* Similarly in the 
New Testament, we find in both the Pauline and Johannine 
writings the claim put forward that the act of Christian 
faith brings freedom to the believer: '‘Where the Spirit
of the Lord is, there is liberty;'* “Ye shall know the 
truth, and the truth shall make you free."**
It is notable that both in existentialism and'in 
the New Testament teaching the freedom of an authentic 
existence is contrasted with the lack of freedom in 
an inauthentic existence. We seem here to find 
illustration of a recurring dictum of philosophy, 
namely, that virtue alone is free and vice is servitude. 
Heidegger, as we saw before, thinks that wfaten the in­
dividual is iperged in the public he loses the power
* S. u. Z. , p. 298, etc.
** II Corinthians 3, 17; John 8, 32.
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of choice, his possibilities are taken away from him, 
and his decisions are made for him. Saint Paul explicitly 
contrasts "the bondage of corruption" with "the glorious 
liberty of the children of God,"* and we noted already 
that he considers slavery to be one of the characteristics 
of the life without Christ. The Fourth Gospel has a 
corresponding contrast between the servitude of sin 
and the freedom which is given by the Son.**
But if this is so, how do we meet the standard 
criticism of the view that virtue is free and vice is 
servitude - namely, that if man is to be held responsible 
for bad actions as well as good ones, he must be free 
in both? The objection can be answered if we recall 
what was said about inauthentic existence. The individual 
is enslaved to the deprsonalised mass, but in that mass, 
as Heidegger has expressed it, man unfolds his own 
dictatorship. He has lost his freedom because he fled 
from it. He wanted to lose it and chose to lose it.
But once lost, he cannot regain it, because that would 
mean to choose choice - and it was at that point we 
suggested that although Heidegger does not acknowledge 
it, his understanding of man brings us to the place
* Romans 8, 21. ** John 8, 33-36.
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where either the divine grace must intervene or all 
thought of* an authentic existence he given up entirely. 
In the New Testament man is represented as enslaved to 
the personified powers of sin and death, and to the 
rulers of the Yet again, as we saw, though
there may he some Gnostic terminology here, there is 
no Gnostic dualism. The powers to which man is enslaved 
are powers of his own making, and he has chosen to serve 
them. Yet once that fatal choice has heen made, the 
power of choice is itself lost, and man cannot of himself 
reverse his decision. We reach the paradoxical position 
that man is responsible for his own irresponsibility.
He has chosen to surrender freedom, hut once freedom 
is surrendered, it cannot he recovered and man is 
enslaved - unless indeed some Power outside himself 
restores freedom to him. But the point is that if man 
has surrendered his freedom, he is responsible for his 
enslavement. This arises not from facticity, for which 
man could disclaim responsibility, hut from fallenness, 
or in. other words, not from his being hound up with 
the world in his existence, hut from his having chosen 
the world, and having lost his being with its freedom 
to the world in that act of choice.
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The Christian concept of freedom involves us 
immediately in another paradox, for this freedom is 
at the same time the service of God. The act of faith 
which appropriates the gift of freedom is the act of 
surrender and obedience to God. A man who is a slave 
in earthly society "becomes free in the Lord, and a man 
who is free in earthly society "becomes a slave of 
Christ.* When we contrast this with Heidegger*s some­
what arrogant conception of freedom, we see that the 
difference arises simply from the absence of God in 
Heidegger* s philosophy. For Heidegger, man* s freedom 
in a hostile world must have something of a defiant 
character. But for the "believer, freedom is found 
when he turns from the worship of the creature, which 
meant slavery, to the worship of the Creator, "Whose 
service is perfect freedom." Man is free when he finds 
his true "being as a child of God, to Whom his relation 
finds expression in obedience. To be free is to obey 
God* s command to life.
Bultmann defines Christian freedom in typically 
existentialist language: "Freedom is nothing else
than being open for the genuine future.'1** As a
* Cf. I Cor. 7, 22. ** Th. des NT., p. 331.
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formal definition of freedom* this would presumably be 
acceptable to Heidegger, but because of the absence of 
God from his philosophy, the content of Christian freedom 
is quite different from that of the freedom envisaged 
by the existential analysis, although, as regards its 
formal structure, it is almost exactly parallel. This 
last point is important if we accept the view that 
theology has its ontological presuppositions,* and 
that its statements about man and his possibilities 
should be capable of being brought into relation with 
m a n 1 s own understanding of himself as clarified in the 
existential analytic. Christian freedom is an an 
existentiell possibility the gift of divine grace, 
yet that the gift can be given, it must lie within 
the horizon of man1 s existential possibility. That it 
does indeed lie within this horizon will become clear 
from a comparison of the New Testament concept of 
freedom with Heidegger’s. The formal structure is 
threefold in both cases.
The first element is freedom from the depersonalised 
collective body, liberation from the tyranny of the 
fallen mass of mankind. As we saw in the discussion
* Supra, p. 8 ff.
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of* conscience, this may mean for the existentialist 
a revolt against the generally accepted moral code.
This can he a most dangerous doctrine, though in the 
case of Heidegger there are reasons which would make it 
unfair to press this point too far. But if we recall 
again the pernicious influence which the philosophy of 
Nietzsche had in Germany in inculcating the belief that 
there is a morality for the masters and a morality for 
the slaves, we shall understand that whatever the 
philosopher’s intentions may be, whenever he teaches 
a doctrine of freedom from public conventions, he is 
at once opening the door to the most undesirable con­
sequences, and these seem to be inevitable if God is 
absent from his message. In the New Testament it is 
taught that the Christian believer is made free from 
the law.* No doubt there were some who misunderstood 
this teaching as opening the door to licence.** But 
the danger of such misunderstanding is negligible 
compared with the danger inherent in the teaching of 
the existentialist philosophers, for whereas with them 
God is absent, in the New Testament it is God Himself 
Who has given this freedom through Christ. The Christian
* Galatians 5, 18. ** Glatatians 5, 13.
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believer is freed from the law, considered as external 
restraint, precisely because his inward delight lies 
in obeying freely the will of God. We come back here 
to our Lord's own teaching, which contrasted the law 
as the traditional collective usage of the Jews with 
the authentic will of God which the law had obscured 
rather than expressed. And his demand was for radical 
obedience to God, which would issue in going beyond the 
demands of the law rather than in ignoring them.* Thus 
in one of its aspects Christian freedom is a concrete 
actualising of the existential possibility of liberation 
from the depersonalising power of convention, yet 
since it is a freedom founded on God, such liberation 
can never be disruptive of morality, as it may easily 
-prove to be in the absence of God,
The second element is freedom from the world of 
things, into which inauthentic man is fallen. To 
resolve to obey conscience (in his own special sense 
of the term) and to live in the anticipation of one's 
own death is, in Heidegger's view, the way to deliverance 
from concern with the material world. But as we have 
already seen, he does not show how fallen man can make
* Supra, p. 35 ff.
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the resolve, and in any case there is no valid reason 
for rejecting the comforting illusions of the worldly 
life if in the end all existence amounts to nothingness. 
Heidegger's analytic has disclosed here an existential 
possibility of freedom, but only an act of grace can 
make it an existentiell possibility. This we do find 
in the New Testament teaching that the Christian 
believer has in fact freedom from sin.* He is "open 
for the genuine future" in the sense that God's act of 
grace in the Cross and Resurrection of Christ breaks 
into man's fallen situation to restore choice and set 
man before his lost authentic possibility of life. "The 
power of the flesh binds man to the past, the power of 
the spirit gives the freedom which discloses the 
future. "** Freedom from sin does not mean that 
temptation is removed - it remains so long as the believer 
is in the world, and he may succumb to it. But he is 
free from it in the sense that another possibility is 
now open to him, and he overcomes it so far as he is 
perpetually appropriating the gift of grace and living 
in the possibilities of the Cross and Resurrection.
* Romans 6, 18.
** Th. des NT., p. 331.
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"Looking unto Jesus," that is to say, oriented to these 
possibilities given in him who is the Mediator of grace 
and the Author of faith, the believer "runs his appointed 
course with steadiness,"*
The third element in freedom relates it to death.
The difference between the existentialist and Christian 
viewpoints comes out here in the different prepositions 
which are employed. Heidegger speaks of freedom "for" 
death. By this he appears to mean that death can be 
removed from the realm of contingency and made a true 
possibility in the existentialist sense of the term - 
something upon which I can choose to project myself.
This is done in anticipatory resolve. I accept my 
facticity, the fact that I am thrown into death, and 
I take it up into my resolve and project myself upon 
this capital possibility, which is the possibility of 
the impossibility of my existence. All other possibilities 
are evaluated in the light of it. This is, of course, 
a hard doctrine, but presumably those who accept it 
do find themselves free in the face of death. In 
having the courage to accept death and the nothingness 
of their own being, there is no doubt that in a sense
* Hebrews 12, 1-2 (Moffatt).
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they rise above death and are freed from the fear of it. 
The New Testament however speaks of freedom "from” death.* 
But it is ”the spirit of life in Christ Jesus” that brings 
this freedom. Again the formal correspondence between 
the New Testament and existentialist concepts of freedom 
is accompanied by a difference of content which arises 
from the absence of God in the latter and the supreme 
iloportance of God* s act of grace for the former. The 
Christian believer is freed from death because, in the 
possibility opened to him in the Resurrection of Christ, 
he has been brought into life, and since that life is 
founded upon God, it is eternal. Death cannot separate 
man from the love of God made known in His act of grace, 
the purpose of which was to give life to men.**
With the mention of freedom from death, we have 
come to another characteristic of the life of faith, 
namely, hope. There could scarcely be genuine hope 
apart from a belief in God, and therefore we find that 
Heidegger has little place for hope in the scheme of 
authentic existence, and suggests that its function is 
simply to lighten the burden of being.*** But the
* Romans 8, 2. ** Romans 8, 38-39.
*** S. u. Z. , p. 345.
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Christian, believing both that he is the creature of*
God and that God acted in Jesus Christ for his salvation, 
has the gift of hope.* The Christian hope is especially 
the hope of the life to come, or rather, the continuation 
heyond this present world of the life in Christ already 
hegun. Sin, we saw, is the falling away from the self 
which is also a falling away from God, and so sin leads 
to death. But if in the Christian life there is freedom 
from sin, the self is unified and brought into communion 
with God. Heidegger too believes that in a resolved 
authentic existence the self attains its unity. But 
the Christian goes on to interpret the consequence of 
this unity and the communion with God which goes with 
it as the opposite of the disunity which arises with 
sin - that is to say, if the way of sin leads to dis­
integration and death, the way of faith leads to life. 
Life i£ the command of God as Creator, and at the same 
time His gift in the risen Christ. Death and suffering 
prevail in this world, but the Christian is directed 
beyond to the invisible world of God, and has hope.**
Joy and peace are further characteristics of the 
life of faith as it is described in the Hew Testament
* Homans 15, 15. ** II Corinthians 4, 18.
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writings.* And here again we note that Heidegger mentions 
these in his account of the formal structure of an 
authentic existence, though of course with the usual 
difference of content. There is joy, he claims, in 
the dread-filled resolve to live in the anticipation 
of death** - and no doubt there is, though it would 
seem to be the somewhat grim joy of knowing that every 
comforting illusion has been shattered and the worst 
freely accepted. He also claims equanimity as a character 
of authentic existence, and carefully distinguishes it 
from indifference, on the ground that the latter is 
grounded in a failure to observe and appreciate, while 
the former rests on resolve.*** In spite of the 
difference of content, it is not difficult to see the 
formal existential structure which is common to both 
the existentialist and Christian concepts of peace (or 
equanimity) and joy. They arise from that unity of the 
self which in the one case is attained in resolve 
(Heidegger) or that unity of the self which is at the 
same time a communion with God and follows from the 
committal of the self to God in faith - the other case, 
the Christian ,,5joy and peace in believing."
* Rom. 15, 13; John 14, 2 7 ; John 15, 11, etc.
** S.u.Z., p. 313. *** S.u.Z., p. 345.
368
The life of faith is above all characterised by 
love. Love is said to be greater than hope or even 
faith itself; that we should love one another is Christ’s 
commandment; and the presence in a man of love for his 
brethren is the token that he has entered into the 
new life.* Considering the central importance of love 
in the Lew Testament teaching, it is surely rather 
remarkable that Bultmann seems to have relatively 
little to say about it in his exposition of that teaching. 
Is there a reason for this reticence? Is it not rather 
strange that freedom figures much more prominently in 
his account of the life of faith than does love?
Let us begin by noting what he says about the 
love of God.** He practically identifies this with 
grace, which he understands as an act. The love of 
God then is, in his view, not so much a feeling or a 
disposition or even an attitude of God towards men 
as simply an act or event, namely, the sending of 
Christ. Is this however an adequate account? We 
usually think of God’s love as the motive of His act, 
and the act as the manifestation of His love, rather 
than that the two are one and the same.
* I Cor. 13, 13; John 15, 12, etc; I John 3, 14.
** Th. des NT., p. 286.
Bultmann rightly says that it is God’s act of 
love towards us that gives to us the existentiell 
possibility of loving. The love of the brethren, as 
the Lew Testament teaches, follows from the appropriation 
of God’s gift of love in faith. Is this love of the
brethren than an act also, like the love of God? Or
if, as we suggested, Bultmann’s concept of the love 
of God is inadequate, is his concept of Christian 
love among the brethren also inadequate?
For a fuller account of his views on Christian 
love, we have to go elsewhere than to his systematic
exposition of the New Testament teaching on the life
of faith.* He rightly contends that love is not an 
emotion, as it is often understood to be. If love is
Christ’ s^commandment, it cannot be an emotion, for I
cannot experience any particular emotion at will, and 
so I could not obey the command. Neither is love an 
ideal, nor yet is it a universal love of mankind.
Love is always the demand made now in a particular
Situation, and that demand is understood in the context 
of relation between I and Thou. Here Byltmann touches
* Essay, "To Love Your Neighbour,n (Tr. R. Gregor Smith).
370
on t h e  important Christian concept of the neighbour. The 
n e i g h b o u r  i s  one who is always there already. Man is 
n o t  an i s o l a t e d  subject who m u s t  form relations with 
o t h e r s  -  h e  is always already "being-with-others" - 
a n d  h e r e  w e  h a v e  n o  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  r e c o g n i s i n g  in Bultmann1 s  
e x p o s i t i o n  t h e  c o n c e p t s  o f  Mit d a s e i n  (equated with the 
n e i g h b o u r )  a n d  Mitseln o r  b e i n g - w i t h - o t h e r s  which we 
h a v e  a l r e a d y  m e t  i n  H e i d e g g e r . *
L o v e  i s  a b s e n t  w h e n  I approach the Thou (Mitdasein) 
a s  i f  h e  b e l o n g e d  t o  t h e  world (vorhanden), or in the 
" e n f o r c e m e n t  o f  the I in f a c e  of the Thou." This is 
a  f a l s e  relation b e t w e e n  p e r s o n s ,  a n d  presumably leads 
to H e i d e g g e r ’ s  inauthentic being-with-others, das Man.
L o v e  i s  p r e s e n t  w h e n  I u n d e r s t a n d  m y  connection with 
my n e i g h b o u r  a s  a  T h o u  in each situation as it arises.
Love i s  " a n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  the self in relation to 
the Thou," a n d  s i n c e  t h i s  understanding is in a definite 
concrete situation, it involves decision, We now see 
the r e l a t i o n  of love to faith. This loving understanding 
is also the new understanding of the self in faith, 
and the decision of love is made possible by the decision 
of faith. Love of my neighbour is made possible by
* Supra, p. 155 ff.
the love of God - and again Bultmann reminds us that 
"by the love of God he does not mean some eternal quality 
of God, hut His act of love in a definite situation.
And the New Testament itself provides a neat summing 
up of the argument here: "Herein is love, not that we 
loved God, hut that he loved us, and sent his Son to 
he the propitiation for our sins."*
Gan we say more explicitly what this attiude of 
love to one's neighbour, this being open for one's 
neighbour means? There is clearly a strong admixture 
of Heidegger's existentialism in Bultmann’s exposition 
of the concept of love, and perhaps it will clarify 
matters if we look more closely at Heidegger's position. 
For him, as for Bultmann, man is always already being- 
with-others (Mitsein), and my neighbour is never an 
object within the world but always a co-existent (Mit- 
dasein). My relation to him (Fursorge) is of a different 
order from my relation to things (Besorgen). Heidegger 
does not speak of love, but he does speak of authentic 
being-with-others, which we take to be the nearest 
approach to a concept of love in his philosophy. ®hre 
The duty of a person who existssauthentically with
* I John, 4, 10. Of B u l t m a n n ' s Essay, pp. 48-55.
others is "to liberate them, to become their conscience 
as it were and recall them, to themselves."* Now we 
saw that Bultmann identified the love of God with His 
act of grace in which He restored to man the possibility 
of attaining his true being. Is the Christian love 
which God's act of love originates in those who accept '
the gift of grace to be understood in a similar way -
in which case it would be very close to Heidegger's
idea of authentic being-with-others, which recalls
/
the other to his true being? In other words, does 
love consist in helping the individual to be himself?
Or is this altogether too individualistic an account?
We note that Tillich, in his ontological analysis 
of love which has certain affinities with Bultmann* s 
approach, says that "the highest form of love and that 
form of it which distinguishes Eastern and Western 
cultures is the love which preserves the individual
who is both the subject and the object of love."**
Presumably there is no greater benefit that one man 
can convey to another than to help to bring the other 
into his true being. In that case Christian love
* Cf. S. u. Z., p. 398, also p. 123.
** "Love, Power and Justice," p. 27.
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would seem to be indistinguishable from Christian witness. 
And since Christian witness has very wide limits, it 
may well he that every act of love done in the name of 
Christ would fall within it — it would "be a proclaiming 
of the Word, recalling the other to himself through 
love, the Christian counterpart of Heidegger’s idea 
of "becoming the other’s conscience, as it were.
Yet while acknowledging the force of these con­
siderations, we would still contend that Bultmann’s 
v i e w  both of the love of God and of Christian love 
among the brethren is inadequate, and betrays the 
infection of existentialist individualism. It is in­
adequate because it has no place for fellowship or 
communion. It is true that Christian love can never 
be selective - our Lord himself answered the question,
Who is my neighbour? Is there not a quality of love, 
a sharing of being or a participation in being, which 
belongs only to those within the community of Ghristian 
believers, founded on their communion with God in 
Christ, and about which Bultmann has said nothing?
The New Testament would certainly appear to indicate 
that this is so when it speaks of a fellowship of the 
Spirit which is also a fellowship with one another,
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and of -believers being ’’all one in Christ” - a unity 
which is made possible by their faith in Christ.* The 
Christian is open to his neighbour whoever the neighbour 
may be in any particular situation, he may hope by his 
act of love to.bring the neighbour into the fellowship, 
but we still have to realise that the neighbour may not 
yet be within it, and the love which binds the fellow­
ship itself together Bultmann has left out of account.
In speaking of fellowship however we have really passed 
to another subject, the question of the Church or the 
Christian community, and it is in that connection that 
the question whether Bultmann shows, an excessively 
individualist bias will have to be pursued.
Meantime, we sum up the discussion of the life of 
faith in the Crhsitian individual. As well as faith, 
including its constituent structures of decision, 
understanding, and obedience (following Bultmann’s 
analysis), we find that freedom, hope, joy, peace and 
love are important characteristics of Christian existence 
as described in the New Testament. Formally these may 
be considered to be existential possibilities of 
man, as may be shown by a comparison with Heidegger* s
* II Cor. 13, 14; I John 1, 3; Galatians 3, 28.
analysis of an authentic existence, "but concretely they 
have a uniquely Christian content in that they arise 
as the gifts of God’s act of grace in Jesus Christ.
They are possibilities of man which are only actualised 
as ”the fruit of the Spirit.”*
* Galatians 5, 2 2 .
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CHAPTER IX 
EXISTENCE IN THE COMMUNITY
26. The Church.
It is surely rather remarkable that in a major 
work devoted to the exposition of New Testament thought 
and to the analysis of its concepts, the index of 
nearly one hundred and fifty Creek terms should omit 
the word <d?v#ov/Cc*. , which might have been supposed to 
have some importance. Yet that is true of Bultmann’s 
‘’Theologie des Neuen Testaments.” This curious circum­
stance alone might tend to confirm what was said in 
the discussion of love about there being an excessive 
bias towards individualism in Bultmann1s thought, 
stemming from the influence of Heidegger’s existentialism. 
It might even indicate a weakness in the existential 
approach to theology in general. It is true that Bultmann 
has quite a few things to say about the Church, and 
much of what he does say is extremely relevant and 
valuable. Yet it seems equally true that there is a 
certain inadequacy in his whole treatment of this theme.
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To clarify the subsequent discussion of the Church 
proper, we begin by summarising a short essay in which 
Bultmann has expressed his views on the nature of 
human community in general.* In this essay, he tells us, 
his approach to the problem of community is not socio­
logical but ontological. He distinguishes four types 
of community: a) the natural community, rooted in
blood and soil, of which the family and the nation 
are examples; b) the historical community, which 
arises out of common experiences and common tasks.
The state is the obvious example here. c) The cultural 
community, founded upon a common body of ideas, whether 
they be scientific, philosophical or artistic; d) 
the religious community, which is based upon faith.
The presupposition of a genuine community, he 
believes, is selfhood. The community must ensure the 
freedom and responsibility of personality, it must be 
the setting for individuality, unlike the false 
community of das - Man which destroys these things.
In his survey of the first three types of community 
he shows how they can be - and often are - perverted 
through a process of depersonalisation in which the
* "Fomen menschlicher Gemeinschaft,” (Tubingen, 1952).
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specifically human and personal element is destroyed. 
The obvious illustration for the first type is what 
the Nazis made of the doctrine of ’'blood and soil" 
which reduced even love and marriage to the level of 
cattle-rearing or horse-breeding.* The apparatus of 
the totalitarian state is the threat to personality 
contained in the second type of community. For the 
third type, the peculiar danger lies in dogmatism, the 
fixation of ideas.
Genuine community, it is contended, is rooted in 
religious faith. If the presupposition of community 
is selfhood, then community must have a foundation of 
faith because, as we saw, it is through faith that man 
attains his true self, or alternatively expressed, it 
is God Who makes the gift of the self.** And here of 
course we come to the paradox of individualism and 
community. Man can only receive this gift from God 
when he is taken out of every (more or less perverted) 
human community and placed before God in radical 
isolation (Einsamkeit). "If any man come to me and 
hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, 
and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also,
* Op. cit., p. 263, ff. ** lb. p. 270 ff.
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he cannot be my discipLe.”* The way to God involves 
the decision of faith which is taken in isolation, and 
is a surrender of the world and of the old understanding 
of the self which was hased on the world and on relation­
ships within the world. Yet this nihilism, if we may 
so call it - for Bultmann draws attention to the 
obvious relation between the radical surrender of 
Christian faith and the despair of the self and the world 
in such thinkers as Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre - 
is the founding of a new community, which is a community 
in the transcendent, or a community in God. When man 
is freed from concern with the world (for it is this 
concern which divides men) he is free for a new relation 
with his neighbour. I find myself on the other side of 
despair (Sartre), in my end is my beginning (Eliot).
These sayings are teken by Bultmann to be echoes of 
our Lord’s own teaching that it is through losing his 
life that a man finds it.** And for the Christian 
this finding is made possible through God’s act of grace.
The Christian believer, delivered from the world 
and entered on the new life, is free for a new relation
* Luke 14, 26.
** Matthew 16, 25; John 12, 25.
/
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with his "brethren, and belongs to the community of those 
who are called, the Yet this community, the
Church, is in continual danger of degeneration. For 
the Church, in one sense invisible, is in another 
sense a visible community in space and time which 
cannot avoid being institutionally organised. And as 
soon as that happens, there arises the threat of con­
vention and officialdom, and above all, Bultmann thinks, 
the threat of orthodoxy which transforms the knowledge 
of God in faith to a dogma.
Bultmann however visualises the community of the 
Church as passing over into a wider community which 
reaches out beyond the boundaries of the Church, the 
community of love. This, as we saw, is not an ideal 
Utopia grounded on universal human love, but rather 
the love of one's neighbour which consists in being 
open for those whom we meet in actual situations. But 
if this being open for one's neighbour rests on a 
detachment from worldly concern, then, Bultmann contends, 
there is community even between the nihilist and the 
believer, because for both worldly differences have 
ceased to matter, they are delivered from the old 
self and set free for genuine relations with each other.
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Like the salvation of the individual, which was 
described on the basis of the existential analysis as 
simply m a n ’s fulfilment of his authentic intention to 
life,* so the Christian community is held to be simply 
the fulfilment of what is already adumbrated and 
intended in all human community, "Faith brings to light 
the hidden community of all men."** Man is created to 
be himself, and that means to be himself in the community.
We do not at this stage comment on Bultmann’s 
views on community, but bearing them in mind, we turn 
to the more detailed examination of his concept of the 
Church. There are two broad types of understanding of 
the nature of the Church, which Quick has termed the 
utilitarian and the organic views.*** On the utilitarian 
view, the Church exists primarily for the sake of its 
mission of proclaiming the Word, and its organisation 
is secondary to that purpose, and adaptable to changing 
circumstances. On the organic view, the Church is 
primarily a community or fellowship of believers, a 
Christian society with a more or less fixed pattern 
of organisation.
* Supra, p. 235, see Th. des NT., p. 266.
** "Formen des mensch. G-em." p. 273.
*** ’’Doctrines of the Greed," p» 330.
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It will not surprise us to find that Bultmann 
leans towards the first of these two possible under­
standings of the Ohurch. That accords "both with the 
Protestant and the existentialist influences in his 
thought. Yet at the same time Bultmann strives to 
maintain a high conception of the Church, and does not 
allow himself to "be carried to extremes, even when these 
might seem to "be the logical consequences of some of 
his own positions.
The origin of the Church he finds in the mighty
*
acts themselves. Those who had entered upon the new 
life in Christ were conscious of "being separated from 
the world, and so of "belonging together to an escheto- 
logical community. It was not the need for organisation 
that produced the Church, "but rather the consciousness 
of belonging to the Church led to the growth of an 
ecclesiastical organisation.* And Bultmann makes it 
clear that he considers that some kind of organisation
is a necessity.
The double significance of the Church, Bultmann 
suggests, is already to be seen in Saint Paul s writings. 
Sometimes he speaks of the whole Church, sometimes of
* Cf. Th. des NT., pp. 91-106, 304-306, 440-446.
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individual congregations. In the first sense, Bultmann 
thinks, the Church is conceived as something which does 
not Belong to this world, it is the instrument for pro­
claiming God* s grace, while in the second case it is 
conceived as embodied in actual communities within the 
world. This is not quite the same as Quick* s distinction 
of tuitilitarian and organic views of the Church, though 
it is related to it, hut like that distinction, it must 
not he pressed too far. Bultmann here seems to make the 
distinction too radical. On the one hand, the individual 
congregations were conscious of belonging to the wider 
Church. And on the other hand, the universal Church 
itself might he thought of as an organisation which is 
in some sense at least within the world. For the first 
Jewish converts, the Church was the new Israel, the 
continuation of the authentic tradition of God’s chosen 
people on earth. For the Hellenistic converts, to whom 
the notion of a new Israel would he unfamiliar and 
meaningless, the Church was the body of Christ, (TW^ tct)^ t<f*ro£4 
And though both terms imply a separation from the world, 
they also imnly some kind of organised community within 
the world. We notice however that Bultmann traces the 
concept of the body of Christ to Gnostic origins, and
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holds that it expresses primarily the unworldly nature 
of the Church. But that seems to he a strange explanation 
when we remember that the term itself was inter­
preted by Bultmann to mean m a n ’s way of being in virtue 
of which he is in the world.* Are the terms <er2)ktt and 
XpuTTdO completely unrelated? The idea of the 
body of Christ is said to be not so much that of dif­
ferences being combined in a unity (which as Bultmann 
points out would be true of any human society) but 
rather that the members so far as they belong to Christ 
are not differentiated from each other by those things 
which make a difference in the world - nationality, 
wealth, social position and so on.**
Wherever the Word is proclaimed, there is the 
Church. Its primary function is thus to witness, to 
recall men to themselves. This is in line with the 
concept of love already analysed. Cod’s love towards 
men was identified by Bultmann with the sending of His 
Son, that is to say, with His act of grace, so 
presumably Christian love is the communicating of 
this grace (remembering that the Word is proclaimed in 
many other ways besides preaching) so that men are
* Supra, p. 67 ff. ** Th. des NT., pp. 304-305
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■brought to themselves’ and assisted to find their authentic 
being.
But here we come back to the question of the love 
which subsists within the Church, binding its members 
in one. It could be wished that Bultmann had given us 
a more positive account of the fellowship of the Spirit - 
or for that matter a more positive doctrine of the Holy 
Spirit. But these are matters on which he remains silent. 
Is it really adequate to say that the unity of the body 
of Christ arises simply from the fact that worldly 
differences have ceased to mean anything for the 
believers? True, it is the concern for the things of 
the world together with the belief in self-sufficiency 
that makes for divisions between men, and when individuals 
surrender their self-sufficiency and concern with 
things to live in obedience to God, the differences 
disappear and they are free to come together in unity.
But here is the difficulty. If the body of Christ is 
defined in the negative sense that worldly differences 
have ceased to count, how does it differefrom that 
wider community of which Bultmann spoke in which 
nihilists and existentialists and Buddhists and all 
who have turned away from worldly concern, as well
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as Christian believers, are free for genuine relations 
with one another; Actually I can find no difference at 
all. As Bultmann defines it, the body of Christ has 
nothing specifically Christian about it.
This is a very serious criticism to make, but it 
seems to be just. Surely we are entitled to ask for 
a more positive conception of the unity of fellowship 
and love in the Christian community than we find in 
Bultmann* s theology? He is perfectly right of course 
in saying that the fellowship of the Church is not to 
be found in any social programme belonging to this 
world.* But on the other hand, as the late President 
Roosevelt pointed out, m a n ’s chief problem is how to 
live with his neighbour. An important part of the 
witness of the Church, or in other words an important 
way of proclaiming the Word, must be simply the mani­
festation within the Christian community of a spirit 
of fellowship and love which cannot be found outside 
of it. And about this distinctively Christian fellow­
ship, it seems fair to complain, Bultmann has nothing 
adequate to say.
* Th. des ITT. , p. 305.
Here however we have struck upon a fundamental 
problem in the theology of the Church. What is the 
relation of individualism and community in the Christian 
life? The existentialists have a strong tendency towards 
individualism. We know what Kierkegaard thought of 
an organised state church. We find Zehrer in our own 
day somewhat rhetorically suggesting that Christians 
will have to go out to the deserts or the catacombs to 
carry on their witness.* And while Bultmann certainly 
would not go to the lengths of either of these two, the 
individualist influence is strong in him also.
It must be admitted that a certain suspicion of 
the organised Church is not entirely without justification. 
As a matter of historical fact, that Christian fellowship 
and love which ought to bind the believers in one has 
been perhaps least in evidence when the Church was 
most fully organised, and perhaps most in evidence 
when the Christians were driven into deserts or cata­
combs. And there appear to be two reasons for this 
state of affairs.
The first is that the Church tends to usurp what 
rightly belongs to the individual. The task of the
* "Man in this World," p. 312.
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Church in the proclamation of the Word is to bring the 
individual into the moment of decision. But in fact 
the Ghurch has frequently taken away from the individual 
the real possibility of decision. It can make the 
Gospel a tradition to be unthinkingly accepted. When 
it has done so, it has fallen into precisely the same 
condition as the cult of Israel against which the 
prophets contended, or the Jewish legalism which our 
Lord criticised. Or again, the Ghurch may take away 
from the individual the new understanding of himself in 
faith, by transforming the existential knowledge which 
belongs to faith into a set of dogmas to which assent 
is to be given, whether they are understood or not - 
and it is this petrified orthodoxy which, as we saw, 
Bultmann considers to be the chief danger in organised 
Christianity. Or again, the Church may destroy that 
freedom which we saw to belong to the life of faith 
by multiplying the rules which are inevitable in any 
organised body. It was against such a destruction of 
the liberty of the Christian man that Luther protested.
A direct existential relationship of the believer to 
God in Christ is an essential and vital element in the 
Christian religion. There are some things that the
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believer must understand and do for himself, if his 
faith is authentic, and the tendency, even in Protestant 
churches, has been for the Church to encroach on the 
sphere which rightly belongs to the individual.
The second reason is that the Church, as an 
organisation, tends to approximate to the pattern of 
das Man. As a community within the world, the Church 
must evolve some kind of machinery for its affairs, 
a system of government and administration. It must 
own property, it must enter into relations with other 
associations of men, especially the stfete. Bultmann 
and everyone else, except a few extremists, admit the 
necessity for these things. But as soon as all that 
happens, some measure of depersonalisation is almost 
inevitable. All the familiar phenomena which Heidegger 
described as characteristic of an inauthentic being- 
with-others re-appear within the Ghurch. It may become 
marvellously efficient as a mechanism and yet be 
completely deficient in fellowship and in the other marks 
of the life of faith. That seems to be the price of 
collective organisation. And of course in its relations 
with secular organisations, the Church may easily 
become entangled in the whole social mechanism, and
390
so incur share in deeds which it should he the Christian's 
duty to oppose - and indeed it would not he difficult 
to cite examples from history where individual Christians 
have protested while the official Church acquiesced, and 
only long afterwards were these individuals vindicated 
and the conscience of the Church as a whole caught up 
with them. At its worst, the Church can become a 
business, as happened in the later Middle Ages, and 
then we have the terrible spectacle of what must be 
paradoxically called a fallen Church. That is an 
exceptional state, but just as the Christian individual 
is exposed to temptation as long as he is in the flesh, 
so is the Church as long as it is in the world, and it 
appears that the collective body is always more vulnerable 
than the individual. As a collective organisation, the 
Church shows a steady tendency, against which it must 
always be striving, to fall back into the world.
But because the empirical Church is exposed to 
such dangers and has in large measure failed to manifest 
the fellowship of the Spirit, are we to abandon the 
organic concept of the Church altogether, and think 
of it hs simply the sum of individual Christians whose 
unity is somewhat negatively expressed by saying that
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for them worldly differences no longer matter? Let us 
remember that on the other hand it is this admittedly 
imperfect organised Ghurch which makes possible the 
proclamation of the Word in many ways and in many places 
where it could not have been heard but for the organisation 
or the machinery, if you care to call it such. As 
against Zehrer’s preference for the deserts and the 
cataaoMbs, we may set Latourette’s conviction that the 
great era of the Ghurch was the nineteenth century, 
when tremendous expansion was accompanied by and made 
possible by a high degree of organisation. Mission 
and organisation depend on one another. The Church1s 
witness to the world must have behind it the Ghurch’s 
own internal organic structure. The functional and 
organic views of the Ghurch, and their precursors in 
the New Testament, are not rival theories but complementary 
aspects of the life of the Ghurch. Sometimes one may 
be emphasised at the expense of the other, but both 
are necessary to the life of the Church.
In the same way, community and individualism 
are both necessary in the Christian life. It is in 
his relations with others that the faith of the individual 
receives its concrete expression. Even Heidegger,
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individualist though he he, acknowledged, as we saw, 
that being-with-others is not something external which 
is added on to the being of the individual, hut belongs 
to m a n ’s being as such - though admittedly Heidegger 
does not develop this point very far. Paradoxical 
though it may seem, Heidegger is probably right in 
suggesting that the existential basis of authentic 
community lies in liberation, in helping the other to 
become his true self. Further than that, he has put 
the problem on its proper level - the level of personality. 
But he has not followed up his own clues. Bultmann 
seems to be on similar lines when he thinks of the 
body of Christ as made up of individuals for whom 
earthly differences have ceased to matter - they are 
made free for genuine relations with each other. But 
like Heidegger, h'e has nothing positive to contribute 
to the understanding of Christian j c o iv w l *  . Neither 
of them has gone beyond the fringes of the problem, 
and one feels that for both of them it is individual 
existence that is really interesting. This is perhaps 
one of the weakest points both in existentialist 
philosophy itself and in any theology which attacks 
its problems from the existential approach. However
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admirable its treatment of individual Christian experience, 
it fails to make the transition to the Christian com­
munity, But in criticising Bultmann for the inadequacy 
of his thought at this point, let us remember that 
Christian community is an unsolved problem not for 
him alone but for the Church at large, and that not 
only the concept but - let us confess it - the reality 
of (co i viOviut is all too often lacking in the Church.
27. The Word and Sacraments.
To the Church are committed the Word and the 
sacraments - these are indeed the vehicles for its 
mission and the basis o f  its organisation. We have 
already seen something of the key position which the 
Word holds in Bultmann’s exposition of Christian 
theology, and we must now examine what he says about 
it more closely.*
The Word is not a world-view, nor yet is it a record 
of past events. Ho doubt it implies a world-view and 
no doubt it implies that certain events have once 
taken place, but essentially it is a K ^ p o y ^  , It 
confronts the individual, it questions his understanding
* Cf. Th. des NT., p. 302.
of himself, it demands from him a decision. Nor in the 
Word the saving events, and therefore the grace of G-od, 
are present. The Word sets before the hearer now the 
possibilities contained in the Gross and Resurrection, 
and brings him into the moment of decision. "How shall 
they believe in him of whom they have not heard? And 
how shall they hear without a preacher? And how shall 
they preach, except they be sent? .... Faith cometh by 
hearing, and hearing by the word of God."*
From the point of view of the existential analytic, 
we may say that the Word holds in Bultmann's thought 
the place which Heidegger assigns to conscience. We 
saw that Heidegger placed upon conscience a heavier 
burden than it is able to bear. Bultmann is right in 
claiming that only the Word - and that means the Word 
of God - can fulfil the function which Heidegger 
referred to conscience. That function is to summon 
man out of his fallen existence and set him before his 
authentic possibility. It is therefore quite literally 
the Word of life.** It is in virtue of the Word that 
the Gross and Resurrection are eschatological or 
existential-historical events, for it is through the
* Romans 10, 14-15 & 17. ** Of. John 6, 68.
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hearing of the Word that the possibilities contained in 
these events are real possibilities of decision for me 
now. Yet on the other hand the Word can only be pro­
claimed now because these events did in fact once take 
place, and the Word can only be the Word of God because 
in fact God acted in these events.
Bultmann therefore adheres to the importance of 
preaching in the Protestant and Evangelical tradition.
In the proclamation of the Word, it is the risen Christ, 
yes, God Himself Who speaks.*- Grace is present in the 
proclamation, the saving deed itself is present, for as 
saving deed it is an eschatological or existential- 
historical event and therefore not tied to a particular 
point in time. This high concept of preaching is of 
course found in the New Testament. "We are ambassadors 
for Christ, as though God did beseech you by us: we 
pray you in Christ’s stead, be ye reconciled to God."** 
The Word which is proclaimed is God’s Word, and in it 
God speaks to men, as He spoke in the Incarnate Word.
Here also there is a definite view of what preaching 
ought to do. Its function is to bring men into the 
moment of decision, to disclose to them their own
* Th. des NT., p. 301. ** II Corinthians 5, 20.
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selves in the light of the Cross and Resurrection. Prom 
what we know of apostolic preaching in the New Testament, 
Bultmann again would appear to be loyal here to the 
New Testament understanding of preaching. It is an 
existentiell proclamation which brings the hearer to 
confront the gift of grace. True, much has passed for 
preaching in the Church that would not conform to this 
understanding of it, but that is a judgment of what 
the Church has made of the gift of the Word entrusted 
to it. It would not be too much to say that the whole 
aim of Bultmann’s theology, including his views on 
demythoiogising, is to spotlight the essential , '
of the New Testament for the men and women of our time, 
and to bring it before them as the one relevant possibility 
that is still open for a bewildered world. His aim, 
that is to say, is an evangelical one.
The concept of the Word described here seems to 
imply also a high view of the Church. The preacher is 
sent - he is commissioned for his talsk, and the commission 
is given to him by the Church, the community of those 
who have heard and have been called by the Word, and 
to whom the word is committed. The Word is proclaimed
397
"by the Church, which means that God speaks through the 
Church. But in that case would not Bultmann have to 
allow more to the idea of the Church as crijitsk X p i& r w  than 
he does? Would he not need to acknowledge more substance 
to this concept, since it is the body of Christ, the 
Church, which now proclaims the Word and so becomes 
mediator of the grace which had its origin in the 
Cross and Resurrection? Let us be clear however that 
this does not mean that Bultmann would need to allow 
more to the visible or institutional Church than he 
does, because the essence of the Church does not lie 
for him in its organisation or its succession or anything 
of that sort, but quite simply - in its proclaiming of 
the Word! Where the Word is proclaimed, Christ is 
present, the Cross and Resurrection are present, the 
Church is present and speaks "in Christ’s stead."
There is another aspect of the Word which should 
not be overlooked. In the proclaiming of the Word, 
judgment has begun. In this sense too the saving 
deed which it proclaims is eschatological. The Word 
is "sharper than any two-edged sword . . . and is a 
discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart."*
•Hebrews 4, 12.
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The Word proclaims the grace and love of God. But, 
as Bultmann points out, these do not exclude what the 
New Testament as well as the Old Testament call's the 
wrath of God, and which Bultmann, corresponding to 
his treatment of grace and love, considers to "be an 
act, not a quality, and namely the act of judgment.
This act goes on now in the proclaiming of the Word, 
for according as men either accept or reject the grace 
which the Word "brings Before them, they take the way 
that leads either to life or to death.
In Bultmann1s thought, the Word is very closely 
connected with the sacraments of "baptism and the Lord’s 
Supper. If we think of the sacraments as means of 
grace, then it is clear that Bultmann’s understanding 
of the sacraments must he oriented to his concept of 
grace as God’s act in which through Ghrist He restores 
to man his true Being. The sacraments are therefore 
essentially the same as the proclamation of the Word 
in which grace is present to the hearer. The sacraments 
are special modes of this proclamation in which, in 
addition to the spoken word, certain visible elements 
are employed and certain visible actions performed.
They are nothing But concrete manifestations of the
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Word, and the grace which they convey consists in "bringing 
the recipient into the authentic possibility of his being - 
namely, making him at one with G-od and with himself.
Bultmann* s view of the sacraments has the two 
great merits of simplicity and intelligibility. Perhaps 
it will be objected that he has oversimplified the 
matter and deprived the sacraments of their distinctive 
character. But in what way has he done so? True, he 
has not perplexed and mystified us with talk of sub­
stance and accident, but since these concepts are in 
any case of philosophic rather than of Biblical provenance, 
it is no matter for regret that he has dispensed with 
them. The question is here related to existence rather 
than to metaphysics. It is, '’What do the sacraments 
mean for my existence?*’ Or alternatively, ’’What possi­
bilities do the:/ open to me?” It is true also that 
Bultmann has dispensed with all obscure animistic 
conceptions of grace, and that he leaves no room for 
a mechanical or automatic sacramental efficacy. But 
again, what fault can we find with that? If Bultmann 
has eliminated magic and metaphysics from the under­
standing of the sacraments, he has certainly not tried 
to eliminate the essential mystery and miracle of the
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sacraments - the mystery namely that God Himself speaks 
and acts in the sacraments, and the miracle of present 
grace that "brings the "believer into the new life opened 
to him "by the Gross and Resurrection of Christ, so 
that he lives in the power of God. These points will now 
he illustrated from the individual sacraments, and we 
shall find that nothing in Bultmann*s understanding of 
them deprives them of any character which might "be 
considered essential to their sacramental nature.
Baptism, according to the New Testament, is a 
"burial with Christ and a rising with him through faith.* 
It is, in other words, an entering into the possibilities 
of the Cross and Resurrection, of forgiveness of sins 
and newness of life. But in giving us part in the 
death and resurrection of Christ, the sacrament of 
baptism has the same function as the proclaiming and 
hearing of the Word. In it the believer receives through 
faith the gift of grace.**
Yet as a special mode of the Word, baptism must 
have its special character. That character seems to 
lie in this, that baptism brings out the polarities 
of Christian existence as at once individual and communal.
* Rom. 6, 4; Col. 2, 12. ** Th. des NT., pp. 306-308.
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Baptism is an individual experience, in which the in­
dividual is placed over against God. Yet at the same 
time Baptism is the gateway into the Ohurch. The in­
dividual Believer is in Baptism received into the Body 
of Christ.*
One oBvious difficulty which seems to arise out 
of Bultmann1s view of Baptism concerns the practice of 
infant Baptism. If Baptism is a way of proclaiming the 
Word, it implies a corresponding hearing and act of 
faith on the part of the Baptised person, and presumaBly 
the young child is not yet capable of either. One 
possible way out of this difficulty would Be to hold 
that infant Baptism is only made complete in confirmation, 
just as we suggested that in the case of a child Brought 
up in the Christian faith, the moment of decision may 
Be of extended duration. One can of course see many 
difficulties in such a line of argument, But apart 
from it, it seems that Bultmann^ understanding of 
Baptism would exclude children from this sacrament 
and reserve it to those who had reached an age at which 
the making of an existentiell decision had Become 
possible.
* I Corinthians 13, 13.
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The sacrament of the Lo r d ’s Supper is understood 
By Bultmann in much the same way as he understands 
Baptism.* It is a way of proclaiming the Word in which 
the elements of Bread and wine and the ritual acts 
have their place along with the spoken word. And 
again in this sacrament the polarities of the Christian 
life are exhibited. The consecrated elements are given 
to the individual, and receiving them in faith, he 
as an individual is the recipient of Christ with the 
Benefits of his Cross and Resurrection. Yet on the 
other hand in its character as a common meal the Lord’s 
Supper discloses the individual within the Body of 
Christ, the fellowship of faith. The doctrine of a 
real presence is also safeguarded on Bultmann’s inter­
pretation of this sacrament - not indeed through any 
theory of transubstantiation or consubstantiation or 
anything of the sort, But Because this is a proclaiming 
of the Word, and in all proclaiming of the Word the 
crucified and living Lord is present and himself speaks. 
The sacrament is not a mere memorial of a past event - 
Christ is present, though not of course localised in 
the elements or anywhere else.
* -Th. des NT., pp. 309-310.
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This discussion of the sacraments allows us to
see the place of worship in the Christian life. Christ
is present with the worshipping Church, and there is 
consciousness "both of the individual relation of each 
to him, and of the unity of the Church as the community
of those whom he has called out of the world. In
worship is the perpetual appropriation of grace, the 
steady orientation of the self towards the possibilities 
of the Cross and Resurrection in virtue of which the 
"believer lives not of himself but in the power of 
God, and can fight against the temptations of the world. 
This is the foundation of an authentic existence, as 
opposed to that inauthentic existence which is founded 
on worldly concern. And so far as the believer appropri­
ates the grace thus made available to him, he enters 
upon and continues in the life of faith, freedom, 
hope, joy, peace, love and fellowship.
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CHAPTER X
RESULTS OP THE INQUIRY
28. The Perspective.
An attempt to assess the value of the existential 
approach to theology must "begin "by indicating the place 
which such an approach, as exemplified in Bultmann's 
work, occupies among recent trends in theology. According 
to Tillich, "A theological system is supposed to satisfy 
two "basic needs: the statement of the truth of the
Christian message and the interpretation of this truth 
for every new generation. Theology moves Lack and forth 
"between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation 
and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth 
must "be received. Not many theological systems have 
"been able to "balance these two demands perfectly. Most 
of them either sacrifice elements of the truth or are 
not a"ble to speak to the situation. Some of them 
.combine both shortcomings. "*
It would hardly be unfair to say that much of the 
liberal modernism which prevailed at the beginning of
* "Systematic Theology," vol. 1, p. 3.
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the present century had the demerit of combining both 
the shortcomings to which Tillich refers. On the one 
hand it had sacrificed elements of the truth, in'attempting 
to combine and harmonise the Biblical teaching with 
the philosophical and scientific thought of the day.
On the other hand, it did not speak to man1s real situation 
as a fallen and sinful creature, since it was infected 
with the optimistic view of man which then prevailed in 
secular thought. Or alternatively, if it did speak 
to a situation, it spoke to an inauthentic situation 
without recognising it as such.
As an illustration, let us take the so-called 
moral influence theories of the Atonement which were 
being put forward around that time. On the one hand 
these theories failed to do justice to the New Testament 
teaching on the death of Jesus, and simply passed over 
whatever elements in that teaching seemed to them to 
be not congenial to the temper of thought in their 
generation. And on the other hand they failed to do 
justice to the factor of sin in the human situation, 
and supposed that if man is shown the ideal of goodness 
he will follow it and eventually perhaps attain to it 
as his moral evolution proceeds.
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It may not "be without significance that two of the 
major theological developments that have taken place 
since that time have each followed upon one of the two 
great wars which convulsed the world in the first half 
of the twentieth century. And further, both of these 
develQpments have emerged on the continent of Europe 
where the crisis of modern civilisation has been far 
more acutely-experienced than either in the British 
Isles or in America.
The first development was the theology of Karl 
Barth in the period after the First World War. The 
great and invaluable contribution which Barth made to 
Christian theology lay on the side of its kerygma or 
message. He called a halt to the process of amalgamating 
and diluting that message with the human speculation of 
the day, and referred theology back to its true source 
in the revealed Word of God. The practical value of 
his theological work was soon attested in the stiffening 
which it afforded to those elements in the German 
Church which resisted Nazi pressure. Barth was right 
in rescuing the kerygmatic character of theology which 
was in danger of being lost, and in causing the Church 
again to hear the Word of God over against the voice
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of human speculation. But the danger in such a kerygmatic 
theology is that it may lose touch with m a n ’s actual 
situation. It is in danger of lapsing into a complacent 
orthodoxy which is curiously irrelevant to the modern 
mind. It should he said in fairness that this criticism 
applies more to the disciples of Barth than to their 
master himself. To quote Tillich again: ’’Barth’s
greatness is that he corrects himself again and again 
in the light of the situation and that he strenuously 
tries not to become his own follower. Yet he does not 
realise that in doing so he ceases to be a merely 
kerygmatic theologian.”*
After the Second World War there took place a further 
development in theological thought, and of this we have 
taken Rudolf Bultmann as representative. It would be 
a complete misunderstanding to think that Bultmann has 
gone back to the attitude which prevailed before Barth.
On the contrary, he accepts with Barth the kerygma, the 
revealed Word of God, as the foundation of Christian 
theology. His thought is based upon the New Testament.
But as he sees it , the kerygma is always understood in 
the answering situation of faith, and it is in that
* Op. cit. , p. 5.
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actual situation that it is to he interpreted. Let him 
speak for himself: ”Paith is nothing other than the
answer to the kerygma, and this is nothing other than 
the Word of God addressed to us, questioning and promising, 
directing and pardoning. As such it does not offer 
itself to critical thought, hut speaks in concrete 
existence. That it never appears except as a theological 
exposition depends on this, that it can never he expressed 
except in a human language formed hy human thinking.
But that is precisely what confirms its kerygmatic 
character; for that makes it clear that the propositions 
of the kerygma are not universal truths hut are addressed 
to a concrete situation. They can therefore only appear 
in a form which is moulded hy an understanding of 
existence (or the interpretation of such an understanding). 
And correspondingly they can only he intelligible for 
one who can understand the kerygma as a Word addressed 
to him in his situation - and to hegin with, it is 
understood as question and demand. Expressed differently: 
the kerygma is only intelligible as kerygma when the 
understanding of the self which it has awakened is 
understood as a possibility of man’s understanding of 
himself in general, and so becomes the call to decision.”*
* Th. des NT., pp. 580-581.
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In this important if somewhat involved statement 
in which Bultmann sums up his onception of the theologian’s 
work, he makes clear his intention of holding the balance 
in his theology between kerygma and situation - 
as Tillich also claims to do by his method of correlation. 
If our simplified account of the course of theological 
thinking in the first half of the present century is 
accepted, it will be seen that in intention at least 
Bultmann has advanced beyond the positions both of 
liberal modernism and of Barthianism. He has accepted 
Barth’s correction of the older position in founding 
his theology on the kerygma of the Ghristian revelation, 
and at the same time he has corrected the excesses of 
a kerygmatic theology in attempting to interpret the 
kerygma in relation to man’s contemporary situation.
Whether of course his intentions are always fulfilled 
is quite another question, and we suggested already 
that at some points the liberal modernist influence 
still exerts a very strong influence in his thought.
The situation also has changed during the fifty 
years under review. The facile optimism and confidence 
in human power which marked the earlier period has 
largely disappeared, and has been replaced by a mood
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of anxiety which sometimes comes near to despair. The 
question of man’s own being, which, as Zehrer says, was 
not being asked fifty years ago because the answer was 
assumed to be known, is now being asked anew. This 
mood finds its philosophical expression in existentialism, 
which is not just another speculation but rather con­
temporary man’s self-analysis, and which therefore no 
theologian who speaks to the situation can afford to 
ignore.
We now have before us both the place of Bultmann’s 
work in the perspective of recent theological thought, 
and also a fairly comprehensive view of.his work and 
its relation to existentialist philosophy. We have 
seen some of the strong points and some of the weaknesses 
and inadequacies in his exposition. We are therefore 
in a position to attempt some evaluation, and we shall 
take as the basis of the discussion Bultmann’s own 
statement of his position which has already been quoted 
in full.* Leaving aside certain aspects of the existential 
approach to theology which have already been sufficiently 
discussed and criticised - for instance, the relation 
of theology to the historical, and the relation of
* Supra, p. 409.
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individualism and community in the Christian life - we 
concentrate now upon two main topics - the understanding 
of man and the question of demythologising.
29. Existentialism and the Christian Understanding of Man.
We "begin with Bultmann’s statement that the pro­
positions (Satz.e) of the kerygma ”can only appear in 
a form which is moulded hy an understanding of existence 
(or the interpretation of such an understanding).” This 
last phrase, we take it, means the philosophical inter­
pretation of an understanding of existence. However 
much theology differs in some respects from the natural 
sciences, it resembles them in this that it sets out 
with its presuppositions and basic concepts, and that 
progress in it consists in the continual clarifying 
and fuller understanding of these concepts. It must 
continually examine that ’’understanding of existence” 
which moulds the form in which the kerygma is expressed.
It must understand the situation if the kerygma is to 
be shown as relevant to it, yet such understanding is 
not, strictly speaking, theology, as we pointed out before, 
but a pre-theological or ontological understanding which 
can alone secure the ground on which the theological
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structure proper is to "be raised. To quote another 
sentence from Bultmann’s statement: ’’The kerygma is
only intelligible as kerygma when the understanding of 
the self which it has awakened is understood as a 
possibility of man’s understanding of himself in general, 
and so Becomes a possibility of decision.” Or in-other 
words the Christian life into which the kerygma summons 
us must Be shown as an existentiell possibility lying 
within the horizons of m a n ’s existential possibilities.
But it is not theology but the philosophy of 
existence which says what these existential horizons 
are. And the philosophy of existence is not a speculative 
metaphysic but phenomenological self-analysis. ”It is 
not a speculation detached from man, but man himself, 
as he understands himself.”* The theological exposition 
of the kerygma must take note of m a n ’s understanding 
of himself in general if the new understanding given 
in faith is to be shown as a real possibility for man.
This is what Schrey means when he speaks of the philosophy 
of existence as a corrective to theology. His language 
is perhaps ill-chosen, but he makes his meaning plain: 
’’Since there is a personal identity before and after
* S. u. 2., p. 325.
414
the act of faith, and the new reborn man is nevertheless 
still a man, the expressing of the new understanding of 
the self in faith has its ontological foundation in the 
understanding of man as he was before the act of faith."*
But this is precisely what Bultmann has attempted 
to do, with a large measure of success, as it appears 
to me. Within the context of idea (Begrifflichkeit) 
afforded by the existentialist analysis of the being 
of man, he has shown how the life of faith, which is 
on the one hand the gift of G-od offered in the kerygma, 
is on the other hand related to the possibilities of 
man’s being, and is in fact "the fulfilment of his 
authentic intention to life, to his true being."**
Not only are-kerygma and situation brought together, 
but the ontological foundations of theology are laid 
bare, and the relation of the Christian to the secular 
understanding of man exhibited, yielding as a result 
a clearer understanding of the task of theology and 
also of the concepts which it employs.
This part of Bultmann's work finds its best expression 
in his exposition of the Pauline theology as a doctrine
* "Die Bedeutmng Martin Heideggers Philosophie fur die 
Theologie," p.. 14. ** Th. des NT., p. 266.
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of man - firstly, the understanding of man without faith, 
and secondly, the understanding of man under faith. The 
exposition, as we saw, is carried out within the context 
of existentialist ideas, and is closely paralleled hy 
Heidegger1s own existential analytic. The validity of 
Bultmann* s work here is to he .judged hy three con­
siderations.
The first is an exegetical consideration, and 
concerns Bultmann's understanding of the term <?#/** .
This is one of the few definitely ontological terms 
in the He?' Testament, and Bultmann as we saw understands 
it as roughly equivalent to Heidegger's concept of 
,fheing-in-the-world," and as implying the concept of 
existence in the sense in which Heidegger expounds it.
We already considered the evidence for Bultmann* s 
interpretation.* If that evidence is deemed sufficient - 
and we argued that it is so - then the foundation for 
Bultmann* s interpretation of the whole Pauline theology 
as a doctrine of man is securely laid, for' everything 
else in his interpretation turns on this hasic 
ontological concept.
* Supra, p. 68 ff.
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The second consideration is an apologetical one.
It concerns the relevance to my existence in the con­
temporary world which Bultmann has shown as "belonging 
to the Pauline teaching. Archaic notions, whether of 
Jewish origin (as justification) or of Gnostic pro­
venance (as the dominion of demonic powers) are exis- 
tentially interpreted so that they "become meaningful 
for the modern man. Common words which Saint Paul used 
in a technical or semi-technical way are likewise inter­
preted with the aid of existentialist concepts so as 
to "become meaningful for existence to-day - the flesh, 
the world, and so on.
The third consideration is a logical one. It 
concerns the question of coherence of thought. It has 
laready been pointed out how Bultmann has exhibited 
the various Pauline concepts within the framework of 
a systematic understanding of the being of man in 
relation to God and the world. He is not content to 
clarify isolated problems or to dwell on single aspects 
of Pauline teaching but has set himself the greater 
tafek (in which he has been remarkably successful) of 
exhibiting the massive unity of Saint Paulfs theological 
thought. For although Saint Paul expressed his theology
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fragment ifaily in his Epistles, Bultmann Believes that 
it is a unity,* and his exposition of it has demonstrated 
that Belief. Yet the key to this unity is the concept 
of existence, or the concept of cntytot as Bultmann has 
interpreted it.
A similar case could Be put forward as regards the 
Johannine theology. There is here admittedly no key 
ontological concept corresponding to (Ttijkc*. and the 
ontological assumptions have to Be inferred from the 
ontical statements. But the considerations of relevance 
and unity apply in full force, and attest the validity 
of Bultmann1s interpretation Based on the concept of 
existence.
Of course it must always Be remembered that 
Heidegger Began his philosophising with the study of 
mediaeval thought, and that his works are interspersed 
with references to Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Kierke­
gaard and other Christian thinkers. It would Be an 
interesting exercise if someone were to reverse the 
order of the present inquiry, and investigate the 
influence of Christian, theology - and ultimately of 
Biblical thought - upon the philosophy of existentialism.
* Cf. Th. des NT., p. 186.
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Such an inquiry would almost certainly show that, 
whether it is acknowledged or not, the secular and 
even atheistic existentialism of the twentieth century, 
with its insistence on the long neglected phenomena 
of fallenness, care, death, and guilt, and its quest 
for an authentic existence, is nothing other than, a 
partial rediscovery of some aspects at least of the 
Biblical understanding of man.
We have here tried to indicate Bultmann1s con­
tribution to Christian anthropology or the understanding 
of man. He has based that understanding firmly on its 
ontological foundations, and has shown the life of faith 
to be nothing other than man’s existentiell possibility 
of authentic existence. He has made the Christian 
understanding of man intelligible to contemporary philo­
sophical thought on the one hand while remaining loyal 
to its source in the &ew Testament on the other. This 
appears to me to be the most valuable part of Bultmann’s 
work. And if, as was said, progress in theology con­
sists in the clarification and fuller understanding 
of its basic concepts and presuppositions, then here 
we seem to have a genuine theological advance.
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30* Existentialism and Demythologising.
We now turn our attention to some other points in 
Bultmann*s statement of his theological position. The 
kerygma, he says, "does not offer itself to critical 
thought, hut speaks in concrete existence . . . and 
to begin with it is understood as question and demand." 
The kerygma is not a world-view, not a system of timeless 
truths about the universe, as thinkers like Bradley 
seem to have supposed. It is not a statement about 
something but, says Bultmann, is first understood as 
question and demand. This line of thought becomes 
clearer when we remember that the kerygma rests on 
the Christian revelation. That revelation consisted 
in God’s mighty acts in Jesus Christ, and so its truth 
is not the truth of a statement but the truth of a person. 
The revelation was expressed in action, not in pro­
positions. Yet surely the revelation gives us to under­
stand something? It does indeed, but the understanding 
which it gives us is an existential understanding which, 
as Heidegger shows, need hot be expressed in words at 
all, but may issue in some practical consequence - to 
recall his illustration, I understand that the hammer
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is heavy not in making an objective statement about its 
weight, but in changing it for a lighter one. The 
kerygma is understood in analogous fashion as something 
which demands of me a decision. But what am I to decide? 
I am to decide between God and the world, or, expresed 
in another way, between the understanding of myself in 
the light of the Cross and Resurrection of Christ, and 
the understanding of myself as self-sufficient.
But if the kerygma brings me into a decisive 
question, and appears as demand, what about theology?
As a science of some kind, it must express itself in 
descriptive statements rather than in Questions. It 
would seem to follow therefore that theology cannot be 
a direct interpretation of the kerygma. Yet the 
kerygma, Bultmann says, '’never appears except as a 
theological exposition, and can never be expressed 
except in a human language formed by human thinking. "
But if this theological exposition is different from 
the kerygma itself, what mediates it? "Faith is the 
answer to the kerygma." We saw already that faith 
is the decision to make the possibilities offered to 
me in the kerygma my own. But this means to enter into 
the new understanding of the self in the light of the
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Gross and Resurrection. And here we have something that 
is capable of "being expressed in descriptive statements - 
namely, the new understanding of the self in faith.
Thus for Bultmann theology is the systematic analysis 
of the understanding which is given with faith, or, as 
he also expresses it, faith explaining itself. It is 
not the direct expression of the kerygma, "but, so to 
speak, the mediate expression - the analysis of human 
existence as it understands itself in faith, considered 
as the response to the kerygma in a concrete situation. 
This exposition of the content of faith, according to 
Bultmann, is Christian theology proper, as distinct from 
the pre-theological analysis of the presuppositions of 
theology.
That this view of theology has a certain attractive­
ness is impossible to deny. It has a firm ontological 
"basis which relates it to the understanding of man in 
general. And further, in making theological statements 
proper to "be statements a"bout the understanding of the 
self in faith, that is to say, existential statements, 
it gives them a relevance to the situation which they 
could scarcely otherwise have. Theology "becomes the 
exposition of an existentiell possibility of existence,
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namely Christian existence, which is shown to he a genuine 
possibility within the existential horizons of existence. 
This appears to he also Heidegger’s own view of the 
function of theology, as he expressed it in an unpublished 
paper on the relations of philosophy and theology, 
the substance of which has been made available by 
Schrey.*
But over against that attractiveness must be set 
the gravest dangers. If the business of Christian 
theology is to analyse an existentiell possibility of 
existence, then it is difficult to see how it can 
avoid being swallowed up in existentialist philosophy 
altogether. That is what we meant by our hint earlier 
I on that one of the perils inherent in the existentialist 
influence upon theology is that existentialism might 
prove to be the Gnosis of the twentieth century.**
The concepts of Christian existence could be taken 
over by existentialist philosophy without any reference 
to their origin in the Cross and Resurrection of '
Christ, and Christian theology would disappear as 
such. We already discussed the question whether
* In his essay to which reference was made on p. 414.
** Supra, p. 147 ff.
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the existential approach to theology does not tend to 
detach theology altogether from any historical basis.*
We have now struck on a more far-reaching question - 
whether this approach does not detach theology from 
any religious "basis in the activity of God, so that 
strictly speaking theology itself would have ceased, 
and have passed over into philosophy. In a very 
different way, no doubt, but with pretty much the same 
result, we might arrive at something similar to the 
view sketched by Bradley** on which the ideas of 
Christianity, separated from any reference to Christ 
or to G-od in Christ, are incorporated into a secular 
philosophy.
It may be replied that this cannot happen, because 
Christian existence is only-made possible by the kerygma, 
and ultimately by the mighty acts of God in Jesus Christ. 
That is perfectly true, and we noted it before in the 
discussion of demythologising. But as soon as that 
claim is made, as soon as we sp®ak of mighty acts or 
of grace or of revelation or of the uniqueness of 
Jesus Christ, we are making or implying statements 
which are not statements about human existence, and
* Supra, p. 329. *• Supra, p. 331 ff.
424
we have abandoned the concept of a purely existential 
theology. That is the inconsistency in Bultmann*s own 
position. He puts forward a view of theology which 
calls for radical demythoiogising, and the translation 
of all transcendent statements into statements about the 
understanding of the self. Yet at the same time he 
believes that God has acted decisively in Christ, and 
he does not appear to realise the incompatibility of 
the two positions. We do not find fault with him for 
holding to the latter position. Rather we might say - 
adapting Tillich's remark about Barth to our own purpose - 
that Bultmann* s greatness here shows itself in his 
stedfast refusal to follow out his own ideas to the 
bitter end. But we can readily imagine that some 
disciple of his, with more consistency and less insight 
than his master, might run straight into the dangers 
which we indicated. The danger can only be guarded 
against by the frank acknowledgement that theology is 
concerned not only with statements about human existence 
but with statements about God and His activity as well - 
transcendent statements, if you like, which, because 
we lack categories for the understanding of transcendent 
being as such, can only be expressed in symbolic or 
mythical form.
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Another danger, perhaps equally great, arises out 
of the selective emphasis which Bultmann*s concern 
with existentialism has led him to place on those 
elements of Christian truth which lend themselves most 
readily to his method of treatment. We drew attention 
to several instances of this in the course of the 
argument. A further illustration would he the doctrine 
of the Holy Spirit, one of the ohvious gaps in 
Bultmann*s theological exposition. The existential 
significance of the spirit is interpreted - and 
interpreted very well - hut of the divine Spirit as 
personal and transcendent there is scarcely a trace.
But that is not to he wondered at in a theology which 
is hased on the analysis of the understanding of the 
self.
When all this has heen said, however, let us hasten 
to add that Bultmann’s existential interpretation of 
theology has its own value. The attention which he 
draws to the existential-historical significance of the 
mighty acts appears to me a real contrihution hoth to 
the understanding and communication of the truth which 
they give us to understand. Yet that existential- 
historical aspect must he understood in relation to
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the objective-historieal aspect and above all to that 
irreducible transcendent element contained in the 
mythical aspect, as Bultmann would call it. The truth 
is that theology is not quite so simple as Bultmann* s 
description of it would suggest. He deserves all credit 
for stressing the existential element, so often neglected 
and yet so vital, but room must also be found for that 
transcendent element which cannot be existentially 
translated, and which Bultmann, in spite of his theories, 
fully recognises, so that he himself never really gets 
away from the symbol and myth in which it must find 
expression. Just as Heidegger intended to pass beyond 
the analysis of human existence to the quest for 
being in the widest sense, so theology cannot rest in 
existential statements but must go on to speak of G-od 
and the transcendent - though in both cases the 
question of man* s existence certainly appears to me 
to be the right starting-point for the inquiry.
Why is Bultmann so anxious to get rid of myth?
If he says that it is inadequate toN expres what it is 
meant to express, no doubt he is right up to a point.
But then our knowledge of God can never be perfect 
(in this world at least), and if that knowledge can
only be expressed in mythical f o m ,  then the inadequacy 
of myth does not mean that therefore we must abandon it, 
for it is the only way of expressing such knowledge as 
we have. It is better to "see through a glass darkly"* 
than not to see at all. If on the other hand Bultmann 
says that the myth must be related to existence, he is 
again right. The meaning of myth and symbol is mis­
understood if they are not related to existence, but 
that is not to say that we can then translate them 
into existential statements and have nothing left over, 
for the religious myth may contain in itself a transcen­
dent element which it relates to human existence but 
which can never be reduced to human existence.
Bultmann*s strongest objection to myth appears to 
be that he considers that it is the chief stumbling- 
block to the acceptance of the Christian Gospel in the 
modern world. Yet as Professor Henderson pointed out 
in the passage which we already quoted, twentieth 
century man has been ready to swallow myths that are much 
more improbable than any that are to be found in the Bible 
Schrey has drawn attention to what he calls the mythical 
elements in Heidegger’s thought, for instance, his idea
* I Corinthians 13, 12.
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of nothingness which is not lacking in positive content, 
and which Schrey compares to the Buddhist Nirvana.* 
Actually Schrey misses the obvious illustration which 
is Heidegger.’ s use of the myth of Hyginus to elucidate 
the concept of care,** and the instances which he does 
quote might more accurately he described as mystical 
than mythical. Yet it is interesting to find him 
suggesting that Bultmann's attitude towards mythology 
is more negative than Heidegger’si When these points 
are taken into consideration, it seems clear that 
Bultmann’s objections to myth are extravagant, and that 
he overestimates the intellectual stumbling-block which 
myth is supposed to put in the way of accepting the 
Christian faith.
The real stumbling-block is of course the surrender 
of self-sufficiency and the acceptance of the Cross.
And the real problem of communication confronting the 
Church is not the removal of myth but a much wider 
problem which is not confined to language alone, but 
implies the communication of the Christian life through 
the manifestation in the Church itself of faith, freedom, 
hope, peace, joy and love. In spite of all the
® Op. cit., pp. 17 & 20. ** Supra, pp. 198-199.
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existentialist warnings against excessive intellectualism, 
it seems to be a fair criticism of Bultmann that he has 
concentrated on a fairly narrow intellectual front and, 
like the liberal modernist of fifty years ago, attempted 
to present the Christian faith in a form not likely to 
give offence to the modern outlook.
But on the other hand theology is only one part 
of the Church’s activity, and the theologian is no doubt 
entitled to concentrate on the intellectual - or con­
ceptual - presentation of the Christian life, provided 
that he remembers that the Church as a whole has a 
much wider problem of communication to face. And it 
is only fair to add that i f  Bultmann has resembled the 
liberal modernist in an e x c e s s i v e  desire to remove 
every intellectual stumbling-block, he has done so 
not to make way for a theistic world-view or a Christian 
ethic but for the presentation to man of his authentic 
possibility - to be forgiven and renewed through 
acceptance of the Cross and Resurrection of Christ.
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Appendix A. Glossary of German Existentialist Terms.
(The page-references show where an explanation of the 
meaning of each term may "be found.)
Ahgefalien ........ 176
Alltaglichkeit . . . 157
Angst ............ 116
Augenblick ........ 337
Becteaitsamkeit . . . . 83
Befindlichkeit . . . 114
Begrifflichkeit . . 19
Beruhigumg ........ 177
Besorgen . ........ 65
Bewandtnis ........ 83
Dasein ............ 51
Durchschnittlichkeit 157
Eigentlich ........ 233
Einebnung . . . . . 157
Entfremdung . . . . 177
Entschlossenheit . . 337
Entwurf .......... 102
Entwurzelt ........ 176
Existenz .......... 52
Existential . . . . 55
Existenzial, das . . 56
Exist enziell .m . . . 55
Existenzialitat . . 56
Erschlossenheit . . 100
Eaktizitat . . . . . 140
Eragestellung . . . 16
Eursorge ........ 155
Gerede ......... 158
Geschichtlich . . . 296
Geschriebe . . . . . 158
Geworfenheit . . . . 142
Historisch . . . . .  292
In-der-Welt-sein . . 64
Innerweltlichkeit . 65
Innerzeitigkeit . . 277
Insein . . . . . . .  65
Jerneinigkeit . . . .  53
Man, d a s ...............156
M a n s e l h s t ............ 159
Mitdasein . . . . .  155
M i t s e i n ...............154
Mitwelt . . . . . .  153
N e u g i e r ...............158
(5ffentlichkeit . . . 158
Ontisch . . . . . .  48
Ontologisch . . . .  48
P l a t z ..............  84
Schuldigsein . . . . 247
Seiendes . . . . . .  48
S e i n ................  48
Sein-zum-Tode . . . 208
Selbstverstandnis . 112
Sorge  ...............196
Unauffalligkeit . . 82
Uneigentlich . . . .  65
Verfallenheit . . . 175
Versuchung . . . . .  177
V e r w e i s u n g .........  83
Vorhandenheit . . .  52
V o r l a u f e n ............ 221
Wiederholbar . . . .  281
Zeitlichkeit . . . .  276
Zuhandenhfeit . . 81
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Appendix B. Index of Scriptural References.
Genesis 1, 26 . . .  . . 30 John (cont.) 8, 32 . . • 356
1, 31 . . . . . 87 8, 33-36 • 357
2,77. . . . . . 149 10 10 . • 236
2, 8 ff . . . . 87 10 11 . • 138
3 , 5 . . .  . . . 175 11 25 . • 236
3, 6 . . . . . 32 11 42 . • 354
3, 19 . . .  . . 212 12 25 . • 379
18, 17 . . . . 133 12 31 . • 170
Joshua 24, 13 . . .  . . 32 12 50 . • 236
Psalms 8, 6 ......... . 87 14 6 . . • 113
8, 6 ........ . 150 14 27 . • 367
42, 2 . . . . . 33 15 1 . . • 138
90, 3, 6, 10 . . 210 15 1-8 . • 355
103, 15-16 . . . 32 15 11 . • 367
Jeremiah 8, 7 . . . . . 130 15 12 . • 368
22, 16 . . . . 96 15 18 . • 170
Matthew 5, 21-22 . . . 35 16 7 . . • 311
6, 24 . . .  . . 36 16 9 . . . 193
6, 31 . . . . . 200 17 3 . . • 114
10, 29-31 . . . ' 54 17 3 . . • 236
10, 39 . . . . 36 17 11 . • 170
16, 25 . . . . 379 17 14 . • 170
Mark 8, 3 6 ......... . 36 17 15-16 • 65
9, 1 .......... . 218 17 21 . • 354
10 , 5 ......... . 251 20 31 . • 236
Luke 14 , 2 6 ......... . 379 20 31 . • 354
15 , 1 7 ......... . 36 Acts 16, 30 • 299
John 1, 5 .......... . 79 Romans 1 5 • 349
1, 7 .......... . 354 1 20 • 169
1, 1 0 ........ . 89 1 25 • 88
1, 1 4 ........ . 192 1 28 • 111
1, 1 4 ........ . 320 1 32 • 212
3f1 1 6 ......... . 236 2 15 • 259
5, 24.......... . 236 2 17 ff ♦ 186
6, 3 3 ........ . 236 3 6 • 170
6, 35 . ...... . 236 3 23 • 49
6, 6 3 ........ . 236 3 23 • 191
6, 68 . . . . . . 394 3 28 • 268
7, 4 2 ........ . 138 4 25 • 314
8, 1 2 ........ . 138 5 12- 19* • 191
8, 3 2 ........ . 79 6 2-5 • • 314
Romans (cont.)
I Corinthians
6, 4 . . . 400 I Cor. (co#t,) 9 27 • 152
6, 6 . . . 68 10 26 ' , 87
6, 12 . . 69 12 8 . • 349
6, 12 ff . 71 12 13 * 401
6, 18 . . 363 13 12 • 427
6, 23 . . 212 13 13 # 368
7, 5 . . . 212 15 3-4 314
7, 10 . . 190 15 5-8 • 324
7, 11 . . 213 15 10 • 267
7, 14 . . 215 15 17 • 324
7, 17 . . 190 15 35 ff 69
7, 18 . . 184 15 44 74
7, 22-23 . 151 T  -r 15 54 • 224
7, 23 . . 111 II Cor. 1, 17 . •  • 0 183
7, 24 . . 71 3, 17 . •  • 0 356
8, 2 . . . 365 4, 4 . •  • 0 170
8, 4 . . . 237 4, 8-9 • • 0 152
8, 5 .  .  . 183 4, 18 . • • 0 238
8, 6 .  .  . 238 4, 18 . • • 0 366
8, 9 .  .  . 182 5, 17 . •  • 0 226
8, 12 . . 184 5, 19 . • • • 320
8, 22 . . 87 5, 20 . • • • 395
8, 28 . . 152 8, 9 . • • • 315
8, 31 . . J 152 10, 2 . • + • 183
8, 38-39 . 365 12, 2 . • • • 70
10 , 14-15 394 12, 7 . • • 0 182
10, 17 . . 346 13, 14 • • • 374
10, 17 . . 394 G-alatians 1, 12 • • • 137
12 , 1 . . 71 1, 11-17 . • 137
12 , 2 . . 111 1, 16 • • 0 182
14 , 12 . . 265 2, 20 • • 0 182
15 , 13 . . 366 2, 20 • • 0 318
19-31 . 186 2, 20 • • 0 345
1, 30 . . . 170 3, 13-14 . 0 318
2, 9 . . . 77 3, 24 • • 0 259
2, 12 . . . 170 3, 28 • • 0 374
3, 21-22 . 170 4, 18 • • 0 182
8 9 8 . . . . 70 5, 13 • • 0 361
6, 13 . . . . 68 5, 16 • • 0 185
8, 19 . . . . 68 5, 18 0 361
7, 22 . . . .359 5, 22 0 0 0 375
7, 29-31 . 238 Ephesians 2, 1 0 0 0 213
7, 32-33 . 201 Philippians 1, 9 0 0 0 350
8, 7 . . . 260 2, 9-11 . 0 301
9, 27 . . . 71 3, 8-10 . 0 347
Phil, (cont.) 4, 6 . . . 201 I John 1, 3 . . . . .374
Golossians 2,. 12......  400 3, 14 . . . .  213
I Thess. 4, 1 5 ...... 218 3, 14 . . . .  217
I Thess. 5, 23   9 3, 14 . . .  . 368
Hebrews 4, 12   397 4, 10 . . . .  371
11, 3 ...... 107
11, 1 3 ...... 120
12, 1-2 . . . .  364
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